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The fear of China comes from a neocolonial desire – such rhetoric is made to produce an economy of fear causing ontological death

Chengxin Pan, 2012, “Knowledge, Desire and Power in Global Politics,” Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc., pg. 66-69, Pan is the Associate Professor of International Relations at Deakin University. ZKMSU

The twin paradigms of China threat and China opportunity are animated by Western/American neocolonial desire. Their constructions of self and Other are not merely discursive in nature, but have political and strategic consequences. Rather than divorced from power, they are always in the service of power and at the same time (re)produced by it through the political economies of fear and fantasy. How knowledge, desire, and power interact in the cases of these China paradigms will be the focus of Chapters 4-7. Thus far, scholarly analysis of Western representations of China has tended to treat those representations merely as knowledge, which is then empirically evaluated against so-called ‘objective facts’ in China. Depending on whether they are thought to match Chinese reality or not, they are labelled either ‘truth’, ‘misrepresentations’, or something in between. But this empirically-grounded approach misses a crucial point. That is, it leaves intact and unquestioned the complicity of China knowledge in power relations. What is needed, therefore, is a critical examination of the power/knowledge nexus in the two modes of China representation. How the ‘China threat’ paradigm relates to the political economy of fear and informs political practice is the focus of this and the following chapter. And Chapters 6 and 7 will deal with the ‘China opportunity’ paradigm. To better understand the dynamics of power/knowledge/desire in the ‘China threat’ paradigm, we need to recognise this paradigm for what I think it is, namely, a particular form of desire—fear—disguised as certain knowledge. Fear, it may be argued, is primarily a biological instinct inherent in probably all animals that are both capable of fear and have experienced such an emotion. And yet, in the human context at least, fear is as much a sociocultural phenomenon as it is a natural, biological reflex. This is because most forms of fear in modern society are not experienced directly through actual physical encounters, but rather are created, mediated, maintained and reinforced through often-institutionalised knowledge resources such as images, symbols, metaphors and, above all, discourses. Sometimes referred to as ‘prevailing danger codes’, those knowledge resources serve as ‘an extremely dense layer of mediation between what one might be advised to fear… and what one’s moment-to-moment experience appears to be’.3 In a study of the politics of fear in the media, David Altheide argues that fear ‘did not just happen or emerge’ from uncertainty, the lack of community or a sense of lack of control over our lives; rather, it is largely produced and reproduced through ‘the entertainment formats of mass media and popular culture’. Only through coming to grips with this culturally-mediated dimension of fear, can we better understand why one’s sense of fear is often not directly or proportionally linked to the object of that fear. 4 In fact, quite often the opposite is true. For instance, Altheide points to the paradox that ‘there is widespread public perception [in the West] that risk and danger are everywhere, that we are not safe, and that the future is bleak’, even though most in Western societies ‘are safer, healthier, living longer, and more secure in their environments than virtually any population in history’.5 How is such a strange ‘surplus’ of fear produced and consumed in an otherwise reasonably safe and wealthy society? Michael Shapiro suggests that the increased level of popular representation in the political process has not been matched by a similar increase in people’s ability to represent safety and danger as they find them in their daily lives. 6 Rather, just as more and more supermarket products nowadays are no longer made locally, so too the ‘commodity’ of fear is increasingly outsourced from elsewhere, manufactured and packaged as knowledge by all sorts of security, intelligence, health and environment experts. And just as consumers part company with their money in exchange for whatever fantasies are evoked by commercial advertisements, consumers of fear surrender their power to scaremongering experts and political leaders, in exchange for the promised certainty and security. In return, through their knowledge of danger and threat, those experts and politicians gain trust, power, and the ability to influence others to behave in ways that meet their expectations. In this way, whatever form of knowledge that can effectively tap into fear and constantly reproduce it is, without doubt, ideally placed to serve power and enforce discipline. Little wonder that the discursive production of fear and threat has been a fixture in modern-day politics. In Australia, no recent federal elections were complete without some forms of politics of fear at play in the political campaigns, be it about ‘boat people’, terrorism, workers’ rights or even interest rates. Of course, fear is not always an undesirable element in politics and social life. Moïse argues that ‘an element of fear is an indispensable protection against the danger of overconfidence. Fear is a force for survival in a naturally dangerous world’.7 The ‘China threat’ paradigm should be understood in this broad context. This paradigm does not reflect a pre-existing sense of fear about a menace ‘out there’, but rather is a discursive site where such fear is first constructed and where a particular form of political economy of fear emerges. With a specific focus on the US, this chapter will examine how the China threat knowledge, which gives the popular fear of China an aura of objective credibility, serves the political and economic interests of the power elite, and is at the same time shaped by those interests. However, when fear is systematically deployed in politics, it is worth asking whose interests this fear politics intends to serve and how such fear is produced and for what purposes. THE CHINA THREAT AND AMERICAN POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FEAR The political economy of fear has been a much-cherished ingredient in statecraft for millennia. ‘Let them hate as long as they fear’, the Roman emperor Caligula once proclaimed. ‘[I]t is far better to be feared than loved if you cannot be both’, admonished Machiavelli in The Prince. 8 Thus, Robert Higgs argues that fear is a foundation of every government’s power: ‘Without popular fear, no government could endure for more than twenty-four hours’.9 While the state has traditionally relied on such visible instruments of fear as the army, the police, the legal system, and the prison to maintain discipline in a society, it has also resorted to a less visible instrument: the discursive production of fear. One particularly fertile ground for such fearrelated knowledge production has been the realm of international relations, where the objects of fear appear plentiful. The French political philosopher Jean Bodin observed that ‘the best way of preserving a state, and guaranteeing it against sedition, rebellion, and civil war is… to find an enemy against whom they can make common cause’.10 Similarly, Adam Smith examined in The Wealth of Nations how a government could use the nation’s anxiety for security to induce its citizens to agree to a new tax which otherwise they would probably resent.11 It is in this context that the fear of the China threat has been a recurring feature in American politics in general and during the presidential and congressional midterm elections in particular. During the 2010 midterm elections, for instance, New York Times reported that in a space of just one week, at least 29 candidates from both sides of politics unveiled advertisements accusing their opponents of being soft on China, with the undertone that China had been the chief villain for current American economic woes. Such is the political economic use of fear especially when it is disguised as scientific knowledge.

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