Prior commitment to Chinese threat perception makes their impacts inevitable –commitments to war collapse chances at peace
Chengxin Pan, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Faculty of Arts, at Deakin University, August 2004, Discourses Of ‘China’ In International Relations: A Study in Western Theory as (IR) Practice, p. 141-142
These are some of the questions in the minds of Western/American strategic analysts, who are wondering how to maintain U.S. preponderance in a world of anarchy and uncertainty. The conservative realist Samuel Huntington asks: “If being an American means being committed to the principles of liberty, democracy, individualism, and private property, and if there is no evil empire out there threatening those principles, what indeed does it mean to be an American, and what becomes of American national interests?” Obsessed with this self-imagery, many scholars and policy planners have been keen to reinvoke the timeless, structural certainty of geopolitical rivalry, and to embrace the ‘back to the future’ scenario, maintaining that despite the dawn of the post-Cold War period little has changed—the world remains a dangerous, volatile place. With such searching eyes for an enemy, it would be surprising if China failed to come into view. Indeed, China makes a perfect candidate, in that “China remains the major source of uncertainty in the Asia-Pacific.” That is, not only do the implications of its economic transformation and military ambition remain unclear, but the resilience of the Communist government even after its roundly condemned Tiananmen suppression seems also to fly in the face of the ‘End of History’ triumphalism. Consequently, (and before September 11), the only major certainty coming out of the post-Cold War era seems to be an unpredictable and dangerous China. From the beginning, this ‘China threat,’ I suggest, is not a result of its actual challenge to the West or the United States per se, but primarily a discursive dimension of the neorealist construction of the American self in terms of global supremacy and indispensable leadership. As Huntington makes it clear, “Chinese hegemony will reduce American and Western influence [in Asia] and compel the United States to accept what it has historically attempted to prevent: domination of a key region of the world by another power.” In the absence of such self-fashioning, most of China’s neighbours, which might arguably be more vulnerable to a China threat if there is one, have traditionally adopted a much less alarmist view on the ‘Middle Kingdom.’ Thus, China’s real challenge for America, as Yu Bin notes, “is perhaps more psychological and conceptual—that is, how to deal with a major power whose rise is not necessarily guided by Washington, unlike the post-World War II rise of Japan and Germany.” Also, it can be argued that the existence of an ‘enemy’ is indispensable to the continued imagination of the ‘indispensable nation.’ In Charles Frazier’s novel Cold Mountain, Inman, a soldier returning home from battle during the American Civil War, pondered the question: “What is the cost of not having an enemy?” Such a cost, then, seems very high indeed, for at stake here is what is seen as the ‘fundamental’ modern Western/American self-identity as a (global) rational being and indispensable leader. Heroic leadership would not be so needed if there was little left to fight for. Clearly mindful of this, Georgi Arbatov, Director of Moscow’s Institute for the Study of the USA and Canada, told a U.S. audience the year before the collapse of the Berlin Wall: “We are going to do something terrible to you—we are going to deprive you of an enemy.” While he correctly noted that for the U.S. to live without an identity-defining enemy is terrible indeed, Arbatov was only half right, for the ‘enemy’ itself often has no control over its status as an enemy. Rather, as noted before, it is primarily a ready-made discursive category built into the American self-imagination. With this discursive category as the analytical framework for understanding other actors on the world stage, Western and particularly American scholars did not simply ‘discover’ a China threat out there; it was cognitively constructed beforehand.