Free beta access. 5 free AI tokens each week. Optional top-ups available. See what is included
Opening Word document…

The affirmatives democratic rhetoric gives the false illusion of peace - it causes mobilization against anything as long as it is labeled totalitarian

Mark Neocleous, Professor of Critique of Political Economy @ Brunel University (UK), editorial of Radical Philosophy, 2008 (“Critique of Security.” PG(s). (115-117)

One of the ways this fear was put to work and the citizenry ‘aroused’ was through the elision of the differences between war and peace. The movers and shakers in the US state claimed that, in theory at least, democracies generally separate peace from war as distinct periods and processes, and that this distinction tends to be obliterated but ‘totalitarian’ regimes. And yet they also claimed that since we lived in an age of ‘permanent antagonism and conflict’ (with ‘no lasting abatement of the crisis’), as the NSC-68 put it-‘the smaller the gap between peacetime and wartime purposes, the greater [is] the likely-hood that a successful military effort will be politically successful as well’. NSC-20/1 noted that ‘a democracy cannot effect, as the totalitarian state sometimes does, a complete identification of its peacetime and war time objectives’, but nonetheless suggested that the US needed to ‘reduce as far as possible the gap between them’. Indeed, one Policy Planning Staff Memo of May 1948 suggested that liberal democracies had been ‘handicapped’ by ‘attachment to the concept of a basic difference between peace and war’ and claimed that what was needed was the idea of ‘political warfare’ as ‘the logical application Clausewitz in time of peace’. NSC-20/1 thus cited Clausewitz’s claim that ‘war is a continuation of policy, intermingled with other means’. The intent was clar: ‘the basic objective outlines…is one which would be valid for peace as well as fro war’. Or as NSC-68 put it: the objectives of a society are equally valid and necessary for peace as well as for war’, and they are so because the challenge of security is one ‘whicch encompasses noth peace and war’. Hence it is ‘essential that this government formulate general objectives which are capable of sustained pursuit both in times of peace and in the event of war’. In other words, since the enemy is as much within as without, and since the objectives, fears, and insecurities running through the body politic are present in times of both peace and war, the distinction between the two is, in essence obliterated. War and politics become a unity, and ‘political warfare’ is set in place mobilizing ‘all the means at a nation’s command’. In this sense, the national security state sought to legitimize the exercise of war powers during periods of peace by transforming the concept of ‘peace’ as applied to liberal democracy. ‘Such as peace as the United States is experiencing is not a peace; it is in fact a war’. This transformation was effected through the notion of security, especially in its ideological circuit with emergency. Herein lies a further reason to explain the emergence of ‘national security’ rather than ‘national defense’ beyond that discussed at the beginning of Chapter 3. As Eyal Weizman has noted, the logic of ‘defence’ deals with war and seeks to constitute with borders and barriers a clear distinction between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’, between the territory within the state and that which is exterior to it. The logic of ‘security’, on the other hand , presupposes that the danger is already inside, presented by a population in which the subverive elements exist…If defence engages directly with the concept of war, security engages with the temporarily ill-defined and spatially amorphous ‘conflict’ not only between societies, but within them as well. Eliding the distinction between military practice and the everyday political administration of civil society thereby helps in ‘securing’ a general willingness among the citizenry to submit to wartime disciline and emergency powers on a permanent basis.

Sign in to recut, update, or save this card.