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Cold War perceptions of Russian decision making perpetuates conflict – casual relations spur escalation

RICHARD SAKWA, expert in the field of Russian and Eastern European communist and post-communist politics, Professor of Russian and European politics at the University of Kent, 2008, “‘New Cold War’ or twenty years’ crisis? Russia and international politics” International Affairs, PDF , KENTUCKY

Cold war redux? Nearly two decades since the Cold War was transcended by the Soviet Union’s refusal to play the game any more,44 why has the rhetoric of the Cold War resur- faced? Nuclear sabres are once again being rattled, and the lines of a new global struggle for geopolitical advantage are beginning to emerge. This, however, would be a very peculiar new Cold War, since no fundamental interests divide the two former superpowers (one has been reduced to great power status, while the other has become a hyperpower). There are no fundamental ideological contradictions, direct conflicts over resources or major differences over the substantive issues that face the international community. Indeed, in some ways Russia could have become the natural ally of America and the EU on a range of questions. So why have the differences become so sharp, and why has the whole architecture of post-commu- nist security arrangements been brought into question? In a rather schematic manner below I will suggest that there have been four major failures in adjusting policy to the new circumstances: political, strategic, intellectual and cultural. The key question is: How can we find our bearings in what we had assumed would be the post-Cold War era, to ensure that it is indeed the end of this particular global confrontation? The political failure There has been a profound asymmetry in the transcendence of the Cold War. While the structures that fought the Cold War (including the ideological ones) were dismantled on the one side, they were retained on the other. The functions of bodies such as NATO have not been replaced by a common collective security regime, but instead have been strengthened and enlarged. Russia’s early enthu- siasm for the OSCE reflected the aspiration to create a genuine common security regime, but failed to take into account the asymmetrical end to the Cold War. The same applies to the ‘softer’ Cold War structures, including the whole ideological- security apparatus. These are active in Washington and London, but in a different way no less alive in Moscow, and have been the easiest structures to revive in a renewed period of confrontation. The asymmetrical transcendence of the Cold War is accompanied by an internal asymmetry at the heart of Russian politics. Russia renounced its claims to the ideological leadership of an alternative system to the world capitalist order and the geopolitical leadership of an alternative military and political bloc, but it did not renounce its civilizational identity or its aspirations to participate in global leadership. The external asymmetry allowed one side of the old Cold War conflict to claim the right to oversee the transformation of the other; and while this was at first welcomed in Russia, it increasingly came to be resented and exacerbated the tensions within the internal asymmetry. While the neo-conservatives in Washington stressed the imperial and global role that the promotion of democratic values should play, Moscow began to reassert an aggressive autonomy in interna- tional affairs, insisting on the sovereign right of each country, if not to claim a Sonderweg, then at least to choose its own path and to define democracy as it saw fit: the new ideology of ‘sovereign democracy’ that came to the fore after Ukraine’s ‘Orange’ revolution in late 2004.45 The fundamental failure in the post-Cold War era has been to find ways to compensate for the twofold asymmetry. Even the recognition of the problem—that Russia could not easily be categorized as just another ‘post-communist’ country— was a long time coming. The general difficulty of adjusting the international system to the end of the bloc politics and hegemonic aspirations that were characteristic of the Cold War has still not been resolved. The key challenge after the dissolution of communist power in 1989–91, the winding-up of the Warsaw Pact in 1990 and the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, was how to insert Russia into the new global order. This would have been relatively easy if Russia had been a defeated power (like Germany and Japan after 1945), but proved much harder to do on its own terms, as an endlessly proclaimed ‘great power’. As early as the December 1992 meeting of what was still the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) Kozyrev warned of the onset of a ‘new Cold War’, and such warnings have sounded regularly since then. The legitimacy of Russia’s ambition to be a great power, even a ‘normal’ one, has been questioned, even more than Britain’s and France’s aspirations in this respect. The major difference, of course, is that Russia’s readjusted role has been accompanied by a profound change in its internal political order, a process that is far from over. Grave issues of international politics have become interwoven into a constant regime of inspection over how Russia is doing internally.46 This asymmetry has been effectively exploited by the opposition in Russia. Domestic political actors soon learnt that easy political capital could be made by working the international circuit, condemning the latest alleged malfeasance by Russia’s rulers.47 Some of Russia’s neighbours learned the rules of this game only too well, and fed a constant stream of anti-Russian material to receptive ears on Capitol Hill and elsewhere.48 This then fed back into profoundly misinformed statements about developments in Russia and its policies, which in turn provoked Russian reactions that only deepened distrust and exacerbated suspicions about policy motivations.49 Thus all sides entered into a deeply negative spiral of mutual suspicion that gradually hardened into abuse which in turn gave way to threats and counterthreats. Russian domestic struggles were projected onto interstate rivalries. Indeed, the scholar Dmitry Furman argued that ‘There is only one opposition to Putin at present—other countries.’50 At the same time, America’s ideological wars for and against various abstractions—against terror and authoritarian capitalism, and for ‘global freedom’ and the like—affect specific countries, not least Russia.51 The net result is that the security of Europe and the world today is facing the gravest threat to peace since the end of the bloc politics of the Cold War. In some ways the threat is even greater, since the earlier confrontation had devised rules and stable expectations about how the conflict would be managed. Cold War conflict management procedures have been dismantled, while elements of the conflict have re-emerged in a far more anarchic context. Indeed, the political failure in the early 1990s, and once again in the early 2000s, to build on the evident desire of Russia to move beyond the Cold War, and to create new organizations that could provide common institutional mechanisms to solidify what was by any reckoning an epochal shift in global politics, allowed old institutions and ways of thinking to reassert themselves. Integration within the framework of the EU was not accompanied by an inclusive pan-European unifi- cation process. In Moscow the representatives of the old bloc mentality are now certainly in evidence once again, and their views are encouraged by their counter- parts in the West. Sergei Karaganov, director of the Council for Foreign and Defence Policy (CFDP), argues that this is evidence that a ‘new epoch of confron- tation (NEC)’ is beginning. Even in the 1990s ‘any attempt by Russia to stop the panicked retreat produced by the disintegration of the USSR was declared to be “neo-imperialism”’, to the point that today ‘the oversimplification of criticism on some parameters is even worse than in the Cold War … Any critic or opponent of the Russian president and the Kremlin automatically becomes a democrat and friend of the West.’ Europe’s failure to act as an autonomous power and the inten- sified rivalry between ‘the traditional West and the energy-producing countries for control of energy resources’ mean that Russia ‘has been forced by history into the centre of a new competitive struggle between the liberal-democratic and authoritarian models of capitalism’.52 A report issued to mark the 15th anniversary of the CFDP on 16 March 2007 talked about a global ‘crisis of manageability’, in which no single power centre on its own could manage the crisis engendered by the growing number of failed and failing states.53

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