The case is a lie – terrorism truths are produced by fearmongering and faulty knowledge of the Other
Spencer, 8 – Lecturer in International Relations @ Ludwig-Maximilians-University, Munich (Alexander, and Rainer Hülsse, Assistant Professor of International Relations @ Ludwig-Maximilians-University, “The Metaphor of Terror: Terrorism Studies and the Constructivist Turn,” Security Dialogue vol. 39, no. 6, December)
In any case, most of what has been written on Al-Qaeda is based neither on interviews nor on field research conducted inside the organization. Rather, it builds on less-direct information – it is ‘veranda terrorism research’. Among the sources used are already existing studies of Al-Qaeda, media information and intelligence reports. Obviously, this leads to a rather incestuous field of knowledge, where one scholar reproduces the unverified views of another and thus contributes to the circulation of the ever-same ‘facts’ (Reid, 1993). This is hardly a new insight about terrorism research, however. Back in 1988, one review found that ‘there are probably few areas in the social science literature in which so much is written on the basis of so little research’ (Schmid & Jongman, 1988: 177). Another remarked that ‘with a few clusters of exception there is, in fact, a disturbing lack of good empirically-grounded research on terrorism’ (Gurr, 1988: 2). These findings have been subsequently confirmed – and deplored – on numerous occasions (e.g. Merari, 1991; Silke, 2001, 2004; Horgan, 2004; Schulze, 2004; Ranstorp, 2007). Obviously, this lack of primary research further aggravates the problem identified above, as it adds another layer of interpretation. Studies of this kind which predominantly use secondary information are interpretations of how others (e.g. intelligence staff or field-researching terrorism scholars) have interpreted Al- Qaeda members’ self-interpretation. And yet, despite these various filters, information in such studies is presented as though it provided objective accounts of the reality about Al-Qaeda. This is particularly true for work that draws on intelligence reports and treats them as though they were primary sources (e.g. Burke, 2003; Gunaratna, 2002; Jacquard, 2001; Koch, 2005; Reeve, 1999). Yet, even if an intelligence report is based on successful infiltration, it provides not a description but an interpretation of Al-Qaeda.