1AC links swamp the perm---all our arguments prove they instill a cognitive dissonance about the true state of security
Inan 4—dr. A. (Annette) Freyberg Inan Associate Professor, the Director of the Master's Program in Political Science, Univ of Amsterdam, PhD in Political Science at the University of Georgia, USA. Her MA degrees in Political Science and English were obtained at the University of Stuttgart in her native Germany. Editorial Board Member: International Studies Review, Globalizations Journal, Advisory Board Member: Millennium, What Moves Man: The Realist Theory of International Relations and Its Judgment of Human Nature 2004
Cognitive approaches concede that real-life decision makers cannot comply with the expectation of full rationality. Instead, political decision makers adopt a number of strategies to deal with the limitations imposed on them by their cognitive capabilities. It is important to remember that such strategies are, to a certain extent, necessary and unavoidable. They facilitate information processing and enable actors to make decisions. However, they may also lead to misperception and error. A number of processes are particularly relevant. The study of problem solving has proven the need to pay attention to actors’ definitions of the problem.51 Studies of the limitations of memory have drawn attention to the problem of information overload in both problem solving and decision making. Most important, the development of the concepts of ‘cognitive dissonance’ versus ‘cognitive consistency’ by Leon Festinger and Fritz Heider in the 1950s and 1960s has served to emphasize the need for stability in beliefs and perceptions, while at the same time alerting us to the costs of such stabilit y: “misperception and biased interpretation, with individuals using denial, bolstering, or other mechanisms to maintain their beliefs.”52 According to Robert Art and Robert Jervis, “[P]eople simplify their processing of complex information by permitting their established frameworks of beliefs to guide them. They can then assimilate incoming information to what they already believe.”53 Thus there exists “a tendency for people to assimilate incoming information into their pre-existing images.” 54 This tendency is explained by psychological theor y as part of a strategy to avoid cognitive dissonance. There is little to stop this tendency, because “information is usually ambiguous enough so that people can see it as consistent with the views that they already hold.”55 Voss and Dorsey observe that “individuals build mental representations of the world and . . . such representations provide coherence and stability to their interpretations of the complexities of the environment.”56 So-called image theory studies the role played in the decision-making process by such interpretive “blueprints,” which have been variously called “images,” “schemata,” “scripts,” or “mental models.”57 The concept of “image,” which is most commonly used in foreign policy analysis, captures the notion of a schema, which is more popular in cognitive psychology. In the 1950s, Kenneth Boulding defined the term image as “the total cognitive, affective, and evaluative structure of the behavioral unit, or its internal view of itself and its universe.”58 He argued that “the images which are important in international systems are those which a nation has of itself and of those other bodies in the system which constitute its international environment.”59 Images can introduce misperception and error into the decision-making process, especially if they function as stereotypes. Stereot ypes can be defined as “images that are assumed to have attributes that characterize all elements of a particular group.”60 The role of stereotypical images, such as the “enemy image,” has been explored by authors such as Ole Holsti, Richard Cottam, or David Finlay and his colleagues. 61 Such studies find that stereot yping generally leads to “over-generalization, that is, erroneously attributing characteristics to a particular countr y that may not have one or more of the given characteristics. The countries are thus not sufficiently differentiated.”62 According to Holsti, “[T]he relationship of national images to international conf lict is clear: decision-makers act upon their definition of the situation and their images of states—others as well as their own. These images are in turn dependent upon the decision-maker’s belief system, and these may or may not be accurate representations of ‘reality.’”63 The impact of stereot ypical national images in policy making was particularly obvious during the Cold War, when Boulding referred to them as “the last great stronghold of unsophistication” in international politics, observing that “nations are divided into ‘good’ and ‘bad’—the enemy is all bad, one’s own nation is of spotless virtue.”64 The bipolar system was commonly characterized as a “closed” one, in which “perceptions of low hostilit y are self-liquidating and perceptions of high hostilit y are self-fulfilling.”65 This is because both sides continue to interpret new information in ways that help preserve the enemy image, even if such information is meant to constitute a conciliatory gesture. Closed systems suffer from the dangerous problem of distorted “mirror images.” Urie Bronfenbrenner explains: Herein lies the terrible danger of the distorted mirror image, for it is characteristic of such images that they are self-confirming; that is, each part y, often against its own wishes, is increasingly driven to behave in a manner which fulfills the expectations of the other. . . . [The mirror image] impels each nation to act in a manner which confirms and enhances the fear of the other to the point that even deliberate efforts to reverse the process are reinterpreted as evidence of confirmation.66 (128-130)