No solvency for dual use biotech regulation – information asymmetry turns the aff
Yang Xue 1,2, Hanzhi Yu 3,* and Geng Qin 3, 12-20-2021, 1 Law School, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China; 2 Center for Biosafety Research and Strategy, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China 3 School of Public Affairs, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou 310058, China; https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/13/24/14056/htm, "Towards Good Governance on Dual-Use Biotechnology for Global Sustainable Development," Sustainability Volume 13 Issue 24 10.3390/su132414056 (ermo/sms, Acc:6-22-2022)
2.1. Predicament 1: The Information Asymmetry Risk of Dual-Use Biotechnology Keeps the
Traditional Self-Governance Model in the Field of Biotechnology from Playing Its Role In contrast to the field of nuclear technology, in the biological sciences, the autonomy of stakeholders is important [30]. The biotechnology industry has a long tradition of self-governance, and there are many historical success stories. However, the information asymmetry risk of dual-use biotechnology has caused problems for the traditional model of industry self-governance.
Dual-use risks of biotechnology show obvious characteristics of information asymmetry. Since the research and development environment and application scenario of dual-use biotechnology are concealed, anonymous and opaque, the public may not be able to ac- quire enough information about the dual-use risk of biotechnology. The two hidden risks of information asymmetry are as follows. The research of scientists who have mastered dual-use biotechnology cannot be monitored effectively by the institutions with which they are affiliated. This could pose risks to national biosafety and public safety. Moreover, is difficult to supervise the application of dual-use biotechnology in the early stages of disease diagnosis and treatment, as well as drug research and development. In response to these information asymmetry risks, professionals in the life sciences have always emphasized enhancing professional internal supervision mechanisms, but this may worsen information asymmetry. Researchers concerned with dual-use biotechnology acquire their professional skills in a closed environment, at scientific conferences, under the guidance of risk or ethics expert committees, and peer review of papers submitted for publication. All of these have formed an enclosed internal supervision mechanism for research, training and practice. These monitoring mechanisms determine that the identification and judgment of dual-use risks of biotechnology depend on the expert group from within the system, which may have some negative effects. For example, the internal standards and operational mechanisms within the scientific community may exclude the concerns, doubts and interventions of the government and the public. Even the judicial system, as a third party with traditional punitive capability, should rely on the judgment standards and operational systems established by the life science community in resolving legal disputes caused by the misuse of dual-use biotechnology.
Furthermore, biotechnology implementers who tend to be self-governing within the industry will resort to information asymmetry to deliberately resist the design of the public power system, which exacerbates the dual-use risks of biotechnology. Some biological scientists reject the top-down public power supervision system, which is most obvious in the field of synthetic biology research. Some technical experts in this field believe that supervision by public authorities can’t keep up with the pace of technological change, and that the bottom-up industry self-regulation is superior to the traditional “hard law” in terms of time cost, and will be less likely to be resisted by practitioners [31]. However, bottom-up industry self-regulation, or other self-regulation modes, have failed to regulate the malicious abuse of the synthetic technology of known pathogenic viruses. It is also difficult for such self-regulation models to accommodate the greater risks caused by the creation of synthetic organisms based on standardized component methods. In addition, excessive reliance on industry self-regulation will easily lead to the public’s misunderstanding of biotechnology development. Thus, the public may tend to believe that biotechnology development will undermine social consensus on biotechnology development and restrict the sustained and rapid progress of biotechnology if scientists assume certain technological risks after taking internal decisions to lift restrictions in some areas of research without having arrived and an informed consensus with the public. The public can do nothing except express doubt in the technology once such risks arise.
The He Jiankui incident of 2018 was an international controversy for two reasons. He violated institutional and international research regulations when he applied CRISPERCas9 gene editing technology to editing human embryos, and he conducted his experiments while claiming to be working on a cure for AIDS. As the public expects diseases to be cured and people to live longer, the internal private domain in life sciences will contradict public opinions on safety risk management and control. In a larger sense, different stakeholders have different understandings of and demands for the risks of dual-use biotechnology among biological scientists, social science experts, industries, media and the public.