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Direct “dual use biotech” fails – 22 agents/models are key – aff will miss some

Yang Xue 1,2, Hanzhi Yu 3,* and Geng Qin 3, 12-20-2021, 1 Law School, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China; 2 Center for Biosafety Research and Strategy, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China 3 School of Public Affairs, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou 310058, China; https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/13/24/14056/htm, "Towards Good Governance on Dual-Use Biotechnology for Global Sustainable Development," Sustainability Volume 13 Issue 24 10.3390/su132414056 (ermo/sms, Acc:6-22-2022)

In the military field, “dual-use” biotechnology refers to both civilian and military technology [1]. In the civilian field, it refers to a legitimate scientific purpose that yields information or technologies that may be misused to pose a threat to public health or other aspects of national security [2]. Dual-use biotechnology has benefits (such as promoting scientific progress or improving public health) but also has the potential for malicious abuse or misuse (such as bioterrorism). At present, internationally recognized dual-use biotechnology consists of technology used for acquiring new types of biological or molecular materials (combinatorial chemistry and high throughput screening, DNA shuffling, and directed evolution), directed design technologies (protein engineering, virus genome synthesis, standardization in synthetic biology), technologies for manipulating biological systems (development of psychoactive drugs, synthesis of peptide bioregulators, immune regulation, personal genomics, RNA interference, transcranial magnetic stimulation), and technologies for the packaging and delivery (chemical micro-processing equipment, gene therapy, aerosol vaccine). Tucker lists three characteristics of dual-use: (1) its technical attributes, including availability, abuse susceptibility and potential harm caused by abuse; (2) its controllability, including concretization (the materialization of technology), maturity, convergence, development speed and international diffusion; and (3) the reducibility to the state, institutional, individual, product and knowledge levels [3]. However, due to its ubiquity, it is difficult to manage the risks of all dual-use biotechnologies. Therefore, NSABB has adopted a strategy of determining a limited scope of knowledge, products or technologies produced by life science research that is most likely to be misused to threaten national biosafety. This part of research is referred to as “dual-use research concerns”, and encompasses 15 key biological agents or toxins and seven types of dual-use research [4].

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