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Unilateral and global mechanisms mitigate dual use biotech risks

Yang Xue 1,2, Hanzhi Yu 3,* and Geng Qin 3, 12-20-2021, 1 Law School, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China; 2 Center for Biosafety Research and Strategy, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China 3 School of Public Affairs, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou 310058, China; https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/13/24/14056/htm, "Towards Good Governance on Dual-Use Biotechnology for Global Sustainable Development," Sustainability Volume 13 Issue 24 10.3390/su132414056 (ermo/sms, Acc:6-22-2022)

By the end of the 20th century, all countries had begun to pay attention to the four risks caused by dual-use biotechnology. In “Biotechnology, Weapons, and Humanity” (1999), the British Medical Association, for the first time in its history, expressed concern about the malicious abuse of genetic engineering, biotechnology and other emerging technologies, and suggested that social supervision should be strengthened and moral standards be established within the sciences to prevent the exacerbation of potential risks. In 2002, the Chinese government promulgated the “Regulations on Export Control of Dual-use Biological Products and Related Equipment and Technologies” to restrict the export of dual-use biological products and related equipment and technologies, to prevent them from being used to manufacture biological weapons [16]. In 2003, the National Academy of Sciences of the United States released a report, “Biotechnology Research in the Era of Terrorism” (the Fink Report), a pioneering document of the research into national security risks in the field of life science. The Fink Report identified seven types of biological experiments with dual-use risks, including microbiology and molecular biology experiments, which require safety inspections before project approval and funding [17]. To this end, the U.S. government set up a federal advisory committee under the National Biosafety Scientific Advisory Committee, which took charge of formulating policies and recommendations on dual-use research concerns (DURC) in life science research [2]. In 2004, the World Health Organization (WHO) announced that “every major new technology can be used not only for peaceful purposes, but also for hostile purposes. To tackle the common security challenges to all mankind, we should put the protection of biotechnology from being maliciously used above the security interests of all countries.” In 2009, the European Union passed Regulation No. 428/2009, which listed the controlled goods subject to export restrictions and licenses, including dual-use biological materials and production equipment [18]. In the same year, the Federation of American Societies for Experimental Biology (FASEB) warned that “scientists who educate their research on potential dual-use shall pay more attention to taking necessary safety control measures” [19].

Since 2011, countries have paid more attention to the dual-use of biotechnology. After the research results on genetic modification of H5N1, the highly pathogenic avian influenza virus published in “Nature” in September 2011 triggered global controversy. The United States issued several regulatory policies concerning dual-use biotechnology, including the “Regulatory Policy on Dual-use Life Science Research of the U.S. Government” (2012) by the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB), and the “Regulatory Policy of Dual-Purpose Research Institutions in Life Sciences of the U.S. Government” (2013) by Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) [20]. In 2014, NSABB halted research on the Gain of Function of highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1, severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) and middle east respiratory syndrome (MERS) viruses, and required all independent and federal research institutions to strictly abide by the “Dual-use Research of Concern” (DURC) from 24 September 2015, and established a special entity review body, the IRE. In 2015, the U.S. government established the “Institutional Regulatory Policy Concerning Dual-use Research in Life Sciences” [21]. In 2018, the U.S. government issued a “National Biodefense Strategy,” and the National Academy of Sciences of the United States released the report “Biodefense in the Age of Synthetic Biology”, which emphasized the imminent threat of synthetic biotechnology being used as a virus weapon for terrorist activities by biohackers [22]. In 2017, the Chinese government issued “Safety Management Measures for Biotechnology Research and Development” to impose special control measures for biotechnology research and development activities with high risks of causing serious diseases in humans or animals [23].

While strengthening supervision at home, some countries have begun to mitigate the dual-use risks of biotechnology on international governance platforms. In 2016, the United States and Britain submitted Working Papers No. 10, No. 14, and No. 17 to the General Assembly at the Eighth Review Conference of the States Parties to the BWC. Germany submitted ‘Control Measures of Dual-use Materials’ at the preparatory meeting, which emphasized that the dual-use of new biotechnology poses a greater threat of large-scale epidemics and bioterrorism [24–27]. The management of dual-use risks of biotechnology was put on the international agenda and became a hot topic in the field of international arms control. To counter the possible abuse and misuse of biotechnology, Working Paper No. 30, jointly submitted by the Chinese and Pakistani governments, proposed the formulation of a model code of conduct for biological scientists. It would be binding upon all biological scientists worldwide when conducting biological research. In this important meeting, the state parties agreed to “encourage the promotion of a culture of responsibility amongst relevant national professionals and the voluntary development, adoption and promulgation of codes of conduct” [28]. At the international level, UN Security Council Resolution 1540 has been passed as the principled framework, BWC has been adopted as the basic norm, and international export control standards have been established by informal associations, including Australia Group and similar organizations.

These conventions and standards have been adopted by the international community, and have been enshrined in laws, regulations and operational mechanisms, including China’s “Regulations on Export Control of Dual-use Biological Products and Related Equipment and Technologies”, the U.S. “Regulations on Export Administration”, and Australia Group’s “Guiding Principles on Export Control of Biosensitive Items”.

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