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Excessive securitization undermines experimental governance frameworks

Yang Xue 1,2, Hanzhi Yu 3,* and Geng Qin 3, 12-20-2021, 1 Law School, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China; 2 Center for Biosafety Research and Strategy, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China 3 School of Public Affairs, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou 310058, China; https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/13/24/14056/htm, "Towards Good Governance on Dual-Use Biotechnology for Global Sustainable Development," Sustainability Volume 13 Issue 24 10.3390/su132414056 (ermo/sms, Acc:6-22-2022)

3.2. Stage 1: Achieving Consensus on a General Global Governance Framework with

Open-Ended Principles

The first links of the experimental governance model is to invite as many stakeholders as possible to participate in the discussion, to construct an authoritative international platform for the discussion, to set an open-ended principle, and to form a legally binding agreement. The Biological Weapons Convention of the United Nations is an open-ended model platform. It can establish communication among countries, and create opportunities for other non-state actors to participate in discussions through the mechanism of experts’ meetings, side events and best practice sharing in order to systematically monitor and review developments in science and technology. We believe that for the risk of dual-use biotechnology, all stakeholders need to reach a consensus on three principles: (1) risk communication, (2) process transparency, and (3) subjectivity.

First, all States Parties should regard multi-party risk communication as the basic principle of governance. The National Research Council of the U.S. defines “risk communication” as an “interactive process in which individuals, groups, and institutions exchange information and ideas” [51]. Risk communication plays an important role in resolving conflicts caused by differing perceptions, as there is generally disagreement among the public, government officials, scientists and industries about the nature and severity of risks [52]. Under the media rendering of dual-use biotechnology in animal soldiers, genetic weapons, and super soldiers, the public become fearful of these artificial creatures as “unknown, frightening, uncontrollable, catastrophic and may affect future generations.” Due to this bias, politicians and the public tend to pay more attention to the risk of bioterrorism than to other kinds of risks [53]. Therefore, it is essential to strengthen and extend contact and communication among biotechnologist, policy makers, social scientists and the public.

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