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Consultation CP vs experimentalist governance

Yang Xue 1,2, Hanzhi Yu 3,* and Geng Qin 3, 12-20-2021, 1 Law School, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China; 2 Center for Biosafety Research and Strategy, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China 3 School of Public Affairs, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou 310058, China; https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/13/24/14056/htm, "Towards Good Governance on Dual-Use Biotechnology for Global Sustainable Development," Sustainability Volume 13 Issue 24 10.3390/su132414056 (ermo/sms, Acc:6-22-2022)

3.3. Stage 2: Countries Take Actions Based on Local Conditions Led by the General Global

Governance Framework

Under the framework of the above-mentioned principles and objectives, the experimentalist governance model requires that grassroot practitioner should be provided with the power to act in accordance with local conditions. We believe that in view of the characteristics of dual-use biotechnology risks, different countries need to promote three aspects of work according to their actual conditions.

First, it is important to seek a dynamic balance between “hard law” and “soft law”. Facing the dual-use risk of biotechnology, countries need to find a dynamic balance between “hard law” and “soft law”. Soft law consists of democratic, open, universal and normative rules through the participation of stakeholders to regulate the social relations in biosafety governance, including its guidelines, codes, standards, and norms. It is therefore necessary to protect social and public interests, encourage scientific and technological research and industrial innovation, and ensure that the development of dual-use biotechnology is in accordance with the law and regulations. Due to the difficulty to meeting the demands for legal adjustment of new social contradictions caused by the dual-use risk of biotechnology by simply creating high legislative costs alone, and existence of complicated biological safety risks, no country has a panoramic understanding of the possible consequences of such risks, and some hidden dangers of such risks are far from being fully exposed. It will be increasingly difficult to supervise biotechnology as it gains momentum, as it is necessary to keep up with biotechnology through soft law, improving governance efficiency through “easily adjustable and easily controlled” mechanisms, and forming a policy reserve of national governance rules. Noticeably, integrating hard and soft law to create a prevention network needs a dynamic adjustment mechanism [54]. The most valuable, promising results of dual-use biotechnology are often produced in the early stage of research. Therefore, application of soft law, such as a code of conduct and professional rules, should initially predominate. As new technologies are being industrialized, regulation through hard law should be strengthened.

Second, to develop a dynamic consultant mechanism with multi-stakeholders in accordance with specific national conditions, the governance of emerging technologies should be the final outcome of interactions of socio-political management under the collective consultation of social actors [55]. This interactive mechanism should balance and coordinate the views and propositions between scientists and other stakeholders, thus deepening trust and integration. At the same time, biotechnologist can be encouraged to discuss issues such as social risk, which will be an important part of their scientific research activities in the future [56]. When such interactions produce a mutual understanding and shared vision, these biologists will form an “autonomous network” in which several entities and regulatory agencies will pool their social resources, intellectual expertise and interests [57]. With the advancement of dual-use biotechnology, this autonomous network must have the capability of dynamic learning and adaptive capacity. Multi-level organizations, including government regulatory departments, scientific research institutions, and industrial associations should carry out popularize science to improve the public understanding of dual-use biotechnology, enhancing enthusiasm for participating in and supervising the development of dual-use biotechnology. These activities can build public confidence in dual-use biotechnology and create a social environment more conducive to its sustained and healthy development. In short, government supervision should mobilize social forces, promote the orderly participation in the governance of the dual-use risk of biotechnology so that those social forces will jointly assume responsibility, formulate the rules, minimize risks and share in the outcome.

Third, to implement dynamic supervision of hierarchical management and risk assessment according to actual needs, each country should engage in hierarchical management and provide dynamic supervision mechanism for risk assessment. The idea of implementing hierarchical management of risks in the field of biosafety has become a common choice of major countries throughout the world yet have different characteristics. The “Biosafety Law of the People’s Republic of China” of 2020, emphasizes that “the state implements classified management on biotechnology research and development activities,” and that biotechnology research and development activities should be classified into high-, mediumand low-risk categories according to the amount of harm these activities may cause to public health, industry, agriculture, and the environment [58]. The “Dual-Use Research of Concern” (DURC), conducted by the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB), focuses on 15 hazardous biological agents or toxins and seven types of partial dual-use research [2]. Furthermore, according to a country’s own situation, it is necessary to develop risk assessment models by means of scenario analysis for policy makers to formulate and revise the laws and regulations [59,60]. In 2012, Bansak and Tucker proposed a 3 × 3 matrix model for risk assessment of dual-use biotechnology based on two key variables: abuse risk and controllability (Table 1). They then divided the abuse risk variables into four types: availability, vulnerability, potential hazard, and potential abuse crisis. The abuse risk can be high, medium, or low. Countries can modify the key variables of the model as needed.

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