Ukraine defeat risks Putin nuclear escalation
Richard D. Hooker, Jr. 4-21-2022, Fellow Nonresident Senior Fellow Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/managing-escalation-in-ukraine/, "Climbing the ladder: How the West can manage escalation in Ukraine and beyond," Atlantic Council (ermo/sms, Acc:6-29-2022)
Transitioning the conflict in Ukraine into a frozen conflict lasting years, as has been done in the Donbas since 2014, may be Putin’s best option now. A resolute Ukrainian government and highly motivated Ukrainian forces will continue to fight to reassert sovereignty over the national territory. Continued Western support will enable Ukrainian forces to grow stronger, though it may not be possible to retake the areas newly controlled by Russia without more armor and combat aircraft. In this scenario, Putin will have to consider more extreme and high-risk strategies to stave off defeat, prevent economic collapse, divert public opinion, and stay in power. Even more than success in Ukraine, regime survival will become the overriding priority.
With this in mind, what escalatory options could Putin choose?
Employing cyber tools. Under such desperate circumstances, Putin may elect to employ the full scope of his offensive cyber capabilities, which are formidable. Repeatedly in recent years, Russian cyber weapons have been employed successfully. While Russia has employed its cyber tools at the tactical level to some success in Ukraine, for reasons that remain somewhat unclear, the potential strategic effects of these weapons have been held in reserve so far in the campaign. Potential targets could include critical infrastructure such as power and transportation grids, nuclear-power plants, healthcare systems, government operations, the financial sector, and military command and control in the United States and Europe. These attacks would certainly invite retaliation, but Putin may see them as warranted to stave off defeat and preserve his regime.
Employing WMD. Putin may also choose to resort to weapons of mass destruction to cow the Ukrainian public and frighten off Western support. This could take the form of chemical strikes using military-grade chemical agents, such as nerve or mustard gas (although a signatory to the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, Russia is known to retain substantial stocks). Russia has already accused Ukraine and the United States of establishing chemical- and biological-weapons facilities inside Ukraine, a likely precursor to its own use. Russian formations field organic nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) protection units at all levels, from brigade to combined-arms army, and Russian planners will surely contemplate using them if faced with a humiliating defeat.
Employing nuclear weapons. Use of tactical nuclear weapons inside Ukraine is also a possibility in a last bid to achieve military success, although senior Russian military officials may balk at such an extraordinarily risky step. As NATO’s nuclear umbrella does not extend over Ukraine, Putin may discount the chance of retaliation. An added benefit could be a sharp warning of Russia’s willingness to use nuclear weapons if provoked—for example, if NATO ultimately entered the conflict to save a foundering Ukraine. This option would take the form of low-yield tactical weapons, launched from aircraft or field artillery, or delivered via Iskander-M short-ranged ballistic missiles or Kalibr cruise missiles. Such use would not necessarily lead to uncontrolled escalation, and is well within the calculus of Russian military doctrine. The shock of such an event would be profound, and could lead to Ukraine’s submission or acceptance of unfavorable terms. Similarly, Russian forces could engineer a nuclear “accident” involving one or more of Ukraine’s fifteen reactors, located at Yuzhnukraines, Rivne, Khmelnitsky, and Zaporizhzhia. (Chernobyl, located one hundred kilometers north of Kyiv, is not operational, but still houses large amounts of radioactive material.) The spread of radioactive fallout would, however, be very weather dependent, making this a very high-risk venture. Unquestionably, Russia would be condemned even by its few remaining supporters, to say nothing of an aroused and angry international community. At this stage, Russia is already an international pariah, with little moral currency left to lose. Ordering the use of tactical nuclear weapons could well be game changing. It might also drive Putin from power.