Russia will counter NATO clout with Middle East escalation
Arman Mahmoudian, 6-3-2022, https://trendsresearch.org/insight/03-06-2022/, "Russia-Ukraine war: Implications for the RSII coalition," No Publication (ermo/sms, Acc:6-29-2022)
Since the start of Russia’s military operation in Ukraine on 24 February 2022, speculation over the cost of this war for Moscow has been the topic of discussion among experts and scholars. The financial losses in the aftermath of Western sanctions, diplomatic isolation, military personnel casualties, and the severe damages to Russia’s war machine were the main objects of speculation. As the Russo-Ukrainian War escalated, so did the complexity of its dimensions. However, the long-term implications of the war for Russia appear to be even more perplexing. The complexity of these implications was heightened when, in mid-March 2022, several media outlets reported that Russia started to withdraw some of its troops from Syria, while also drawing thousands of fighters from the Syrian army and allied militias[1] to bolster the military operation in Ukraine and step up its offensive in the east of the country. Immediately after, Middle Eastern media outlets claimed that Iran would fill the vacuum of power created by the Russian withdrawal by increasing the presence of its troops and Shia militants in Syria.[2] This could shift the balance of influence in Syria in favor of Tehran.
Russia’s military operation in Ukraine has already started to affect Syria, so one might ask what the implications of Russia’s war in Ukraine would be for the Russia-Syria-Iran-Iraq (RSII) security coalition. This is a coalition that the Kremlin has been building in the Middle East with the help of Iran and its Shia allies. The Russo-Shia cooperation reached its peak in 2015, when the RSII security coalition, with two headquarters in Baghdad and Damascus, was officially formed.[3] The RSII coalition, since its formation, has been holding annual meetings in Baghdad to exchange intel and discuss recent regional developments, the last of which was held on February 25th, the day after Russia’s military operation in Ukraine.[4] However, since then, many things have changed. Russia’s recent gradual withdrawal from Syria, and the fact that the war in Ukraine might not result in Moscow’s favor, indicates that the Kremlin might have to shift its attention to deal with the growing escalation with NATO. Thus, it is very likely that Russia’s policy toward the Middle East and the RSII will change. In this context, Russia might choose to escalate tensions in the Middle East by sending Iran new advanced weapons that could potentially alter the balance of power in the region, or it might encourage Syria’s Assad to launch a new offensive against Turkish-backed rebels in the north or the US-backed SDF. Russia might find further escalation in the Middle East beneficial since it can force the West to divert its attention from Ukraine to the Middle East. Thus, it is vital to understand the implications of the Russo-Ukrainian War for the RSII coalition. To do so, we must first analyze the implications of the war individually for each member and then for the coalition as a whole.