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Non-state bioterror is accessible – 3 reasons

Yang Xue 1,2, Hanzhi Yu 3,* and Geng Qin 3, 12-20-2021, 1 Law School, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China; 2 Center for Biosafety Research and Strategy, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China 3 School of Public Affairs, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou 310058, China; https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/13/24/14056/htm, "Towards Good Governance on Dual-Use Biotechnology for Global Sustainable Development," Sustainability Volume 13 Issue 24 10.3390/su132414056 (ermo/sms, Acc:6-22-2022)

Accessibility is the difficulty in obtaining dual-use biotechnology. It is the first step of the intentional misuse of biotechnology, including obtaining hardware, software, and intangible information that can be applied to such technology for non-state actors to carry out bioterrorism activities. In the field of dual-use biotechnology, non-state actors can include ethnic separatists, transnational criminal organizations, terrorist organizations, cults, biohackers, and others who engage in covert behavior, have more freedom to conduct research, and are more difficult to supervise than state actors. At the Eighth Review Conference of the Convention on the Prohibition of Biological Weapons, the U.S. government announced that bioterrorism plots had been foiled by Kenya and Morocco. In addition, more than 15 criminal cases in the past ten years have involved the use of biological weapons in the U.S. There is therefore increasing concern over non-state actors using dual-use biotechnology to carry out bioterrorist attacks [5].

There are three accessibility risks of dual-use biotechnology. One is the disclosure of key technical information, such as key gene sequences of highly pathogenic pathogens that can be easily obtained from academic conferences, journals and public databases. In 2011, scientists from the United States and the Netherlands published academic papers on the transmission ability of highly pathogenic H5N1 influenza virus in mammalian cells, in which the methods of modifying the virus so as to enhance its transmission ability were made public [6]. This event that triggered global concern about the dual-use risk of biotechnology [7]. In addition, it is now easier than ever to obtain key experimental materials. In light of the industrialization of biotechnology, biotechnology enterprises can provide technical services and related reagents, including the detailed steps of entire experiments. Anyone can readily order laboratory equipment, consumables and substitutes online, and each year these become less expensive, so it is not difficult to set up a simple biology laboratory [8]. Finally, there are more ways than ever to obtain technology. More methods of communication have emerged outside of traditional channels in recent years, including the International Genetic Engineering Machine Competition (iGEM) and other international biology academic competitions, as well as online forums such as DIY biology.

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