A2 CBD solves regulation now
Ronit Langer & Shruti Sharma, 11-20-2020, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Technology and International Affairs Fellow & Technology and Society Sr. Research Analyst), https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/11/20/blessing-and-curse-of-biotechnology-primer-on-biosafety-and-biosecurity-pub-83252, "The Blessing and Curse of Biotechnology: A Primer on Biosafety and Biosecurity," (ermo/sms, Acc:6-8-2022)
There are numerous international treaties and regimes in place to help mitigate the risks at play with biotechnology. Three of the most significant ones are the Convention on Biological Diversity, the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), and the Australian Group. Each of these agreements or regimes tackles a different aspect of the risk profile—biosafety, bioweapons, and banned substances—but each of them comes with limitations, such as limited scope, sparse funding, and inadequate verification and monitoring mechanisms. None of the agreements create a binding framework to holistically address biosafety and biosecurity risks, making for an overall lack of accountability and rendering the development of international standards piecemeal and incomplete. In this regulatory environment, it is difficult to keep up with rapidly emerging advances in biotechnology or address pressing issues such as releasing biotechnology products, like gene drives, into nature.
THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY
The Convention on Biological Diversity is an international legal instrument for ensuring that countries work together to promote a sustainable and equitable future that protects biological diversity. It has been ratified by 196 countries. The convention has two protocols, the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety and the Nagoya Protocol, that promote the safe and equitable use of biotechnology with respect to biodiversity.
The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety governs the use and transport of GMOs to protect biological diversity and human health. The Nagoya Protocol is a benefit-sharing agreement that mandates that—when researchers enter another country and use genetic sequences from indigenous plants, animals, or microorganisms and/or employ indigenous procedural knowledge—indigenous people are either compensated up-front or receive a fair share of the profits from commercialization.
The Cartagena Protocol, which entered into force in 2003, promotes a precautionary approach enshrined in the fifteenth principle of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, which states, “Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.” In essence, if the scientific community is uncertain about how a new organism will impact the environment, this principle states that scientists should proceed with extreme caution. In general, the Cartagena Protocol attempts to balance between the propensity of advances in biotechnology to help countries protect their biodiversity and develop economically alongside the threats that biotechnology poses to biodiversity and human health if something were to go wrong.
The Cartagena Protocol mainly covers the handling, transport, and use of GMOs across borders. The protocol established the Biosafety Clearing-House to facilitate the implementation of its guiding principles. The clearinghouse is designed to “facilitate the exchange of scientific, technical, environmental and legal information on, and experience with, living modified organisms [or GMOs].” All members of the protocol must inform the clearinghouse when countries make a new transfer agreement on GMOs, of any unintentional releases of GMOs that may cross borders, and any national laws that pertain to the effects GMOs may have on sustainability. While the protocol ensures safe use and transport of GMOs, it does not include any penalties for violations or have any accountability mechanisms for accidental releases of pathogens from labs or any other laboratory-acquired infections.
One key limitation is that the Cartagena Protocol only covers the transfer of physical material, whereas much of the information that tends to be transferred involves digital DNA sequences. The Nagoya Protocol, which was adopted in 2010, specifically focuses on benefit sharing from the genetic information of regional biological diversity or regional know-how. The Nagoya Protocol sets the standards for transfer agreements between a potential commercial actor and a local population to ensure that the local population is properly compensated for the use of its regional biodiversity. Similar to the Cartagena Protocol’s Biosafety Clearing-House, the Nagoya Protocol has an Access and Benefit-Sharing Clearing-House to help coordinate implementation and exchanges of information on benefit sharing. Although the protocol monitors fair utilization of genetic resources until indigenous communities are compensated, it does not monitor the safety and security of experiments that occur once fair compensation has taken place.
Both the Cartagena Protocol and the Nagoya Protocol are therefore limited in scope and do not protect against a wide range of biosafety threats. For example, neither protocol covers safety concerns from the transfer of DNA sequences and, therefore, would not prevent a nefarious actor from ordering sequences that might be used for the development of dangerous pathogens. In addition, the Cartagena Protocol only covers GMOs, not DNA sequences or other precursors to GMOs, while the Nagoya Protocol only covers indigenous benefit sharing, not transborder data on pathogens.
Fundamentally, the Cartagena Protocol and the Nagoya Protocol are trade mechanisms designed to protect local biodiversity from being overtaken by GMOs or exploited by biotech companies. They do not provide international guidelines for establishing biosafety protocols. Nor do they protect against the dangers of cheaper and faster DNA sequencing, easy DNA synthesis, online access to genomic information, and developments in synthetic biology, among other issues. Given these limitations, there is a need for the scientific community to expand on global biosafety standards to minimize risks from laboratories undertaking biotechnology-related research.