Unilateralism guts experimental governance – can’t solve biotech
Yang Xue 1,2, Hanzhi Yu 3,* and Geng Qin 3, 12-20-2021, 1 Law School, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China; 2 Center for Biosafety Research and Strategy, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China 3 School of Public Affairs, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou 310058, China; https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/13/24/14056/htm, "Towards Good Governance on Dual-Use Biotechnology for Global Sustainable Development," Sustainability Volume 13 Issue 24 10.3390/su132414056 (ermo/sms, Acc:6-22-2022)
3.4. Stage 3: Dynamic Consultation Mechanism for Transnational Information Sharing and
Action Review
Based on the governance practices of countries tailored to local conditions, experimentalist governance requires that the multilateral platforms of international organizations need to further review and supervise the actions of the country, so as to realize the integration of “bottom-up” and “top-down” governance. International organizations and other specialized associations need to review and supervise governments’ implementation of the governance of dual-use biotechnology. We believe that to achieve effective review and supervision functions, international organizations need to establish a dynamic consultant mechanism for transnational information sharing, and ensure that the governance of international organizations and specialized associations is self-regulated and connected by legislation and regulatory policies of governments of various countries.
Under the current framework of international biotechnology security governance, the Biological Weapons Convention still has the most powerful binding force. Therefore, under the framework of the BWC, a scientific advisory committee of scientists from developed and developing countries that takes into account the interests of developed and underdeveloped countries should be established as soon as possible to conduct regular information tracking, risk research and evaluation, and information sharing so as to strengthen risk management of dual-use biotechnology worldwide. Each contracting party may formulate its own laws and regulatory policies according to the risk evaluation of dual-use biotechnology carried out by the Scientific Advisory Committee of the Biological Weapons Convention, based on the self-regulation established by international professional associations and other international organizations. Biologists and enterprises, as important objects of dual-use biotechnology governance, while joining international professional associations and other international organizations to constantly improve their self-regulation, have also achieved a dynamic negotiation process for governance subjects (see Figure 2).
Regarding the governance of dual-use biotechnology risks, it is necessary for international organizations to re-examine and update set principles and objectives as well as to strengthen and specify the key content under the circumstance of the continuous improvement of technology application and R and D level.
We believed that the global cooperation on risk management of dual-use biotechnology may benefit from a window of policy opportunities. The COVID-19 pandemic has drawn global attention to global health governance and biosafety, both of which are essential in forging a consensus on global governance. Despite the volatile international climate, many governments have prioritized responding to and solving the challenges in global governance. The Ninth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention will be held in 2022, and a breakthrough in cooperation is possible. We call on the world to take advantage of this opportunity and allow biotechnology to benefit global development.