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OCOs are complex and extremely costly

Smeets ’22, Max; Feb 23; Senior Researcher at the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich, co-founder and Director of the European Cyber Conflict Research Initiative (ECCRI.eu), an organization promoting the interdisciplinary study of cyber conflict and statecraft in Europe and beyond, also an Affiliate at Stanford University Center for International Security and Cooperation; Security Studies, “Cyber Arms Transfer: Meaning, Limits, and Implications,” vol. 31/ceng

An offensive cyber organization will also need attack tools to achieve a certain effect or goal. Payloads greatly vary in size. On one end of the spectrum, they can come as very lightweight files that are easy to distribute, but once executed they will trigger the download of a much larger piece of malware.43 On the other end of the spectrum, payloads can be multiple megabytes (MBs) in size. A multipurpose toolkit was discovered in 2012 by researchers from Kaspersky Lab, which they called Flame. Whereas the Stuxnet code is “only” about 1 MB in size, Flame’s malware code is about twenty times larger—and still not fully understood.44 It is difficult—and cost inefficient—to build an arsenal of tools for a more mature cyber command or intelligence agency. Although early development and stockpiling would be desirable to ensure swift deployment if the need arises, tools often must be tailored to the target and desired effect (especially if the actor desires stealth and stability), which means that in-time development is often necessary. Consider, for example, a case in which the leadership of a command decides there is a need to target a specific programmable logic controller (PLC) used to run a certain manufacturing process. The developers will likely have to build tools that can work on that particular PLC model. If leadership subsequently decides to target a different process, developers will have to deploy a new toolset. Finally, the more features of the target you can use, the less you need yourself. Napoleon was famous for making sure his troops were living off the land through which they moved. It allowed his army to travel light and march long distances. This notion of living off the land is also commonly applied to cyber operations. The attacker may use something exotic to get into a target’s network, but it makes a lot of sense to subsequently use the target’s existing infrastructure to gain further network access. For example, existing communication lines to push out notifications can be used to move through an organization’s network. Living off the land is not merely done for cost-efficiency benefits. The practice is equally, if not more, important for remaining undetected. Fourth, to effectively run cyber operations an organization requires infrastructure, broadly defined as the processes, structures, and facilities needed to pull off an offensive cyber operation. This element can be split into two categories: control infrastructure and preparatory infrastructure. Control infrastructure refers to processes directly used to run an operation. This is also the type of infrastructure that is generally burned down after a failed operation. It includes domain names of phishing sites, leaked email addresses, or other abused technologies.45 It also concerns C&C infrastructure used in remotely conducted operations to maintain communication with compromised systems within a target network. Depending on an operation’s goal and resources, the C&C infrastructure might be as basic as a single server operating on the external network.46 At the same time, an organization may run a whole set of operations simply to compromise legitimate web servers to use them for C&C later.

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