Decline ensures transition wars, not peaceful multilateralism---the US could launch a pre-emptive attack or China could strike first
Min-hyung Kim 20. Department of Political Science and International Relations, Kyung Hee University, Seoul, South Korea. “A real driver of US–China trade conflict: The Sino–US competition for global hegemony and its implications for the future” Emerald Insight. 02-04-2019. https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/ITPD-02-2019-003/full/html
Underlying these arguments for an inevitable war between the two superpowers is PTT. PTT originally formulated by Organski (1958) posits that war is likely when the power of the dominant state in the international system (i.e. hegemon) is declining and that a dissatisfied rising challenger substantially reduces the power gap between the hegemon and itself. Unlike balance of power theory, PTT argues that the war is most likely when there is near power parity between a dominant state and a rising and dissatisfied challenger (Organski and Kugler, 1980, pp. 19-20)[5]. A rising power here is generally dissatisfied with the existing international order and initiates war against a declining hegemon in order to impose orders that are more favorable to itself (Organski 1958, pp. 364-367). Layne (2018, p. 110) put these power transition dynamics quite succinctly as follows: “Over time, however, the relative power of states changes, and eventually the international order no longer reflects the actual distribution of power between or among the leading Great Powers. When that happens, the legitimacy of the prevailing order is called into question, and it will be challenged by the rising power(s).” And when the balance of power between a dominant state and a rising challenger changes sufficiently, a new order replaces an old one typically by a hegemonic war (2018, p. 104). Paying close attention to the growing Sino–US competition over hegemony in the twenty-first century, therefore, Shirk (2007, p. 4), China specialist, argues that “History teaches us that rising powers are likely to provoke war.” On the other hand, scholars like Gilpin (1981) contend that the power transition war between great powers is likely to occur when a hegemonic state whose power is declining due to imperial overstretch[6] views “preventive war as the most attractive means of eliminating the threat posed by challengers” (Ned Lebow and Valentino, 2009, p. 391), although they do acknowledge that there might be some “ways to prolong the period of its power preponderance vis-à-vis the rising challenger, so that the rapidly rising power will not dare to challenge the hegemonic leadership” (Kim and Gates, 2015, p. 221). In this case, the initiator of war is a declining hegemon, rather than a rising challenger. The declining hegemon who fears a rising challenger’s overtaking its power in the near future sees war as a better option than other options of maintaining its hegemony such as reducing its commitments abroad and appeasing a rising challenger.