DoD action is visually representative of Empire – lays the groundwork for a constant network of policing that subjects us to imperial biopolitical control
Wozniak 21 - Associate Professor of Sociology at West Virginia University (PHD), (Jesse, "Policing Iraq," De Gruyter, 03-24-2021, https://www-degruyter-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/document/doi/10.1525/9780520975972/html, Accessed 7-22-2022, LASA-CB)
A central argument of this book is that police are integral to our conception of the modern state in ways both practical and theoretical. In the practical sense, police are the most direct experience of government for many people. This is evident in places like Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, where the police were used to directly carry out dictatorial commands but is just as much the case in well-established constitutional democracies like the United States, where each year roughly one out every five citizens has face-to-face contact with the police.1 The modern democratic state famously has a monopoly on the legitimate use of force, and the police are its certified representatives wielding this legitimated force. Police are where the rubber meets the road in terms of a significant amount of government power, as which laws the police choose to emphasize and which they choose to ignore (to say nothing of how they enforce these laws) has a far greater impact on how the law functions than do the actual statutes themselves.
The police are also central to the ability of the state to garner legitimacy and establish hegemony as a primary repository of social, political, and physical power. This perspective builds off the work of Gramsci, who argues the state is how a ruling class both consolidates and, much more importantly, legitimizes its control through “a combination of coercive force and intellectual-moral leadership.”2 However, state legitimacy is not a static phenomenon; it must be actively constructed and reproduced.
While the ruling classes of some states survive by outright repression, democratic states vastly prefer securing hegemony through the consent of the governed. Yet even within states that principally earn their legitimacy through consent, there will always be a need for coercive power to enforce discipline on those groups who do not consent to state rule. In the modern state, the police are centrally responsible for this line between consent and coercion.
For the police occupy much more than just a narrow law-enforcement role; while this is part of their mandate and dominates public perception of them, democratic police actually spend the majority of their time on order maintenance and social service tasks, filling a wide variety of roles.3 The ability of police to fulfill these many functions in a fair and legitimate manner is a central factor in the strength of a democracy and the quality of life enjoyed by its citizens.4 The failure on behalf of those leading the reconstruction of Iraq to recognize the importance of the many varied roles played by police in a constitutional democracy, and the subsequent fragmentation of these roles to a wide variety of public and private actors, has played a major part in the rise of violent nonstate actors like the Islamic State, who have exploited their ability to provide what the state and police currently cannot.
Ignoring the many service and order maintenance functions police fill is but one of a litany of well-established practices ignored by the United States and coalition authorities. Despite the extensive experience of the United States with police reconstruction in postconflict and developing nations, those responsible for police training in the new Iraqi state ignored nearly all prior knowledge on the subject. Instead, they have opted for creating the appearance of a legitimate police force, with training focusing almost exclusively on self-presentational matters to the detriment of nearly anything police-related. While this “cultural performance” of policing may assuage short-terms concerns of police capacity, the lack of knowledge regarding policing practices as well as the human and civil rights guaranteed to the populace by the new constitution means the police as constituted are very unlikely to become the type of force needed for a democratic state, something confirmed by ongoing, widespread documentation of corruption and brutality.5
This lack of relevant police training is in no small part due to the unprecedented decision to place the reconstruction of the police under the auspices of the Department of Defense. Treating police as part of the military not only departs from the long history of democratic societies moving to divorce the two but contradicts the scholarly consensus that treating the police as part of the military “works against every principle of democratic policing.”6 The DoD’s approach to policing focused on force generation and questions of equipment and capacity over the core aspects of policing, and the coalition’s own initial report on the status of Iraqi police forces found them “better trained in counterinsurgency tactics than civilian policing.”7
Although being led by the Department of Defense is unprecedented, the arming of a police force to act as a counterinsurgency force is not. The United States has long used police training and reconstruction programs to advance nation-building strategies that favor American geopolitical concerns over those of the nation they are supposedly helping. These programs have often minimized or outright ignored crime control, order maintenance, and social service functions in favor of developing intelligence networks oriented toward countersubversion programs to create the internal security and order necessary to implement larger political and economic plans. As such, rather than establishing democratic order or respect for human and civil rights, these police reconstruction programs have served to modernize the repressive apparatus in nations that have served the interests of the United States.8