The alt’s scholarship alone leads to academic fragmentation and fails to promote material change
David Lake, June 2011, “Why ‘isms’ are evil: theory, epistemology, and academic sects as impediments to understanding and progress,” International Studies Quarterly, 55(2), 465-480, https://www.jstor.org/stable/23019696?seq=1, mm
The problem is not that we have too many research traditions, but how we respond to this plethora. Nor is the problem our professional structures and incentives, as many other disciplines operate within the same environment and have responded in more productive ways.' Rather, we have adopted over time a set of professional practices that produce five linked pathologies." These patholo-gies, in turn, transform research traditions into insular "sects" that eschew expla-nation in favor of theology. Fortunately, if these pathologies follow from professional practices, they can be remedied by changing those norms. Recogniz-ing these practices and highlighting their effects is a necessary first step toward change. First, we reify research traditions. We are all familiar with the mandatory literature review in articles and books wherein complex literatures are grouped into one or more schools for the primary purpose of demonstrating what is new and unique about the author's own contribution. These are necessary for positioning our work in the field. We likewise organize courses—and especially introductory courses and graduate field seminars—in terms of the "great debates" or "great books" where we assign exemplary works that help students identify the core traits of each tradition. We also organize our handbooks of international studies by research tradition (see Reus-Smit and Snidal 2008). This is how we introduce novices into the shared understanding of the field and its practices. In classifying research into such categories, we collectively construct the research traditions in which we live. But in classifying research in these ways, we also necessarily lose subtlety, emphasize lowest common denominators, and simplify scholarly inquiry into easily recognizable schools. In short, through often well-intentioned prac-tice, we force research into artificial traditions that we mistakenly believe have real standing and meaning. Sometimes, categories are also self-imposed as scholars search for a shared identity with like-minded others. We are active participants in creating our own professional fragmentation. More insidiously, however, even while perhaps pro-claiming our own broadmindedness and denying that "our work" fits cleanly into any particular research tradition, we nonetheless classify others into these neat, simplified categories.' We may believe ourselves to defy academic stereo-types, but we are usually all too ready to label our intellectual opponents as a this or a that. Just like ethnic identities in times of conflict, it matters less how we may think of ourselves and more how others think of us. We may congratu-late ourselves on our intellectual cosmopolitanism and flexibility, but we are in the end branded by others as adherents to one or another tradition and cred-ited—or more likely damned—with all of the failings of the approach. One's research tradition is not entirely of one's own making. Second, having reified research traditions, we then reward extremism. We all cite the same canonical sources in our own and other research traditions.' We assign these same works in our courses. These canonical works are typically read to embody the assumptions of a research tradition in pure form. Their purpose is to communicate meaning and information to other scholars—citing "Waltz 1979," "Keohane 1984," or "Wendt 1999," for instance, carries a world of meaning to sophisticates who have learned the research traditions. These canoni-cal works serve a useful purpose by orienting debates within the field. Although they are typically bold, clear statements of a new approach, like the research traditions they come to embody these iconic works are themselves reified, with meanings attributed to them that the author may not have intended. In interpretation, they lose subtlety, sophistication, and—most important—qualification. Wendt, for instance, has written that, properly understood, many of the issues between rationalism and constructivism dissolve (Fearon and Wendt 2002, 67). Keohane (1984, esp. 9 and 245), in his own writings, has always posi-tioned himself between traditions as beginning from realist foundations and then developing the role of institutions on that footing. Nonetheless, these canonical works are commonly interpreted by the international studies community as staking out intellectual positions that are notable precisely for their "purity" or, more accurately, their extremism. These canonical works—in their stylized and reified forms—shape the disci-pline. Sitting at the top of the profession, in turn, their authors receive dispro-portionate professional rewards, not least because our universities and profession value visibility, whether defined in terms of citations or valuable space on gradu-ate syllabi. These rewards are appropriate in recognizing the unusual contribu-tions of scholars whose research sets the agenda in the field. But these rewards also create incentives for younger scholars to compete for recognition by adher-ing to a sectarian position and, more important, taking even more extreme posi-tions. Indeed, although everyone writing on international studies no doubt hopes to make an impact on the discipline and our understanding of world affairs, authors of canonical works—aware that they are breaking new ground —are often quite sensitive to how they fit into and are dependent on existing streams of political thought. In the quest for recognition, however, their followers often become more shrill and single-minded, further reifying the approaches with which they identify. For reasons of self-identification and increased professional visibility, we also create incentives for adherents of nascent approaches to create new "isms," often embodied in new organized sections that they can control within profes-sional associations. Creating a new section provides a measure of legitimacy, standing, and status for adherents and certifies the approach as one that should be taken seriously by others. It also provides opportunities for entrepreneurs to earn visibility in general and become intellectual leaders of a new research tradi-tion. If there is a tendency in academia towards intellectual fragmentation, the disproportionate rewards for intellectual extremism create a further centripetal force. Ironically, professional associations, often originally formed as a common ground for scholars, become a force for further fractionalization in the disci-pline. At both the individual and collective levels, extremism breeds further extremism. Together, these first two pathologies lead to a proliferation of research tradi-tions within international studies. The existence of these multiple traditions is not in itself a bad thing. To the extent that they organize research and produce new ideas they can be progressive. But when combined with three further patho-logies, they begin to inhibit rather than aid scholarly inquiry. Third, we mistake research traditions for actual theories. As noted, traditions are defined by shared sets of core assumptions. In principle, these core assumptions may be sufficient to generate deductively valid hypotheses or other forms of explanation. In practice, however, these shared assumptions are more often incomplete and must be supplemented by additional assumptions to yield spe-cific hypotheses and explanations. That is, the core assumptions orient scholars working within a research tradition, but they are seldom complete enough to explain specific outcomes of interest. Waltz (1979:118, 121), for instance, was emphatic that two and only two assumptions—anarchy and the desire to sur-vive—were sufficient to predict that states will tend to balance against stronger powers. But these assumptions are, in fact, consistent with a much larger range of behaviors, including cooperation and collective security organizations, on the one hand, and bandwagoning, on the other. In other words, these same assump-tions are consistent with both balancing and not balancing, and thus, the research tradition is theoretically indeterminate (Lake and Powell 1999:23-24). To deduce the proposition that states tend to balance, additional assumptions must be added to the core assumptions of neorealism. Similarly, Powell (1991) and Snidal (1991a,b) showed that both neorealism and neoliberalism did not generate unique predictions about relative and absolute gains maximization, as commonly thought (Grieco 1993), but were actually indeterminate as well; with additional assumptions, each tradition could generate predictions of relative and absolute gains behavior as a special case. That most research traditions are insuf-ficient to generate hypotheses about actual interstate behavior is further sug-gested by the proliferation of theories within each that all claim allegiance to the same core assumptions. Thus, we have offensive realism, defensive realism, neoclassical realism, and more, all sharing a common set of assumptions under-stood as realist but differing in the auxiliary assumptions they employ.' This explains how numerous theories can co-exist and be unified within a single research tradition.'° In turn, since their assumptions are typically incomplete, research traditions cannot be assessed directly. As they are often underspecified and do not gener-ate deductively valid hypotheses themselves, they cannot be "tested" on their own terms. Sometimes, since with different auxiliary assumptions they may pre-dict both a behavior and its opposite, they cannot be tested at all. One can probe the explanatory power of a theory, but usually not of a tradition. Nonethe-less, scholars often pit traditions against one another in head-to-head competi-tions." In these battles, since each tradition is incomplete and yields few logically deductive predictions, no empirical evidence can shed any meaningful light on the explanatory power of the approach or, inversely, broad ranges of behavior may be equally consistent with its assumptions. Without determinate predictions, scholars play a game of "heads I win, tails you lose" in which their preferred approach is almost always supported. Fourth, we narrow the permitted subject matter of our studies to those topics, periods, and observations that tend to confirm the particular strengths of our tradition. Realists, for instance, tend to focus mainly on security policies of great powers where their assumptions appear to fit slightly better, and then find evidence for the power of realism. Liberals tend to focus on economic policy where their assump-tions appear to fit slightly better, and then find evidence for the power of liberal-ism. Neoliberal institutionalists study institutions, which not coincidentally tends to affirm the important role of institutions. Constructivists study changes in norms, and find their approach persuasive. English school scholars often focus on the socialization of polities within the international system, and find evidence of the power of their approach and so on. This narrowing of empirical focus need not be a conscious strategy but can be a natural by-product of the search for confirming evidence. Having spent years developing a theory, it is not unrea-sonable to apply it where it is most likely to fit—at least as a first, initial test of plausibility. Journals and book publishers are also notoriously loath to publish null findings, a belief that need not be true to have a major effect on the choice of research topics by scholars of different traditions. By narrowing its empirical focus, however, each tradition affirms itself by study-ing that which it does best and ignoring subjects that do not conform to expecta-tions. This produces self-affirming sects that come to believe in the power of their tradition based on a selective reading of the possible empirical evidence. It is here that research traditions move from the realm of objective social science to theology. Having adopted a tradition, we then look only for evidence that affirms our prior belief in the rightness of that tradition. Practice becomes not an attempt to falsify theories through ever more demanding tests, but to support theories that were adopted prior to their confrontation with evidence. In essence, we eschew social science theories that can, in principle, be falsified for beliefs that are largely impervious to evidence. Fifth, scholars within each research tradition aspire for their approach to be the scientific paradigm. Rather than accept that our favored tradition is inevitably partial and limited in scope and domain, we seek intellectual hegemony. We claim that our particular tradition with its unique set of assumptions is a general approach that can and should be treated as a universal or near universal paradigm. I have always found the phrases "I am realist" or "As a neoliberal institutionalist, I think..." to be peculiar statements. The only logical construction is that the speaker is asserting that his or her particular tradition is superior to all other known traditions, a claim that all questions can be answered by theories based on the assumptions of that tradition. Thus, by the third and fourth pathologies, we validate our often incomplete theories through favorable and selective evidence but, by the fifth, we then assert they are universal and superior to—or at least worthy of respect by adherents of—other equally self-validated traditions. There are, perhaps, strong reasons of self-identification to seek intellectual hegemony. As scholars, much of our self-worth is entwined with our ideas. To vanquish the alternatives, if even in our own minds, validates our contributions and ourselves. There are also strong professional incentives to win the contest for intellectual hegemony. To establish one's tradition as the tradition promises to put the original adherents at the top of the field. Even if individual scholars are not so narrowly instrumental, intellectual combat is like an arms race. Each tradition perceives the failure to compete for hegemony as ceding ground to opponents, and thus, each tradition believes it must compete in expectation that others will compete for dominance. To admit the partial nature of one's theory is to risk being subsumed as a special case within someone else's tradition—a lower status. Thus, everyone aspires to hegemony if only to prevent others from conquering the field. But like arms races, this intellectual competition leaves everyone worse off than if they could simply cooperate, which in this case means admitting the partial nature and limited empirical evidence for every theory now known in the field. These five pathologies combine to divert professional debate from the sub-stance of world politics to first principles. Having created academic sects based on incommensurate assumptions and supported by selective evidence, we do not seek to assess which approach helps us understand world politics best (or helps us understand which range of phenomena best). We focus instead on the inher-ent superiority of this or that set of assumptions. Rather than seeking to under-stand the world—our highest obligation as scholars—we debate assumptions seemingly without end. What are the fundamental units of world politics? Are individuals, groups or social collectivities, or organizations "rational"? Do actors seek power, welfare, justice, or something else? Which matters more, system or unit, structure or agency? Without comparable propositions derived from these competing research traditions and assessed against the same patterns of behav-ior, there is no possible answer to such existential questions. This makes for a continuing and lively debate of course, but it adds little to our understanding of world politics and nothing at all to practical policymakers. Rather than seeking to understand the complex and often frightening world around us, we spend far too much of our intellectual time and energy debating assumptions as if they mattered in absolute terms. It is here that research traditions tip over from being useful organizing devices to theologies. Assumptions stop being treated as more or less useful simplifications of a complex reality and become beliefs that are accepted or not as truths. We have left the realm of scholarly inquiry and entered the world of academic religions. By whatever definition, we have stopped doing "science."