The perm’s deployment of pragmatism is neither rigid nor fixed – it is simply a starting point for analyzing competing theories
Rudra Sil, 2020, International Journal: Canada’s Journal of Global Policy Analysis, “Analytic eclecticism - continuing the conversation,” 75(3):, mm
Yet, what some see as a dismissive posture with respect to metatheory is actually a metatheoretical proposition: that rigid adherence to foundational positions can become—in Hirschman’s words—“a hindrance to understanding.”13 What we reject is not metatheory but the tight coupling of theoretical arguments with a fixed set of foundational principles that might preclude a more expansive, openended exploration of the interconnectedness of different social forces, essentially turning the incommensurability thesis into a self-fulfilling prophesy. This is why we propose only the temporary bracketing of select metatheoretical postulates as a way to illuminate new analytic possibilities that might be otherwise dismissed out of hand on the basis of fixed epistemological commitments.14 We see a fruitful eclectic scholarship as not ignoring metatheory but engaging with it in a creative and flexible manner. In fact, a search for the term “metatheory” in Beyond Paradigms yields no fewer than thirty references. Moreover, many of these appear in passages explicitly noting that useful eclectic theorizing requires careful consideration of metatheory! We argue in our introduction to the book: increased receptiveness to non-paradigmatic scholarship makes it all the more necessary to think carefully and systematically about what kinds of metatheoretical reformulations and research strategies are most likely to produce useful, coherent eclectic alternatives to theories put forward by the established paradigms.15 Having said that, we do understand and even share Chernoff’s worry that a discipline overrun by eclecticists might eventually come to totally ignore metatheory. This is precisely why, in the conclusion of the book, we remind readers that “eclecticism offers a pragmatic way of getting on with the work of understanding the world, but also requires us to reflect back on existing theoretical perspectives and metatheoretical foundations.”16 Our concern for metatheory is also evident in the pains we take to establish a connection between analytic eclecticism and pragmatism—another move that some have raised concerns about. Let me first note that we are neither interested in offering an authoritative reformulation of pragmatism, nor suggesting that eclectic scholarship is the only or best way to translate pragmatist principles into a comprehensive research strategy in IR. We embrace pragmatism precisely because it offers a set of philosophical positions that allows for a flexible yet recognizable common platform for launching different kinds of eclectic analyses on a wide range of questions. Pragmatism represents a comfortable stance that engages a number of important metatheoretical issues but without rigid adherence to the kinds of foundational postulates upon which established research traditions have been constructed.17 Of course, pragmatist philosophy encompasses a great many principles, not all of which sit comfortably with analytic eclecticism. Peet worries that the pragmatist ideal of a “universal common category” tends to encourage a push for consensus that undercuts the pluralistic impulse of eclectic scholarship. It is worth noting that we make no mention of a “universal common category” among the pragmatist ideals we link to analytic eclecticism. Indeed, even if this ideal holds some significance in the abstract for pragmatism writ large, it is often assigned less weight relative to other features of pragmatism. Our conceptualization of analytic eclecticism, which we emphatically distinguish from the construction of a universal synthetic approach, puts more stock in what pragmatism has to say about fallibilism, dialogue, and the experimental redeployment of pieces of knowledge in light of new experiences and changing situations.18 To the extent that any program of action requires some prior consensus, we stress the need for an inclusive process of negotiating this consensus. Moreover, drawing upon fallibilism, we see any consensus as little more than a tentative, fleeting agreement to permit resolution of a specific problem at a particular time and place. This move hardly necessitates what Peet calls a “static view of categories,” and it certainly does not preclude critical discussion and reassessment in light of evolving conditions and alternative knowledge claims.