Their permutation can’t capture the ethical orientation of the alternative – their method’s insistence on “policy relevance” is an act of disciplinary policing
Eric Blanchard, 2020, International Journal: Canada’s Journal of Global Policy Analysis, “Combing the same beach: analytic eclecticism and the challenge of theoretical multilingualism ,” 75(3): 404-419, mm
Christian Reus-Smit has argued that Sil and Katzenstein’s epistemologically “empirical-theoretic project” is not equipped to deal with normative reflection and thus unable to produce the kind of practical knowledge that can “animate social and political action.”71 This lack of “systematic reflection on values,”72 according to Reus-Smit, hobbles analytic eclecticism’s efforts to produce policy-relevant knowledge as it intends, in the spirit of Aristotelian phronesis. Relatedly, an avowed concern with ethics is never far from the top of the intellectual priority list of many non-triad scholars. For instance, feminist IR approaches to research methods place ethics among epistemology, ontology, and choice of method as primary elements of a definition of methodology.73 Constructivists Klotz and Lynch recognize what they see as the unavoidable ethical dimension of constructivist scholarship, though they warn “against translating ethical assumptions into particular tools of analysis” and against granting any particular method the “moral high ground.”74 Ethical motivations are certainly not the monopoly of critical scholars, but this community tends to foreground ethical concerns in its publications more prominently than realist, liberal, and causal-oriented constructivists. Sil and Katzenstein’s discussion of ethics (in their review of the work of Hoffmann and Finnemore) is scattered, lacks focus, and could be enriched through dialogue with non-triad approaches.75 This is not to say it will be easy to surface ethics in the eclectic analytic heuristic. The urgency of climate change clearly raises enormous ethical issues: intergenerational responsibilities, the morality of population growth, the commitment to exuberant consumption and carbon-intensive transportation practices, and obligations to (distant) humans and non-human life, to name a few. Generally, the commitments of the dominant paradigms of IR, with their group-centric power politics and free-trade-centred pursuit of progress, sit uneasily with the range of anthropocentric and ecocentric approaches to environmental ethics. Burke et al. suggest we develop an ethics of climate change, one worthy of the unprecedented challenge, one that goes beyond “visions of the good life” to address “the goodness of life itself.”76 At a more modest scale, ethical approaches to climate change scholarship align with reflexive postures that acknowledge and foreground researcher positionality and entail giving respectful voice to marginalized peoples and impacted positions. Given the demand for ethics in a chaotic present and uncertain future, non-triad approaches are arguably better placed to cultivate the necessary ethical imagination or identify the constitution of nascent planetary identities, but they certainly complicate the picture we have of climate change beyond states and markets, geopolitics, and public goods, making the boundaries of policy relevancy particularly salient. Critical and post-positivist scholars might naturally be suspicious of the eclectic project, directed at climate change or as a general program, if it seems to reify existing power-laden disciplinary structures by policing the borders of legitimate scholarship. This particular emphasis on power relates to a possible post-positivist concern with the eclectic impulse toward policy relevance. Recall Sil and Katzenstein’s argument that the value-added of eclecticism involves relating research to ordinary actors and policy-makers. Sil and Katzenstein suspect the “compartmentalization of knowledge” prohibits the beneficial sharing of insights that address real-world dilemmas. Yet a move toward policy relevance as a criterion for research may strike many who self-identify outside of the mainstream as political and even disciplining. Steve Smith argues that when “one party announces that approaches have to be policy relevant, [it is] usually defined as relevant for activities of the state. Dismissing work as being irrelevant to policy choices is a powerful disciplining device.”77 This issue evokes further discussion of the ethics of useful knowledge, of its “relevance” (to the state? to ordinary or marginal people? to whom?) and intelligibility. From Sil and Katzenstein’s text, it seems eclecticism emphasizes an appeal to policy-makers more than “ordinary actors,” but this need not be the case. Feminist IR scholars, for example, can argue that their theories and scholarship, developed in close consultation and interaction with real-world activists, policy-makers, and ordinary women, does not “sit on the sidelines” and suffers no such relevance deficit (witness titanic efforts to theorize “gender mainstreaming” in global governance, attention to rape in warfare and other forms of sexual violence, and projects to enable women by making them “productive” in the global economy).