The Counterplan protects the Baltic Region from a Ukraine-esk attack by Russia--- boosts NATO confidence in their most exposed members
Deni 22, John R, 3-3-2022, a research professor at the U.S. Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council. "NATO Must Prepare to Defend Its Weakest Point—the Suwalki Corridor," Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/03/03/nato-must-prepare-to-defend-its-weakest-point-the-suwalki-corridor/ //BigSasher
As the Biden administration monitors Moscow’s reaction to dramatic U.S. and allied increases in assistance to Ukraine as well as the punishing Western economic and financial sanctions on Russia, it should turn its focus to a relatively small corner of northeastern Europe that is familiar to military strategists but often overlooked by most policymakers and the general public.
The Suwalki corridor (also known as the Suwalki Gap) separates the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad on the Baltic Sea from Belarus, now host to thousands of Russian troops and soon home to permanently stationed Russian forces, including advanced fighter jets and nuclear weapons. It is also the only way to get by road or rail from Poland and Central Europe to the Baltic states—arguably NATO’s most exposed members.
A Russian move to seize control of the corridor may seem far-fetched, as it would explicitly involve an attack on NATO territory, triggering a U.S. military response. Nonetheless, if Moscow’s reinvasion of Ukraine has any central lesson to offer at this point, it’s that U.S. and allied officials must prepare now for worst-case scenarios by focusing on actual Russian military capabilities in the region, rather than the Kremlin’s announced intent, considered estimates of Russia’s strategic logic, or intelligence assessments of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s outlook.
Forty miles wide as the crow flies, the Suwalki corridor isn’t much of a corridor, at least in terms of natural boundaries such as rivers, coastlines, or mountains. Driving through the area last October while on a research trip to NATO units, I found it a wide-open rural region, predominantly characterized by rolling farmland interspersed with forests and small villages. Much of it is ideal terrain for tracked vehicles like tanks, given the very limited roadways and the gentle hills.
Two highways—one with two lanes each way, the other with just a single lane each way—plus a rail line, are all the ground-based transportation infrastructure that connect Poland with the Baltic states. Since Russia’s first invasion of Ukraine, in 2014, Western government officials, military leaders, and think tank experts have paid extra attention to this relatively narrow passageway between allies, primarily because of the chokepoint it represents should Russia seek to cut off the Baltics.
These concerns have only amplified in the last week, as Western officials weigh whether assistance to Ukraine might paint the West as co-combatants in the eyes of international law, providing Putin with a justification for lashing out. It’s also possible Moscow might respond militarily to the debilitating sanctions imposed by the West in the last week, in an echo of imperial Japan’s 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor following the imposition of a U.S. oil export embargo. Or as U.S. and other allied forces stream into the Baltic Sea and NATO’s eastern flank, the Kremlin may perceive an increased threat to Kaliningrad and seize the Suwalki corridor to create a land bridge to the exclave.
Kaliningrad—formerly Königsberg—has been Russian territory since the end of World War II, and it’s now home to substantial Russian combat forces, including the Russian Baltic Fleet, advanced air defenses, and mobile nuclear-capable Iskander-M missiles. Given this, Russia is particularly sensitive to any perceived threats to its control of the noncontiguous territory and might risk escalation if it misinterpreted NATO’s actions near Kaliningrad.
Obviously, seizing the Suwalki corridor would entail attacking Lithuania or Poland or both, leading directly to a war between NATO and Russia. This seems illogical or at best strategically unwise for Putin. However, the West’s ability to know and understand Putin’s logic and the rationale behind his decision-making has been obviously constrained by a lack of imagination, quality intelligence, or both.
For instance, some thought it was illogical for Putin to order the full-scale invasion of Ukraine if his objective was simply to keep it out of NATO. The simmering Donbass conflict had effectively achieved this since 2014, since one of the informal requirements for alliance membership is a lack of territorial disputes with neighbors.