The CP solves.
Eman and Dankar 2008 — Khaled El Emam, Children's Hospital of Eastern Ontario Research Institute; Fida Kamal Dankar, Children's Hospital of Eastern Ontario Research Institute, 2008 (“Protecting Privacy Using k-Anonymity,” J am Med, October, Available Online at https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2528029/?tool=pmcentrez, Accessed 07-13-2022)
The way in which k-anonymity would be applied depends on the re-identification scenario one is protecting against. To protect against the prosecutor re-identification scenario, then k-anonymity should be used. If the prosecutor scenario is not applicable, then k-anonymity is not recommended, and k-map should be used instead (or our approximations of it using the hypothesis testing approach D4). If both scenarios are plausible, then k-anonymity should be used because this is the most protective. Therefore, being able to make a decision on whether the prosecutor scenario is applicable is important.
If we assume a threshold risk of 0.2, then under the prosecutor scenario the data custodian would just k-anonymize with k = 5. Under the journalist scenario the data custodian would determine An external file that holds a picture, illustration, etc.
Object name is 627.S1067502708001047.si83.jpg using the hypothesis testing approach (D4) and then k-anonymize with An external file that holds a picture, illustration, etc.
Object name is 627.S1067502708001047.si84.jpg.
An intruder would only pursue a prosecutor re-identification scenario if s/he has certainty that the VIP has a record in An external file that holds a picture, illustration, etc.
Object name is 627.S1067502708001047.si85.jpg. There are three ways in which an intruder can have such certainty: 79,95
1 The disclosed data set represents the whole population (e.g., a population registry) or has a large sampling fraction. If the whole population is being disclosed then the intruder would have certainty that the VIP is in the disclosed data set. Also, a large sampling fraction means that the VIP is very likely to be in the disclosed data set.
2 If it can be easily determined who is in the disclosed sample. For example, the sample may be a data set from an interview survey conducted in a company and it is generally known who participated in these interviews because the participants missed half a day of work. In such a case it is known within the company, and to an internal intruder, who is in the disclosed data set.
3 The individuals in the disclosed data set self-reveal that they are part of the sample. For example, subjects in clinical trials do generally inform their family, friends, and even acquaintances that they are participating in a trial. One of the acquaintances may attempt to re-identify one of these self-revealing subjects. However, it is not always the case that individuals do know that their data is in a data set. For example, for studies were consent has been waived or where patients provide broad authorization for their data or tissue samples to be used in research, the patients may not know that their data is in a specific data set, providing no opportunity for self-revealing their inclusion.
If any of the above conditions apply, then protecting against the prosecutor scenario is required. However, many epidemiologic and health services research studies, including secondary use studies, would not meet the criteria set out above. In such a case, protection against the journalist scenario with the D4 approach is recommended.
Relationship to Other Work
Re-identification risk is sometimes measured or estimated as the proportion of records that are unique in the population. Such uniqueness is then used as a proxy for re-identification risk. One approach for estimating population uniqueness from a sample uses the Poisson–gamma model with the α and β parameters estimated by the method of moments, 96,97 but it over-estimates with small sampling fractions and under-estimates as the sampling fraction increases. 98 Another method that uses sub-sampling performs well for larger sampling fractions. 99–101 More recent work developed probability models and estimators for two attack-based re-identification risk measures. 102 However, uniqueness measures of risk will by definition give an answer of zero for any k-anonymized data set, and therefore are inappropriate in this context.