Hotlines solve Russia
Jeremi Suri 18, PhD from Yale, holds the Mack Brown Distinguished Chair for Leadership in Global Affairs at the University of Texas at Austin. He is a professor in the University's Department of History and the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affair. (1-9-2018; “What’s a Nuclear Hotline Good For Anyway;” Foreign Policy; https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/01/09/whats-a-nuclear-hotline-good-for-anyway/)
The history of previous nuclear hotlines offers important perspective. Their uses have been infrequent and often quite trivial, but their existence has discouraged rash behavior and encouraged confidence that crises can be managed short of war. Hotlines have facilitated signaling between adversarial states, and they have reduced the likelihood of dangerous miscalculations. They are valuable tools for diplomacy, especially in regions — like the Korean Peninsula — locked in conflict. The Cuban missile crisis inspired the creation of the first nuclear hotline. During the two weeks in October 1962 when the United States and the Soviet Union approached the precipice of thermonuclear war, U.S. President John F. Kennedy and Soviet First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev struggled to control events. Khrushchev famously warned Kennedy: “If we succeeded in finding a way out of a dangerous situation this time, next time we might not safely untie the tightly made knot.” The absence of direct communications between the two leaders tightened the knot as they struggled to understand each other’s motives and actions.The absence of direct communications between the two leaders tightened the knot as they struggled to understand each other’s motives and actions. Technological limitations, security concerns, and hostile Cold War attitudes made a point-to-point telephone line from the White House to the Kremlin impossible at that time. Instead, Kennedy and Khrushchev had to rely on intermediaries, including their ambassadors, who were underinformed and distrusted. They created special “back channels” to open new lines of negotiation, but these were often unreliable. Most significant unplanned events during the crisis, including the shoot-down of an American U-2 aircraft over Cuba, threatened to trigger major miscalculations and escalation. Leaders had long relied on diplomats, spies, and other intermediaries for their communications with adversaries. The difference in 1962 was that the speed and depth of potential destruction in a thermonuclear world reduced the time for deliberation and increased the dangers of miscalculation. Kennedy and Khrushchev felt that they needed to talk with more urgency and sobriety than their predecessors. They began by exchanging letters after the moment of acute crisis had passed. Then, in March 1963, the United States proposed “the establishment of direct and more secure communications” between American and Soviet leaders. On June 20, the two governments signed a memorandum of understanding in Geneva — the first arms control agreement of the Cold War — to create “a direct communications link” and “take the necessary steps to ensure continuous functioning of the link and prompt delivery to its head of government of any communications received by means of the link from the head of government of the other party.” Implementation came quickly, reflecting the eagerness of leaders in both capitals. On July 13, 1963, the first Soviet-American hotline became operational. It consisted of two pairs of Teletype machines, linked by dedicated telegraph wires routed through Europe and under the Atlantic Ocean. The receivers sat in the Pentagon and the Soviet Communist Party Headquarters, where they were continuously manned to receive messages and send them immediately to the White House and Kremlin. The communication between leaders was still textual and indirect, but the time required was reduced from days and hours to minutes, and the possibilities for distortion were minimized. In 1967, the White House added a terminal, connected to the Pentagon receivers, and over the next four decades the technology was updated to include satellite communications, facsimile equipment, and eventually, in 2008, email. The superpowers communicated through the hotline during numerous crises, beginning with the assassination of President Kennedy in November 1963, when Washington assured Moscow of political stability within the United States. The first extended exchange occurred during the 1967 Six-Day War, when American and Soviet leaders reassured one another that they would not intervene directly and would mutually sue for peace in the region. Similar communications during the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, the Yom Kippur War of 1973, and the Cyprus crisis of 1974 clarified the lines of deterrence in conflicts that could have expanded beyond their regions. Communications during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the Polish Solidarity crisis of 1981 were less successful in defusing conflict between Washington and Moscow, but the exchange of messages limited possible miscalculations as Cold War tensions increased. A direct voice link between the White House and Kremlin was possible by the 1990s, and it has largely replaced the textual hotline, although the latter still exists. American presidents now call allies and adversaries frequently, particularly during crises.American presidents now call allies and adversaries frequently, particularly during crises. In the last decade, they have begun to use cell connections in addition to landlines. Mobile technology, coupled with secure long-distance capabilities, facilitates reliable voice communications as never before. For leaders in Washington, the notion of a hotline has become more diffuse — there are many “hotlines.” They remain essential for clarifying motives and actions during terrorist attacks, civil wars, and invasions — as well as a growing list of economic, health, and climactic crises. They also ensure confidential dialogue, free from the public posturing that makes crisis de-escalation difficult. Leaders must trust the sincerity of one another’s words for these connections to be meaningful, but their very existence deepens trust among those who use them.