The U.S. can convince Putin to end the war
Beauchamp 22 [Zack, senior correspondent at Vox, where he covers global politics and ideology, and a host of Worldly, Vox's podcast on foreign policy and international relations., “How the US and its allies can help Ukraine without starting World War III”, 3/3/2022, https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/22958725/ukraine-russia-us-nato-sanctions-military-aid-protest]
While the current Western approach has been good at raising the costs of Putin’s invasion, it’s less obvious exactly how it’s supposed to end it.
One common misconception about sanctions, in particular, is that they work by brute force: that the target country suffers so much economic pain that they unilaterally give up on the policy the sanctioner dislikes. In actuality, sanctions more typically work when used as a negotiating tool — serving as a stick, accompanied by diplomatic carrots.
The Iranian nuclear program sanctions are a good example.
For years prior to the 2015 deal, the US and its allies had imposed harsh sanctions on Iran as punishment for its nuclear program — but Iran had refused to unilaterally cease its efforts. It took serious negotiations, and a whole raft of complex provisions in a final deal, for the US to convince Iran to accept limits on its nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief. When Trump tore up the Iran deal, and returned to sanctions absent serious negotiations, Iran .
In the Ukraine context, the US and its allies have not publicly laid out a plan for any kind of negotiated Russian climbdown. It’s not even clear that they have one: spoke to several US and European officials and found that only one even had a “clear-ish plan” for deescalating the sanctions.
Unless they’ve been considerably clearer in their communications with Russia, this vagueness makes the entire US strategy less effective — at least if the aim is to arrive at some kind of political settlement that ends the war short of regime change in Kyiv.
“If the goal is to compel, then the sanctioners need to be explicit about what Russia can do to get the sanctions lifted,” Dan Drezner, a political scientist at Tufts University who studies sanctions, . “Lack of clarity undermines coercive bargaining, because the targeted actor believes that sanctions will stay in place no matter what they do.”
There are several ways to go about this. Charap proposes trading relief of the central bank sanctions for a ceasefire, at least temporarily. More broadly, the West and Ukraine could pair sanctions relief with some diplomatic concessions — reassurance that US troops will never be stationed in Ukraine, for example — as part of a broader peace package.