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No lash-out – reform-oriented revolution enables smooth transition that curbs aggression

Pei 16 (Minxin Pei is the Tom and Margot Pritzker ’72 Professor of Government at Claremont McKenna College, “Transition in China? More Likely than You Think,” Journal of Democracy, Volume 27, Number 4, October 2016, online)//cmr

“Refolution” is a combination of reform and revolution. Typically, this process starts with limited reform initiated by the old regime, but ends with its involuntary exit from power. This phenomenon was first observed by Alexis de Tocqueville, who famously observed that “the most perilous moment for a bad government is one when it seeks to mend its ways.”22 This Tocquevillean paradox was vividly illustrated when Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev’s mid-1980s program of limited political reform, known as perestroika, sparked nationalist independence movements and ultimately a democratic revolution in the Soviet empire. Based on the instances of regime transition since the mid-1970s, “refolution” (or “transplacement,” to use Huntington’s term) can be divided into two categories. The first consists of those transitions that begin with reform and end with the removal of the ruling elites through “founding elections”—peaceful and competitive votes that are negotiated between the old-regime elite and the opposition. The second variant also starts with limited regime-initiated reform, but it ends with the collapse of the old regime rather than its negotiated exit via elections. The final phase of this type of “refolution” resembles a classic revolution, but with one critical difference: The demise of the old regime comes with relatively little bloodshed; rather than suffering defeat at the hands of an armed opposition, the regime essentially disintegrates—its authority evaporates, and its key supporters defect. By Huntington’s count, between 1974 and 1990 eleven transitions qualified as “transplacement.”23 To this list we may now add Burma. Although the country is not yet a full democracy, the democrats are now in charge of the government after the military regime’s humiliating and decisive loss in Burma’s first competitive elections, held in 2015. [End Page 15] The most critical variable in a “refolution” scenario is the shifting balance of power between the old regime and the opposition.24 This insight is crucial when considering the possible transition scenarios in regimes with conditions that are inhospitable to revolution, such as totalitarian or posttotalitarian regimes. For example, mass uprisings have no chance of success in regimes with strong repressive capacity. If, however, a regime becomes significantly weaker during the initial phase of the transition process, there may be some possibility that it could be overthrown at a later stage. The weakening of an old regime typically begins with the decay of its key institutions and the deterioration of its performance. This process can lead to two outcomes: A near-certain outcome is increasing opposition to the old regime and the erosion of its popular support. A less certain outcome is the rise of reformers inside the regime. The deterioration of the old regime could undermine the hard-liners and help reformers to emerge and take control of the top positions. These reformers could then undertake limited changes in the hope of reversing the regime’s deterioration. This would loosen up the old system and create initial opportunities for mass political mobilization. Of course, if the hard-liners manage to hold on to power in spite of the worsening conditions, reform would not occur and decay would continue. If, however, moderate reformers succeed in gaining power and launching limited reforms, three subsequent developments are certain to occur. First, the old regime will suffer a further split into three groups: moderate reformers in power, hard-liners opposed to even limited changes, and radical reformers demanding fundamental changes. This three-way rift will often produce a stalemate that creates highly favorable conditions for the removal of the old regime (primarily because it paralyzes the old regime’s repressive apparatus). Second, even in a stalemated reform process societal forces will gain unprecedented freedom and lose their fear of repression. This window of opportunity allows them to mobilize and acquire new capacities, thus shifting the balance of power in their favor. Third, the erosion of the old regime’s legitimacy will continue at an accelerating pace. Posttotalitarian regimes that attempt to reform must bear the heavy burden of history—specifically, the responsibility for crimes committed by their totalitarian predecessors against their own people. Limited [End Page 16] reform invariably brings greater press freedom, which in turn exposes the old regime’s crimes, laying bear the “Big Lie” that had shored up the regime’s legitimacy. A thoroughly delegitimized old regime is highly vulnerable to revolutionary overthrow. In essence, this describes the “refolution” dynamics that led to the collapse of the USSR. In the Chinese case, the likelihood of “refolution” will increase in the next ten years. By then, China will have experienced roughly an additional decade of regime decay. The effects of long-term economic stagnation, social frustrations, and deteriorating performance will have become plainly visible. If Xi steps down at the end of his second term, his successor will be under immense pressure to reverse the CCP’s declining fortunes. Such speculation, of course, assumes the likely failure of Xi’s efforts to revive the CCP through a mix of internal discipline, heightened repression, appeals to nationalism, and partial economic reforms. Moreover, by the dawn of the next decade, the CCP’s two post–Mao-era survival strategies—neoauthoritarian crony capitalism and strongman rule—will have proved to be unviable. Xi’s successor will therefore have to find another way to regain legitimacy. It will be a supreme irony of history if the CCP is ultimately brought down by refolution. Since Tiananmen, no nightmare has obsessed the CCP leadership more than the collapse of the Soviet Union, and no political leader has been more reviled by the party than Gorbachev. It is possible that the CCP’s determination not to succumb to the same fate as the Soviet Union will prevent the emergence of a Gorbachev-like figure, however dire the circumstances. But again, authoritarian regimes adopt reform mostly out of despair. Truly desperate dictatorships may have few other options. This dynamic compelled Mao’s immediate successors to embrace capitalism in the late 1970s, and we should not rule out the possibility that the same logic will force future Chinese leaders to take another historic gamble.

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