China won’t invade Taiwan---it’s militarily impossible
Patrick Porter 18. Professor of strategic studies at the University of Exeter. “The tyrannies of distance” in A. T. Thrall and B. H. Friedman eds. US Grand Strategy in the 21st Century. Routledge. 114-127.
But even if Taiwan was forcibly stripped of its surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) , and China could command the skies at low cost, in a wider context China faces a dilemma, a tradeoff between surprise and preparation. Whether it struck in 2009 14 or 2019, surprise and deception would come at the expense of preparedness and speed of engagement with large-scale forces, and vice versa. To inflict a surprise first strike that successfully suppressed Taiwan's air defences to the extent that it achieved air dominance, China would need to do so from a standing start, and to avoid giving the game away would have to forgo the prior preparation of a large-scale invasion force into a cross-strait armada, to cross the 100 nautical miles (run) from its bases closest to the most plausible point of assault, the small number of locations on the north-west beaches of Taiwan. It could hardly amass this force invisibly if a watchful Taiwan was minimally alert and used its surveillance technology efficiently. The interval between the first strike and then preparation for the attempted invasion would afford a vital window of time for Taiwan to recover and prepare for the next phase, including the roughly seven hours it would take for a fleet travelling at 15 knots to make the one-way crossing. Conversely, to prepare adequately with a buildup of force would sacrifice surprise, giving Taiwan days at least to disperse its forces, ensure the survival of large parts of its air force and get its planes off the airfields. Taiwan's topography is such that there are only a few landing-friendly points along its 500-mile coastline where a massed invasion could take place and where the defender could concentrate its forces. Consider the contrast with the Allied invasion of Normandy, where an amphibious assault could have taken place along a coastline 1,200 miles long and without the surveillance assets of today. Since the invasion fleet would have to be a sizable one of 100 assault ships loading vehicles, troops and supplies, and since a fully loaded invasion fleet would take about seven hours going at 15 knots in a one-way crossing of 100 nautical miles at the closest point, it is inconceivable that Taiwan would not see the buildup or see them coming.
Given China's greater strength of numbers and firepower and the problem that Taiwan would simply be unable to out-match it in crude material terms, a vital part of Taiwan's defence is the degree to which it has chosen prudent 'doctrine', and how realistically it defines victory. Doctrine simply means ideas of force employment. It scarcely determines outcomes, and relies on execution, but is needed to link technological means with strategic ends. Taiwan may not be able to out-gun China materially, but as history suggests, well-prepared weaker defending sides can return fire by optimising what they have to create an imposing defensive system. Taiwanese and international observers have intensively debated what it should do with its lesser resources in the face of an adversary whose relative material strength is growing alarmingly. Several competing doctrinal options have been on the table. None of these are mutually exclusive but there are tradeoffs involved, as each would draw resources from the others. They can be organised around two ideal-typical 'poles', 'classical defence' and 'porcupine defence'.
The 'classical defence' grows out of Taiwan's traditional doctrine of defence against an invader. When it had the greater qualitative military edge, Taiwan defined victory in offensive terms, to win in a direct clash for control of the seas and skies, overpowering China's larger but less advanced forces. It also planned on interdicting China's approaching forces far from Taiwan's coast. Designed for a symmetrical, toeto-toe clash, this approach was capital-intense and involved hi-tech conventional forces at the cutting edge. It sought to thwart Chinese invading forces out at sea and in air space well beyond its islands, which would also be defended by a mass citizen army. Budgetary constraints, China's military modernisation fuelled by economic growth, disenchantment with conscription and a shift to an all-volunteer army have made this approach problematic. Today the model is reinventeq in the argument that Taiwan should compete with China's modernisation programme with its own, lobbying hard for state-of-the-art aircraft such as the F 16 CID or the Joint Strike Fighter, as well as developing the ability to engage in a conflict via bombing the Chinese mainland with surface-to-surface missiles with extended range, which would also form a pre-emptive strike capability. In a struggle that would entail a clash of advanced machines, Taiwan would not give up its effort to compete in the same technological contest and match its quality with China's.
By contrast, the 'porcupine defence' is more deliberately asymmetrical in the sense that it seeks to exploit the differences between invader and defender - differences of strategic objective as well as differences in the type of forces being used (Murray 2008). Instead of an expensive modernisation programme that attempts to match the quality if not the quantity of China's forces, it looks more to a 'passive defence' that would ensure that enough of Taiwan's forces could survive the initial onslaught. The porcupine approach invests more in the survivability of forces, their dispersal and concealment, the hardening of command and control systems, the repair of damaged assets such as runways, and resilience against electromagnetic and cyber attacks. It is a more army-centric doctrine that places more investment in fortifying ground-based infrastructure and training personnel for a land war. It emphasises the exploitation of terrain. It is less reliant on American largesse and technology transfer. In an alternative version, a low-tech porcupine strategy could also extend out to sea, with guerrilla warfare in nearby waters waged by 'swarms of light combatants' (Holmes 2013a).
What we know of Taiwan's actual strategy mixes features from both models. The evidence that we have suggests that Taiwan is making prudent choices about how it allocates its resources and is redefining its objectives realistically. It draws from the porcupine logic the shift from ambitious to achievable strategic goals. Rather than seeking to defeat Chinese forces outright in a decisive Mahanian naval clash, its objective is to deny China an affordable conquest by raising costs on invader to defend defacto independence. When it had the greater qualitative military edge, Taiwan defined victory in offensive terms - to win in a direct clash for control of seas and skies, overpowering and destroying China's larger but less advanced forces. It designed its defences accordingly, around capital ships and advanced planes and matching its adversaries' investments. Judging by its own published doctrine, the National Defense Report of 2011, Taiwan recognises that victory in these terms is no longer realistic and it is switching accordingly (Cole 2013a). Taiwan now defines victory as ensuring the survival of enough forces and preventing land forces establishing a foothold on Taiwan (Republic of China 2011: 131-132).4 Its Quadrennial Defense Review of 2013 also suggests a doctrinal shift, emphasising the preservation of critical infrastructure to prevent being paralysed by 'sudden and high-intensity assaults' and the exploitation of Taiwan's advantages in space and time (Republic of China 2013: 38-40, 41). The same logic that enables China with today's tools to raise the costs of US intervention into its maritime space to unpalatable levels enables Taiwan to do the same at a price more suited to its limited GDP expenditure on defence (Blumenthal 2011; Holmes 2013b). To turn the nautical approaches to the island into contested zones, it exploits 'swarming' methods by preparing small-attack craft armed with anti-ship cruise missiles as light guerrillas at sea.
There is evidence that Taiwan is putting these doctrinal decisions into practice (Minnick 2010; Cole 2012a; Cole 2013b; Cole 2013c; United States-Taiwan Business Council 2010). Taiwan has built a hidden underground sanctuary inside a mountain near its Hualien air base on its east coast, a bomb shelter large enough to shelter 200 fighters linked to the above-ground base by a 7,500 foot taxiway. At least since 2010, it has been hardening airfield facilities, has introduced a major hardened aircraft storage facility at Taitung in south-eastern Taiwan, and is now addressing one of the weaknesses identified by RAND in 2009 by strengthening its Rapid Runway Repair crews to improve the survivability of runways at several air bases. It invests in mobile launchers for missiles and has acquired and now fields roadmobile missile launchers that can be dispersed and camouflaged, armed with rockets capable of firing at ships (such as the HF-3 supersonic anti-ship cruise missile) and Ray Ting 2000s with an artillery range of up to 45 km into China's mainland. To turn the point of amphibious landing into a shooting gallery, it is digging in with entrenched anti-ship and anti-air missile sites. To make both the sea approach and the beachhead more perilous, it prepares sea and land mines, the former of which could be scattered by artillery tubes. And it prepares to wage a 'war of the flea' out at sea with small, fast and low-signature missile-armed ships (31 Kuang Hua VI class boats) that are harder to locate and sink than heavier frigates and destroyers. They would be assisted by 12 maritime patrol aircraft. These lighter ships are armed with cruise and surface-to-surface missiles, thereby mixing the asymmetric logic of the porcupine strategy with the active extended defence desired by the classical approach. There is some uncertainty about how effectively these could operate in a full-scale war scenario, given their reliance on off-board radar and datalinks for targeting, which are located on vulnerable radar sites within range of China's missiles. Regardless, Taiwan has also diversified and expanded its number of smaller ships, increasing the number of its coastal patrol craft from 51 to 61 - a 20% increase as of 2012 (Cordesman, Hess, and Yarosh 2012: 198) - and armed seven patrol boats and . a radar-evasive fast attack corvette with Hsiung Feng III (HF-3) ramjet-powered supersonic anti-ship missiles to increase the probability of having a surviving naval defence off its coastline. This prudently trades off Taiwan's ability to fight a high-seas naval battle for the ability to mount a defence closer to its littoral. Taipei has also developed the ability to push the defence line further out from its coast through the alternative means of long-range missiles that enable the interdiction of enemy forces out at sea. If the 'swarming' orchestration of smaller assets against larger forces is potentially a potent way for weaker states like Taiwan to threaten surface fleets with their large, expensively acquired capital ships, on the evidence we have, a prima facie overview suggests that Taiwan has developed both the doctrine and the tools to carry it off (Holmes and Yoshihara 2012). Since RAND produced its estimate in 2009, Taiwan's increasing investment in and attention to building a passive defence by increasing the probability that its capabilities will be dispersed, concealed and survivable is possibly the most significant development in Taiwan's preparation to counter the growing 'missile' imbalance across the straits.
Even though there remains uncertainty about the success of any of these measures in a conflict, each of them adds a 'layer' of defence that increases the probability that China will not be able to clear the seas and skies sufficiently to create a safe corridor for its invading forces to approach, and that Taiwan can punch back and inflict significant damage after the first barrage. Just as importantly, each extra layer of potential surviving defence adds uncertainty to China's calculations about the costs of invasion. 5 Through passive defensive measures, Taiwan would aim to keep its forces survivable: through mobility, redundancy, and the hardening and camouflage of its assets, as well as the stockpiling of food and fuel. These would not prevent large-scale damage to Taiwan's military and civilian property but could preserve enough combat power to keep material costs on following-on invading force high. This doctrine, properly applied, would help it raise costs on amphibious force as it approached and as it reached the shore in the following phases.
The 'bottom line' in an amphibious campaign is the ability to transport enough troops to the point of invasion, and securely enough to land and supply them. Let us assume that China now possesses the 100 transport ships it aims to acquire. Going on a rough 1: 1 personnel ratio, RAND estimated in 2009 that China would need to get at least two group armies, or roughly 60,000 troops, ashore, and that this would require 194 successful naval trips or sorties.6 The difficulty for China is that unless its initial effort to suppress Taiwan's defences and deflect its air and naval attacks succeeds almost perfectly, its ability to get enough ships across safely will be in jeopardy. Unless China could successfully neutralise Taiwan's ability to 'thin the herd' by taking out its air bases, its fixed and mobile land-based missile launchers (such as RBS-17 coastal-defence missiles mounted on trucks), its missile-armed Apache helicopters and its swarming fast-attack ships, its invasion will be in trouble.
To take one layer of defence alone: RAND estimates that ifTaiwan's 31 Kuang Hua VI class fast missile boats, armed with four Hsiung Feng II ASCMs each, launch half of their payload, that would put 60 in the air, enough to inflict a disabling 'mission kill' on perhaps 12 Chinese transport ships. Going on RAND's estimate that, distributed evenly, each ship represents 310 troops and six vehicles, 12 ships sunk or turned back would see off 3,700 troops and 72 vehicles, and prevent those ships from participating in the three extra sorties needed for the entire transport fleet to get 60,000 troops and their equipment across within a reasonable span of five days. If China would want each ship to attempt four sorties, 12 ships taken out of action before completing their first sortie would mean a total of 48 sorties denied of the 194 out of 400 needed to succeed.
In this first phase, the weight of forces would favour China, but the conditions of space and time would favour Taiwan. On the more optimistic end of the spectrum, Taiwan's early-warning system would succeed, giving it vital minutes to protect its forces from incoming strikes and preserving enough planes to contest the skies. But taking a worse-case scenario would also leave it with warning of another kind. The Chinese air force, with saturation missile attacks and then fixed-wing attacks, lands a knockout punch against Taiwan's air bases, following the failure of its earlywarning system, Taiwan would be forced to use degraded air bases with a degraded capacity to generate air sorties. But, to ensure deception and surprise, China would have to refrain from large-scale preparatory buildup of amphibious forces. The air attack plus the time it would take to build up invasion forces would place Taiwan on notice to mobilise forces for defending ground. If Taiwan had time and depending on levels of preparation, it could adopt a 'layered' forward defence, looking to 'thin the herd' of China's amphibious forces at sea before defending at the water's edge. It would take aim primarily at its transport ships.
Let us suppose that despite the many problems the task would entail, China has seized the ability to cross the distance of 100 nautical miles from the bases closest to north-west Taiwan, neutralised Taiwan's sea and air defences, and reached the coast bearing platforms to operate from, such as several Type 071 Landing Platform Dock ships with hangers and landing and vehicle decks, loaded with marines, vehicles and helicopters, and over a dozen landing ships. The next task would be to forcibly enter terrain in the face of reinforced defences while vulnerable, establish a beachhead, and continuously supply a very large military force across the ocean despite adversary actions.
In a worst-case scenario for Taiwan, where China successfully destroyed its air bases and runways, the defender would probably still be able to mount a robust defence that inflicted serious costs by creating a lethal zone at the point of 'run-in' where the approaching forces must operate in plain sight, unmasked by electronic sensors (see Shlapak et al. 2009: 114-115). Taiwan's coastline means that it could anticipate the approximate point of invasion. China's transport ships would enter a kill zone in which Taiwan would have roughly a 20-minute window to fire Hellfire missiles at transports, or five minutes to fire at faster air-cushion landing craft. Then with a minimal surviving blend of Apache helicopters, dug-in and mobile artillery, and missile forces and mines, Taiwan could be expected to turn the point of disembarkation into a shooting gallery and a chaotic traffic jam, even if it lacked control of the skies over the beach and even if its aircraft were pinned in shelters or immobilised by destroyed runways. If it would take two 1,000 lb bombs, such as Joint Direct Attack Munitions, to destroy a warship, 100 fired by a B-1B plane could disable 50 ships, or failing that, helicopters, ground launchers, infantry and tanks could deliver Hellfire missiles over a short range of five miles. In this respect, RAND's estimate of 2009 still holds, only Taiwan has taken greater steps to ensure that its arsenal would survive the preliminary bombardment.
This is not the place for a precise forecast that ignores the play of chance and the effect of 'unknowns', not least China's relative ability to mount cyber attacks against Taiwan's increasing preparations of cyber defence, an aspect of the conflict too secretive and untraceable to measure precisely in advance. But on this analysis, the scenario is more difficult for the invader than the attacker, to the extent that the stars must align more or less perfectly for the attacker. The defender, Taiwan, would merely have to ride out the first bombardment well enough to be able to make an attempted invasion expensive. As I argue, a Chinese invasion would be costly, protracted and geopolitically dangerous. There is no certain way to measure the political will of either side in a neat cost-benefit calculs. Taiwan represents something bigger politically than just an island with resources, to both its inhabitants and the larger state that covets it, and the history of the issue is drenched with emotion. We can estimate, however, what an attempted conquest would entail and the kinds of costs and risks that the invader would be wise to consider. The longer the struggle continued, the greater would be the fear of it escalating and drawing in other powers. Taiwan's objective would be to pose the question to China of just how large a sacrifice it was prepared to make to achieve its objectives. Despite the eroding defence advantages and closing gap between China and Taiwan's forces, Taiwan could still inflict grave, possibly prohibitive costs on the invader. China's increasing airpower 'edge' and strengthening cross-strait strike and invasion capabilities would not be enough to negate the possibility of exploiting geography to the defender's decisive advantage. Taiwan's objective, within reach of its capabilities, would not be to sink/destroy China's navy and air force, but to make adventurism very expensive, to the point where successful conquest would set China's military back years if not decades. This confirms the recent warning of RAND that 'forced entry' via large-scale, over-the-shore amphibious assault against resistance is obsolete for many environments (Davis and Wilson 2011: 13-14). The same logic that enables China with today's tools to raise the costs of US intervention into its maritime space to unpalatable levels enables Taiwan to do the same at a price more suited to its limited GDP expenditure on defence. For America, these developments both generate security and constrain its power at the same time. As Christopher Layne argues, 'Far from shrinking the world grand strategically, for the United States, modern weaponry - naval and strategic airpower, intercontinental delivery systems, and nuclear weapons - has widened it' (Layne 2006: 278).
3 No-one's world: negotiating power in an unconquerable Asia
If we really do inhabit a globalising world where distance loses its force, that process should make conquest easier. This should be so to the extent that the outcomes of conflicts are generated by the balance of material forces, mediated far less by the effects of exploiting terrain than they would have been historically. But as this chapter argues, our era is different. Across bodies of water, it is one of fire without conquest. New weapons with their range and lethality have the capacity to increase distance and erect new barriers to interlopers. Space, therefore, is better conceived as an interplay of political will, capabilities and geography. As I have demonstrated here, the history of the continual shifting balance between sword and shield, and the tendency of states to measure the stakes involved according to the 'nearness' or 'farness' of the war, casts doubt on strategic visions where technology erases the dilemmas of distance or creates unambiguous 'offence dominance'. We are seeing the emergence of a period of access denial. These issues are pressing in maritime East Asia, where the strategic implications of new weapons shape the rivalries and mutual fears of rising powers. An illustrative case where offensive technology would meet the exploitation of time, space and terrain for defensive purposes is the crossstrait military balance and the prospects for a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.
The estimate here suggests that amphibious assaults, projecting ground forces from sea to land, against a determined adversary making prudent doctrinal and technological choices, remain complex and demanding. There is little doubt that in a war that the US stayed out of, China would probably eventually prevail at least as far as neutralising Taiwan's air force and navy, if not simply sending repeated waves of ground troops if it could keep enough sea and airlift capability. But it would be costly, protracted and geopolitically dangerous. This problem is reflected also in the projections of future campaigns by the US Marine Corps, the world's premier amphibious force. Its 'Expeditionary Force 21' concept predicts that ever longer range capabilities, such as precision guided missiles, along with widely available and cheap sensors like nautical radar, 'will force the fleet to stay at least 65 nautical miles offshore, a dozen times the distance that existing Marine amphibious vehicles are designed to swim' (Freedberg 2014)
Of course, this is about more than capabilities. There is no certain way to measure the political will of either side in a neat cost-benefit calculus. To itself and its hostile larger neighbour, Taiwan represents something bigger politically than just an island with resources, and the history of the issue is drenched with emotion. We can estimate, however, what an attempted conquest would entail and the kinds of costs and risks that the invader would be wise to consider. The longer the struggle continued, the greater fear of it escalating and drawing in other powers. Taiwan's objective would be to pose the question to China of just how large a sacrifice it was prepared to make to achieve its objectives. Despite the eroding defence advantages and closing gap between China and Taiwan's forces, Taiwan could still inflict grave, possibly prohibitive costs on the invader. China's increasing airpower 'edge' and strengthening cross-strait strike and invasion capabilities would not be enough to negate the possibility of exploiting geography to the defender's decisive advantage. Taiwan's objective, within reach of its capabilities, would not be to sink/ destroy China's navy and air force, but to make adventurism very expensive, to the point where successful conquest would set its military back years if not decades. This confirms the recent warning of RAND that 'forced entry' via large-scale, overthe-shore amphibious assault against resistance, is obsolete for many environments (Davis and Wilson 2011: 13-14).
What does all this mean in the bigger picture? It should both caution and reassure US policymakers. Taiwan can present an ominous defence against an invader without America going to the trouble of ramping up its security assistance and arms trade with Taiwan, and the deterioration of relations with China that this may create. Taiwan's vulnerability is easily exaggerated. In terms of its ability to conquer, a rising China is not as strategically threatening as sometimes assumed. This is also important for the wider security environment. Contrary to the views of some observers, it is not clear that Beijing has an appetite for limitless expansion, or that China's strategy of'peaceful rise' is comparable to that of the Third Reich. But even if China does increase its appetite and make a bid for region-wide supremacy, now or in the future, conditions are not promising for a would-be conqueror. East Asia is not a power vacuum open to the predations of a single aggressor like Nazi Germany or Imperial Japan, but a region crowded with states developing their own formidable defensive maritime-air capabilities to deter and respond to one power's adventurism.
The other side of that coin is that American military power is more greatly constrained than before. If it is true that the home defender enjoys advantage against the cross-sea invader, so too does China's geographic and strategic position make life increasingly difficult for America as an Asia-Pacific power. China's greater proximity to Taiwan in West Pacific or East Asian waters combined with its growing capacity for access and area denial threatens America's ability to intervene at acceptable cost, and more broadly therefore to maintain its credibility as a security guarantor. It is harder for America to function as the guardian of the Pacific region if its ability to operate there is strained and it can no longer act as though the sea lanes were its uncontested lake. This poses difficulties to America's 'air-sea battle' concept. Washington's 'pivot' towards Asia is 'a foreign-policy enterprise by which US joint forces concentrate for action in remote theaters. The military must mass strategically significant quantities of soldiers and armaments in a contested theatre like the Far East, surmounting both transoceanic distances and regional antagonists' attempts to veto intervention' (Holmes 2013a). The increasing range and lethality of weapons systems coupled with the determination of states to defend themselves means that, paradoxically, the growing capacity of states to strike over range has also empowered defenders to an unusual degree.
We are left with a paradox. On the one hand, today's war-making tools with their reach seem to have collapsed distance in a physical sense. On the other hand, as this chapter demonstrates, it seems prima facie that the conquest of territory against defenders with a minimal level of will and capability mostly no longer pays. The greater reach and lethality of weapons today empowers defenders as well as attackers, and, at least in the case of attempted territorial expansion across bodies of water, there remains an overall imbalance that favours defenders if they are willing and competent enough to resist. The likely costs of conquest most of the time make it prohibitively difficult. Measured in these terms, for would-be conquerors and for those who would ride to the rescue of the conquered, the world has never been so large.