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US officials uses terms associated with gender sterotypes to describe other nations – lays foundation for hegemonic masculinity mindset of the U.S.

Costigliola ’97 – Frank, a Board of Trustees Distinguished Professor of History at the University of Connecticut, “The Nuclear Family: Tropes of Gender and Pathology in the Western Alliance”, Spring 1997, Oxford University Press, https://www-jstor-org.proxy.lib.umich.edu/stable/pdf/24913279.pdf?refreqid=excelsior:1d4dbe043a72071f54e4a04e33d89925&ab_segments=0/SYC-6451/test&origin=&acceptTC=1

Throughout the Cold War, metaphors of gender and of pathology re mained available to those officials or analysts who sought to emphasize the "Soviet threat." Just as Kennan at the onset of the Cold War employed emotive language to signify the Soviets as a hypermasculine, monstrous force, two decades later other officials used similar representations to delegiti mate what they feared as uncontrolled détente along the German-German border. As Foreign Minister Willy Brandt reached out to the German Demo cratic Republic, a U.S. State Department analysis in October 1968 characterized his nascent Ostpolitik as "the near-pathetic speeches and statem leaders overflowing with 'good will' and asking friend and foe and at least 'understanding.' " The State Department docum from this behavior that West Germans "are not only jittery and that they feel helpless." The language here - "near-pathetic," " ened," and "helpless" - coded the West Germans as emasculated suggested that West Germans had lost their self-discipline and uphold necessary boundaries. The position of the word "overfl "leaders" suggested that not only the statements and speeches o but also those officials themselves were spilling over with fem or sympatny, good win, ana understanding - not tne stun or reaipoiitiK. Furthermore, the document argued, the West as a whole had demonstrated "marked passivity," in the face of the August 1968 Czech invasion and appeared "rather soft" on the issue of access to Berlin. In language that recalled Kennan's long telegram, the State Department document contrasted the insufficient masculinity of the West with the invasive hypermasculinity of the East. "Coldly systematic and inexorable," the East Germans were becoming "harder and harsher" and appeared ready to "dem onstrate to Bonn its utter impotence and helplessness." East Germany would accomplish this final rape and emasculation "by sudden rapid thrusts" of "specialized forces" into West Berlin.'4 This characterization of détente as making the West vulnerable to emasculation did not mean that the U.S. government opposed détente as such. Rather, détente was a contested policy; this document represented thinking that remained locked in the Cold War paradigm; and even proponents of détente such as Elenry Kissinger wanted the United States to control the process and to prevent a race to Moscow. Although this essay focuses on the emotive language used by U.S. officials to naturalize their superiority and to depoliticize the Western allies' contrary points of view, such language was not, of course, an American monopoly. Rather, tropes of gender, pathology, and other figures of speech — which draw their emotional power from deeply felt notions about the body, the psyche, and the supposed immutable order of the most private aspects of life - are available to any people who believe themselves superior to, and able to judge, others. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that British Treasury and Foreign Office officials used such discourse, notably in 1945—46, when they still hoped to regain their prewar prominence and to guide their presumptively less sophisticated transatlantic cousins. British analysts clung to a structure of meaning based on the perceived opposition between their masculine rationality — "ripe and calm wisdom," as John Maynard Keynes put it — and the Americans' less-than-mas culine emotionalism. The British ambassador in Washington depicted Ameri can leaders as suffering from "uneasy bewilderment," "fear of the unknown," "baffled dismay," and "a constant disposition to prefer the emotional to the rational approach." Furthermore, the Americans were "nervous," "lackjed] stable purpose," and put their "faith in the magic of large words." To counter U.S. bragging about the atomic bomb - that "hubbub of emotional talk" - the United Kingdom would marshal its own masculine-coded superweapon, namedly "lucid ... appeals to reason and the logic of hard fact

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