China uses an autocratic Hungary to expand its sphere of influence to challenge NATO in Europe.
FrançOis Venne, 1-6-2022, François Venne is a Title VIII Fellow with the Transatlantic Leadership Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). Venne holds a Master of Arts in Law and Diplomacy degree from The Fletcher School at Tufts University (as of May 2021) where he concentrated in International Negotiation and Conflict Resolution and Political Systems and Theories. He is also a proud College of the Holy Cross alumnus having earned his Bachelor of Arts degree in International Studies and French, with a minor in Religious Studies. China in Hungary: Real Threat or False Alarm?, CEPA, https://cepa.org/china-in-hungary-real-threat-or-false-alarm jkap
In April 2021, Hungary blocked an EU (European Union) statement condemning China for its authoritarian Hong Kong security law, its latest in a series of efforts shielding the Chinese regime from criticism.1 The backlash from the EU and its largest member, Germany, was fierce. German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas called Hungary’s move an “absolutely incomprehensible” action that prevented the EU from speaking with “one voice” over China.2 “This is not the first time that Hungary has broken away from [the EU’s] unity when it comes to the issue of China,” Maas said.2 Nor will it likely be the last. Since Prime Minister Viktor Orbán came to power in 2010 and Hungary joined the 16+1 Initiative in 2012 and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013, China has become an important factor in Hungary-EU relations. Western claims that Hungary was or is becoming a Chinese “puppet”3 or “Trojan horse”4 that could damage the EU’s unity from within have become commonplace; they are often fueled by incidents such as the blocked EU statement and Orbán’s insistence on treating China as a partner and ally rather than as a competitor and rival. Hungary’s technological dealings with China also actively concern the US; Hungary’s use of China’s Huawei tech despite US pressure has especially been a source of tension between the two governments. In short, Budapest’s relations with Beijing, especially with regard to the BRI, have heightened tensions with the US, the EU, and within Hungary itself. Ultimately, how the transatlantic alliance finds itself challenged by the Sino-Hungarian relationship informs how the US and EU choose to respond. This report therefore seeks to answer the following questions: In what ways does Hungary’s political-economic relationship with China impact the transatlantic alliance as it seeks to counter China? How can and should the US respond to these concerns, if at all? To address these questions, the remainder of this report proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes Hungary’s relationship with the EU and the US. Section 3 explains how the Hungary-China relationship concerns the transatlantic alliance. Section 4 explains the nature of and dispels myths about Hungary’s relationship with China and describes the driving force behind the relationship. Section 5 discusses policy options and proposes a set of policy solutions. Section 5 concludes. With the end of the Cold War and Hungary’s acceptance into NATO and the EU in 1999 and 2004 respectively, Hungary became a welcomed and involved member of the transatlantic community. Since Orbán came to power in 2010, however, Hungary’s relationships with the EU and the US have been tense, with China becoming a particular irritant in recent years. The Hungary-EU relationship has proved politically tense but economically strong over the past decade, with both Hungarian domestic politics and foreign policy toward undemocratic states such as China playing an important role. Since 2010, EU member Hungary has touted itself domestically as an “illiberal democracy”6 and a one-party state at the heart of Europe, distancing itself from its “traditional [European] democratic allies,”7 and drawing closer to other, non-European regimes such as China, Russia, and Turkey.8 Claiming it has systematically failed to comply with EU norms, policies, and expectations such as protecting the rule of law and standing for democracy,9 the EU has criticized Hungary for behaving like a “rogue state”7 within Europe. Hungary has flatly denied all accusations of wrongdoing, calling the EU a “liberal empire”7 and claiming it abuses its power, targets the state, and unjustly meddles in its domestic affairs. Driven by Orbán, Hungary’s conflict with the EU has become especially acute. Elected in 2010, Orbán has gradually “align[ed] the judicial, executive and legislative branches”11 in favor of his national-conservative, right-wing Fidesz party, effectively turning Hungary into a one-party state.In September 2018, the tension between Hungary and the EU worsened when the European Parliament voted to trigger Article 7 of the Treaty on the European Union, an action that could ultimately threaten Hungary’s EU funding and voting rights.6 This past year, they have further clashed or diverged on several foreign policy issues, with China most recently taking center stage. For instance, as internal strife began in Belarus following the (still) disputed results of the August 2021 presidential election, Orbán’s Hungary, which shares Aliaksandr Lukashenka’s authoritarian tendencies,12 called simply for dialogue with Belarus as the rest of the EU called for diplomatic or economic coercion.13 Later, in November 2020, Hungary blocked the EU budget including a COVID-19 relief package, objecting to a provision that would make funds contingent upon a country’s respect for democratic norms.14 Most recently, Hungary blocked or refused to sign several EU statements criticizing China for its actions related to Hong Kong and the South China Sea, and atrocities against the Uyghurs. This political tension has not led to economic friction, let alone a decoupling of their economies. Indeed, despite Hungary’s Opening to the East Strategy of cultivating economic links with China through 16+1 and BRI, Hungary-EU economic ties remain significant. For instance, Hungary continues to receive over €4bn ($4.6bn) from the EU per year, while contributing less than €1bn ($1.16bn) to the EU budget,16 making it the fourth-largest net recipient of EU funding.17 The EU also is Hungary’s largest economic partner, with 82% of its exports going to EU member states and 75% of its imports coming from within the EU.16 Eight of its 10 top importers and nine of its 10 top exporters are EU members (the UK is its tenth importer, Russia is its ninth exporter, and China is its third exporter).18 Germany, its top trading partner both for imports (25.3%) and exports (27.7%),18 is particularly important to Hungary, leading to a largely positive relationship that Hungary has come to depend on.19 Berlin therefore holds a level of economic and political leverage over Budapest that few, if any, other countries share.20 The US-Hungary relationship has also weathered some tension over the past decade, some related to domestic Hungarian affairs and others to China (see Figure 2). As Hungary trended toward authoritarianism, the US, led by President Barack Obama — a self-described champion of democracy, liberalism, and the rule of law — gave Orbán the cold shoulder, effectively cutting off high-level contacts.21 With Hungary’s interest in political recognition secondary to its desire for national security that the US — and not the EU — could offer through NATO, such lack of American appreciation, though problematic, would not generate outright anti-Americanism. Additionally, Orbán said in 2016 that “economic relations… [remained] good” during this period.22 This tame response reflects Hungary’s inherent dependence on the US and a respect for its power. Under President Donald Trump, relations saw an immediate reset. Orbán “welcomed” Trump’s 2016 presidential victory8 and Trump equally welcomed Orbán, inviting him to the White House in May 2019 to “lavish praise” on the prime minister.23 Orbán’s Hungary and Trump’s America shared an embrace of nationalism, “authoritarian populist"24 governance, and skepticism of Western alliances, but they did have tense moments. For instance, the US considered Hungary a “growing liability” for the transatlantic alliance and reportedly considered sanctioning Orbán’s close associates in 2019.25 One significant “liability” is Hungary’s continued use of China’s Huawei 5G technology,26 despite US warnings that Huawei is a national security risk and should be shunned.5 Orbán’s government even allowed Huawei to establish an R&D center in Budapest in 2020 This tech-driven tension that originated during the Trump era remains a growing issue and one of the Biden administration’s primary challenges as it seeks to strengthen its leadership and improve its competitiveness in the CEE region. CHALLENGES POSED TO THE TRANSATLANTIC ALLIANCE BY HUNGARY-CHINA RELATIONS. The Sino-Hungarian relationship has raised the transatlantic alarm and ultimately creates the following primary challenges: First, it emboldens Orbán and exacerbates ideological and policy divisions within the EU, making a united EU and joint US-EU response to China more difficult. Second, BRI and the relationship lays bare the US’s inability to establish a strong economic presence in the CEE region to compete with China. Additionally, the relationship, especially Hungary’s use of Huawei, puts into relief the US’s lack of technology leadership on infrastructure and telecommunications networks development in Europe. Responding to these challenges requires strategies at the US and transatlantic levels. The West must be careful not to misjudge the nature and degree of the threat the Sino-Hungarian relationship poses or misunderstand what drives the relationship, lest it overreact politically and worsen the situation. UNDERSTANDING HUNGARY-CHINA RELATIONS To properly address the challenges posed by Hungary-China relations, the transatlantic alliance must understand several points. First, contrary to the perception created by the Hungarian and Chinese governments, the relationship offers limited economic benefits for Hungary, which therefore remains largely dependent upon the EU and the US. Second, Orbán himself is the main driving force behind Hungary’s pro-China policy; his personal cost-benefit analysis of working with China comes before Hungary’s more generally. Third and last, there is a minimal threat to the transatlantic alliance of a Chinese “Trojan horse” in Hungary controlling foreign policy. THE PERCEPTION VERSUS REALITY OF HUNGARY'S GAINS Seeking to ease its economic dependence on the West following the 2008 financial crisis, Hungary adopted an “Opening to the East Strategy” to cultivate ties with China; the 16+1 initiative and BRI were therefore welcome opportunities. From the start of 16+1 and BRI, the Hungarian and Chinese governments have pointed to developments that suggest Hungary gains substantially from the relationship and that their ties are “prosperous,” in the words of Xinhua, a Chinese state-run news agency.28 For instance, the governments note that China is now Hungary’s greatest trade partner outside of the EU, with annual trade worth approximately $9 bn.29 Since 2013, Hungary has been one the largest recipients of the billions of dollars China has poured into infrastructure projects in CEE.30 It boasts the highest level of cumulative Chinese FDI from 2000 to 2020 of all the EU’s CEE countries, ($3.1 bn), 23% more than second-place Poland (see Figure 3).31 Hungary also reports that last year China invested almost $6 bn in the country (see Figure 4), more than most other CEE members.32 Hungary and China have also signed a deal to build the Belgrade-to-Budapest railway.33 Furthermore, the Chinese and Hungarian governments have frequently held talks at 16+1 summits and BRI forums, and established a “comprehensive strategic partnership,”34 setting the stage for further cooperation. At first glance, these developments give the impression that Hungary has seen large gains and has strengthened its ties with China — and thereby has also decreased its dependence on the EU. The reality, however, is a different story. Few, if any, experts find that Hungary has gained economically from its relations with China in a way that substantially threatens the EU. Most, in fact, find the opposite.35 Hungary’s post-2010 gains have been modest, exaggerated, or underwhelming at best, and completely lacking at worst. First, the Opening to the East policy has failed to deliver, with Hungary increasing its trade dependence on China from 2009 to 2014 by less than 0.5%36 and keeping its trade dependence on the EU at over 75%. Second, Hungary’s $3.2 bn cumulative completed Chinese FDI is minimal compared with the rest of Europe; Germany and the UK have received more than 9 times that amount (see Figure 3), reflecting China’s priorities and preference for ties with Western Europe over Hungary. Third, Hungary received only $4.07 bn in Chinese investment last year — not $5.95 bn or $5.36 bn, as the Hungarian and Chinese governments respectively claimed. Indeed, both governments inflated their figures to create the illusion that China was more invested and involved in Hungary than it actually was (see Figure 4).36 Fourth, the Belgrade-to-Budapest railway offers little, if any, economic benefit to Hungary; some estimates suggest it could take between 130 and 2,400 years (!) before Hungary makes a profit from it.37 Fifth, from 2010 to 2019, Hungary-China export and import levels decreased — not increased — by 16% and 14% respectively.38 The reality is clear: The cost-benefit analysis shows that Hungary, as opposed to Orbán himself, gains little from its relationship with China. Rationally speaking, abandoning the EU and the US in favor of China is not in Hungary’s economic or political interests.
ORBAN's 'ONE MAN SHOW' If Hungary does not economically profit from its relationship with China, what drives the relationship and why does Hungary push to work with China? The answer: Orbán. As an authoritarian leader, one of Orbán’s main goals, especially approaching this year’s elections, is to maintain his support and legitimize his illiberal regime, sometimes even at a cost to his country. Following this logic, the prime minister cultivates a relationship with China for several key reasons: Orbán seeks to maintain a set of strong illiberal “friends,” such as Russia, Turkey, Brazil, and China, that legitimize his regime. In other words, in cultivating economic partnerships with countries like China, Orbán seeks to ensure that he has economic and political alternatives if he should sever Hungary’s relationship with the EU and the US. Once Orbán realized the Chinese government would ultimately not be Hungary’s economic savior, he began to leverage Beijing for political gain in his battles with Brussels. By threatening to turn toward China, Orbán seeks to create the impression that he has a strong hand. In politics, perception often trumps reality. Orbán’s inner circle directly gains from his relationship with China. For example, Opus Global, a company controlled by Orbán’s oligarch friend Lőrinc Mészáros, “won” the contract to build Hungary’s section of the Budapest-to-Belgrade railway. The $2.1 bn deal could earn Mészáros a princely sum.39 Ultimately, Hungary’s China policy is “not a national strategy, but a one-man show,” says Tamás Matura, an expert on central and eastern Europe’s relations with China.40 The relationship is a function of Orbán himself. The opposition parties and candidates do not share the prime minister’s regard for China, especially since the controversy around the creation of China’s Fudan University campus in Budapest showed that being anti-China can poll well. If Orbán were to lose to the United Opposition in Hungary’s 2022 parliamentary elections, the country would likely do an about-face on its China policy.40 THE TROJAN HORSE FALSE ALARM Ever since Hungary-China relations intensified in the early 2010s, journalists and news organizations have peddled the idea that Hungary is China’s “Trojan horse” in Europe,41 implying that China has influence in and control over Hungary and thereby poses a threat to the EU. Some scholars argue that China invests in CEE countries such as Hungary to achieve political objectives such as a pro-China EU policy42 and that China strategically invests in countries that offer a potentially high political reward.43 If indeed true, Hungary would therefore become a threat to be addressed aggressively and rapidly by the West. Admittedly, China possesses indirect influence over Hungarian foreign policy through the prime minister: The more Chinese investment benefits Orbán personally, more he will encourage the government to adopt pro-China stances and partnerships such as the Belgrade-to-Budapest railway. Indeed, even without Chinese pressure to engage, Orbán seeks to cultivate ties and reap his own benefits from Chinese investments in Hungary, whether or not his country does.