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CIVIL WAR Election Chaos/Democratic Decline

The impact of a civil war outweighs all aff impact scenarios – civil war is probable in this context, goes international and effects become widespread

Elshelmani 2015 Arij, a studious author with multiple publications all revolving around unique socio-economic, political, cultural issues, “Why Are Civil Wars so Protracted and Difficult to End?”, 10-20-2015, E-International Relations, end/#:~:text=While%20the%20populations%20of%20warring,large%20number%20of%20civilian%20casualties. //EddyV

As interstate war has become less common, academic attention has shifted to the plethora of armed conflicts occurring within the boundaries of states. These civil wars have proven to be more protracted and difficult to terminate for numerous reasons that vary according to their unique socio-economic, political and cultural contexts. Hence, providing a perfect general theory is problematic. Nevertheless, a number of critical factors that affect the duration of civil wars and their inability to be resolved relative to interstate wars can be distinguished. Firstly, unlike interstate wars, which occur between clearly-defined armies and are generally amenable to compromise, civil wars tend to be low-intensity, existential struggles, making them, therefore, inherently-protracted affairs. Moreover, the decentralized organizational structure of contemporary insurgencies and their tendency to fragment and become engulfed in internecine fighting further undermines attempts at reaching a political settlement. Third, peace is difficult to achieve when, for many actors, war is preferable. Often ignored is the capacity of war to endow belligerents with profits and power. Various cases of “enemies” colluding to prolong violence challenge the common assumption that the ultimate objective of war is victory. Finally, the essay questions what an “end” to civil war implies. Even when one side claims total victory or in the rare cases where peace accords are signed and the war is formally concluded, the transition from large-scale civil violence to peace is not so clear. Collective memories of mutual violence persist into the post-conflict period, and cultures of violence are sustained. If not fully addressed, along with the underlying grievances that originally inspire violence, peace will remain at best fragile, and violence may continue in other forms. In this light, even the success stories of post-accord societies in Latin America and Lebanon appear to be “unfinished” civil wars.[1] The Asymmetric Nature of Civil Wars: Given that interstate wars are generally fought in a series of direct confrontations between professional armies and across defined frontlines, they are relatively quick and decisive. In contrast, intrastate wars are distinguished by the asymmetric distribution of material power among the main parties of the conflict, usually the incumbent government or power and the rebels or insurgents opposing it. The asymmetric nature of internal conflicts forces insurgents to adopt a strategy of guerrilla warfare in which the evasion of the enemy is a matter of survival. To overcome its military weakness, the insurgent force gradually wears down the enemy through hit-and-run tactics. Civil war is thus an inherently-protracted affair. What adds complexity to these wars is that they are almost never wholly internal. In an age of interconnectivity and interdependency, their outcome is often of strategic interest not only to neighboring powers but also to the international community at-large. The role of external intervention in influencing the balance of power between parties and therefore the trajectory of civil wars is critical. When external intervention is balanced between the opposing sides it can increase the duration of war.[2] This was most evident when the Cold War superpowers played out their ideological struggle in the conflict theater of the global South. The weaponry and supplies they provided fueled some of the most ferocious internal conflicts. Similarly, the internationalization of the contemporary Syrian conflict seems to have reconfigured the balance of power towards a prolonged stalemate.[3] Here, negotiation may only be contemplated when both parties reach a “mutually hurting stalemate,”[4] that is, a stage of deadlock when both sides simultaneously perceive continued fighting as offering little returns and mounting costs. However, with external actors distorting the perception of warring parties’ prospects on the battlefield, arriving at this stage may take many years. Limited Space for Compromise Interstate wars may be driven by border disputes; they could be a reaction to some existential threat, an attempt at regional hegemony, or a contest for access to trade routes and resources, to name a few. In theory, all of these factors are amenable to compromise, even if they too can produce long and costly wars. The Persian Gulf War is but one example; after eight years of conflict, Saddam Hussein relinquished his demands for complete control over Shatt-Al Arab and began withdrawing his forces from Iran, effectively bringing the war to a close. Where civil wars are driven by limited aims and objectives, the government can respond with the necessary reforms and negotiate with the aggrieved parties to stifle the conflict. When the objective is to secede, to overthrow the government, or even to radically transform social structures, compromise is improbable if not impossible. Secession is unfeasible for there can only be one government. Such wars are existential struggles with each side framing the conflict in terms of “victory or death.” Unsurprisingly, they take an intensely violent nature. Where belligerents cannot envision a common future of power sharing, incumbents have attempted to delegitimize their opponents by labeling them “terrorists,” “criminals,” or “ foreign agents.” This de-politicization of the opposition is a common feature of civil wars and serves as a serious impediment to their termination through civil means. As long as insurgents are excluded from the political arena, violent force will remain their primary means of communication. In other cases, parties may be willing to compromise on their original political goals and form a united government. However, the vulnerability of disarming and demobilizing entails, given the absence of mutual trust and the lack of a third party entity to monitor and enforce the agreement, can encourage combatants to reject opportunities for a peace settlement.[5] Here, it is the security dilemma, rather than the limited scope of compromise that inhibits the resolution of civil wars.[6] Organizational Structure: Fragmentation and Internal Rivalry A central requirement for any effective peace settlement is the presence of strong, representative leaders at the negotiating table. Interstate wars meet this condition more easily. Governments tend to maintain a unified hierarchical structure, with a strategic apex that exerts a tight reign over its security apparatus. In contrast, contemporary insurgencies are decentralized coalitions, plagued by factionalism and weak command and control.[7] Their propensity for fragmentation is a serious impediment to their resolution, which only becomes more potent as the war goes on and as new sub-groups emerge with their own interests and agendas. As the number of parties to a conflict increases, the prospects for agreement shrink, and, consequently, the duration of the internal war expands.[8] The contemporary experience of Syria is telling. As the war enters its third year, the broad coalition of groups constituting the armed opposition has grown to include thousands of foreign fighters and Salafist groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra, Ahrar al-Sham, and the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, who all possess their own unique ideological vision of Syria’s future.[9] These increasingly potent groups, among other factions, refuse to succumb to the influence and control of the Free Syrian Army and its political wing, viewing the latter as an elite grouping of self-interested exiles. The detachment between the political wing of the opposition and those on the battleground is problematic. Any decision made on the negotiating table at the national or international level is of limited value without the consent of those who control the reality on the ground. The Personalization of Civil Wars Though fragmentation can prolong civil wars, strong leadership is not necessarily a panacea. The Syrian civil war, like others, has also been sustained by its deeply personalized nature. The reputation of Bashar Al Assad among loyalists has achieved a “non-negotiable” status, while the opposition has refused to accept anything short of his removal from power. Gaddafi and Milosevic are two examples of leaders who opted for their own political survival over the national interest, manipulating and inflaming existing social divisions to escalate the war and secure their power.[10] Jonas Savimbi appeared to be the main “spoiler” of the Bicesse peace accords, rejecting the outcome of 1992 presidential election and returning the country to a state of war. Indeed, it was only with his death that his successor, Paulo Armindo Lukamba returned UNITA to the negotiating table and large-scale violence subdued.[11] General Michel Awn’s sense of omnipotence drove him to reject numerous invitations to join the post-Ta’ if government, and instead to declare a “war of liberation” against the Syrian military presence that would claim more than a thousand lives.[12] Of course, leaders are not always the all- powerful decision makers who the media portrays, and placing too much emphasis on their character can lend to their demonization. Nonetheless, the role of the individual cannot be completely discredited either. Indeed, breakthroughs in peace negotiations have frequently coincided with changes in the top leadership.[13] A Political Economy Perspective: Entrenched Interests in the Continuation of Violence The amount of material destruction and human suffering a civil war produces is immense. Yet, while the majority of the population may seek its end, a minority can develop an entrenched interest in its continuation. Thus, attempts to explain the longevity of civil wars are only complete with reference to the political and economic incentives they present. As the civil war rages on, the state’s capacity to control all its territories, enforce the law, and provide basic goods and services are eroded. A range of informal actors, from warlords, militias, and gangs, emerges to fill the vacuum, often carving out their own enclaves where they can become the prime source of social administration and coercion as well as the de-facto owners of the area and its resources. In this context of the state collapse, ordinary civilians can become willing participants in violence. For young uneducated and unemployed men and women, joining an armed band may be the only alternative to a life of destitution. Violence becomes a means of subsistence, supplying its members with shelter and food as well as a sense of protection, belonging and status in a society in which family networks and state institutions have disintegrated.[14] State collapse does not imply an inherent descent into anarchy and senseless violence. Rather, an organized war economy based on looting, extortion, and protection rackets forms around the armed groups. Militias originally relying on volunteers to fill their ranks and finance their operations mutate into professional business entities with profitable links to regional and international trading networks. This has been particularly the case after the end of Cold War. With the sudden absence of external patronage, the warring parties to many conflicts in the South still had to look beyond their borders for alternative means of financing their operations. Therefore, even if economic globalization may not cause civil wars, for their roots often lay in cultural, historical and political grievances, one cannot deny its role in empowering violent sub-national actors by sustaining contemporary war economies. [15] As sub-national actors develop their taste for the status, power and profits violence accrues, they may show small interest in capturing a weak state with no means of enforcing its control over its territories and resources. In the current state of conflict there is a sense of familiarity and economic security. Meanwhile, peace represents uncertainty. For a negotiated peace is ultimately based on promises of political and economic inclusion that can easily be betrayed. A popular assumption is that the objective of each of the warring parties is the total defeat of the enemy’s capability.[16] In reality, the state of violent conflict can endow criminal activities with a rare legitimacy, and therefore every effort is made by belligerents to eschew decisive battles.[17] Indeed, governments may form informal alliances with their enemies to exploit unarmed civilians and natural resources. In Sierra Leone, the poor pay and training of government forces and their affiliated irregulars encouraged them to prey on civilians rather than engage in costly combat with the Revolutionary United Front. Demonstrating this, elite figures in the Angolan administration and security forces have been accused of selling weapons to UNITA on multiple occasions.[18] Similarly, an authoritarian government may deliberately prolong the civil war as a means of concentrating its power and destroying all opposition. In the name of combating “terror” and suppressing “rebels,” a government may declare a state of emergency; introduce draconian laws to limit the freedom of expression, assembly, and association; and indefinitely delay elections. The actions of the Algerian government’s in its contest with Islamist insurgents during the 1990s seem to follow this logic. In the series of massacres of the mid and late 1990s, government forces merely watched from a close distance as Islamist guerrillas slaughtered and mutilated civilians for hours.[19] As the war progressed, the population became alienated from the Islamist cause while the government enjoyed an increase in its support. Only by escalating and prolonging the war could Algeria’s military regime entrench its political power. Unfinished Civil Wars: Sustained Cultures of Violence and the Legacy of Atrocities Even where these barriers to negotiated settlement have been overcome and contesting forces have engaged in dialogue and agreed to end all military confrontations, the transition from war to peace has been less than clear. In Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala, the ideological violence of their protracted civil wars seems to have been merely substituted with extreme levels of criminal violence.[20] There are many explanations for why “peace” can be difficult to distinguish from war. However, in all cases where the peace process has failed to address the roots of the conflict and to challenge the political structures, social divisions and economic inequalities that gave rise to insurgencies in the first place, violence has been renewed. In the case of Nicaragua and Guatemala, the continued economic marginalization of its youth and the incomplete efforts to reintegrate ex-combatants into civilian life have manifested in the plethora of criminal gangs that dominate urban and increasingly rural areas and threaten the rule of law.[21] The same failure to reintegrate demobilized fighters was a feature of the Dayton and Abouja peace processes.[22] Post- Ta’if Lebanon’s peace is at best described as a fragile one. The incessant paralysis of state institutions, which is to a large extent the product of the accords’ consociational formula, has allowed crime to fester and the country to be consumed by political assassinations and kidnappings. More problematically, it has led citizens to increasingly rely on their own sects for economic and social security.[23] Consequently, the relationship between the various confessional groups in Lebanon is still dominated by a degree of distance, suspicion, and even animosity. Problematically, these social divisions have proven to be easily inflamed by regional developments and external forces as well as local elites.[24] It follows that Post-Ta’if Lebanon is more accurately conceptualized as a prolonged ceasefire, rather than as a consolidated peace as virtually the same socio-economic and political structures that gave rise to the civil war remain intact. In such an environment the threat of renewed large-scale violence is omnipresent. Critical to understanding the fragility of post-conflict societies peace are the legacies of atrocities, which remain unaddressed. While the populations of warring states are separated and secured by their respective borders, civil wars do not offer such sanctuary. By their nature, civil wars occur among and between the people and, therefore, claim large number of civilian casualties. With the objective of controlling the populace, factions resort to coercive and brutal means. When so many civilians are displaced, brutalized and killed, a once unified society becomes a deeply polarized one. Healing the psychological wounds of a protracted civil war to avoid its renewal proves to be a long and challenging process. The consolidation of peace is further endangered by the culture of violence that protracted civil wars can breed and sustain, and which often persists into the post-war period. During the civil war, the barrel of the gun becomes the main means of resolving disputes, making demands, and attaining perceived rights among large swaths of the population. The intensity of battle and the level of atrocities against civilians can erode the social norms that may have regulated the use of violence in the past. In the post-civil war environment, often characterized by a weak security apparatus and criminal justice system, the widespread availability of weapons and weak civil society, and with the collective memories of atrocities still fresh, every incentive is available for an individual to distribute his or her own retributive justice. When violence is not sanctioned and barely condemned it becomes normalized and legitimated. Conclusion This essay has attempted to present a number of structural explanations for the protracted and persistent nature of civil wars relative to interstate conflicts. At the most fundamental level, civil wars’ protracted nature stems from the material asymmetry between the incumbent and the insurgents, their tendency to become internationalized, and the limited space of compromise they involve. The essay has also highlighted the role of their factionalized as well as personalized nature as barriers to a negotiated settlement. Given the immense physical destruction protracted civil wars entail, they are often reduced to irrational and meaningless conflicts. However, such views disregard the economic and political incentives that the continuation of violence presents to both sub-state actors and the state itself. The structural aspects of intrastate conflict present clear barriers to a negotiated settlement, but even in the cases where it has been reached, it has rarely succeeded in putting a decisive end to the war. As long as the root causes of civil war: insecurity, poverty, overpopulation, political exclusion as well as the legacy of atrocities and cultures of violence, are not addressed, violence continues, even if it mutates into different forms and occurs between different parties.

Democracy Survived 2020 but Renewed Efforts to Overturn Election Results Lead to Destruction of our Democracy and widespread violence and chaos

Galston and Kamarck -1/4/22

William A. Galston (William A. Galston holds the Ezra K. Zilkha Chair in the Brookings Institution’s Governance Studies Program, where he serves as a Senior Fellow. Prior to January 2006 he was the Saul Stern Professor and Acting Dean at the School of Public Policy, University of Maryland, director of the Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy, founding director of the Center for Information and Research on Civic Learning and Engagement (CIRCLE), and executive director of the National Commission on Civic Renewal, co-chaired by former Secretary of Education William Bennett and former Senator Sam Nunn. A participant in six presidential campaigns, he served from 1993 to 1995 as Deputy Assistant to President Clinton for Domestic Policy. Galston is the author of nine books and more than 100 articles in the fields of political theory, public policy, and American politics) and Elaine Kamarck. (Elaine C. Kamarck is a Senior Fellow in the Governance Studies program as well as the Director of the Center for Effective Public Management at the Brookings Institution. She is an expert on American electoral politics and government innovation and reform in the United States, OECD nations, and developing countries. She focuses her research on the presidential nomination system and American politics and has worked in many American presidential campaigns. Kamarck is the author of “Primary Politics: Everything You Need to Know about How America Nominates Its Presidential Candidates” and “Why Presidents Fail And How They Can Succeed Again.” She is also the author of “How Change Happens—or Doesn’t: The Politics of US Public Policy” and “The End of Government-As We Know It: Making Public Policy Work.” Kamarck is also a Lecturer in Public Policy at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government.) “ Is democracy failing and putting our economic system at risk?” The Brookings Institute. . January 4, 2022 LV

SECTION 1: IS DEMOCRACY FAILING? We examine this question along two key dimensions: public opinion and institutional performance. THE AMERICAN PUBLIC Based on six high-quality surveys conducted in the last year and a half, support for democracy as the best form of government remains overwhelming and mostly stable across party lines.[3] However, about 1 in 5 Americans have views that make them at least open to, if not outright supportive of, authoritarianism.[4] But there’s an important qualification: Americans distinguish sharply between democracy in principle and in practice. There is near-universal agreement that our system is not working well—in particular, that it is not delivering the results people want. This is troubling because most people value democracy for its fruits, not just its roots.[5] Given that situation, it is not surprising that public support is very high for fundamental change in our political system to make the system work better. There is no party of the status quo in contemporary America: both sides want changes, but they disagree about the direction of change. Unfortunately, about 6 in 10 Americans do not think that the system can change.[6] And because it has not changed despite growing dysfunction, polarization has led to legislative gridlock, which has generated rising support for unfettered executive action to carry out the people’s will. - Center for Effective Public Management Senior Fellow - Governance Studies Democracy means the rule of the people, but Americans do not fully agree about who belongs to the people. Although there are areas of agreement across partisan and ideological lines, some in our nation hold that to be “truly” American, you must believe in God, identify as Christian, and be born in the United States.[7] In a period of increasing immigration and religious pluralism, these divisions can become dangerous. Disagreements about who is truly American are part of a broader cleavage in American culture. 70% of Republicans believe that America’s culture and way of life have changed for the worse since the 1950s, while 63% of Democrats believe that they have changed for the better.[8] Strong majorities of Republicans agree that “Things have changed so much that I often feel like a stranger in my own county,” that “Today, America is in danger of losing its culture and identity,” and that “the American way of life needs to be protected for foreign influences.” Majorities of Democrats reject these propositions. Support for political violence is significant. In February 2021, 39% of Republicans, 31% of Independents, and 17% of Democrats agreed that “if elected leaders will not protect America, the people must do it themselves, even if it requires violent actions.” In November, 30% of Republicans, 17% of Independents, and 11% of Democrats agreed that they might have to resort to violence in order to save our country.”[9] While public support for many of the reforms in federal compromise legislation is strong, there is a divide in the electorate on what they view as the largest problem in our current system.[10] In September, only 36% believed that “rules that make it too difficult for eligible citizens to vote” constituted the largest problem for our elections, compared to 45% who identified “rules that are not strict enough to prevent illegal votes from being cast” as the largest problem. The conclusion we draw from this quick review of public opinion is that if democracy fails in America, it will not be because a majority of Americans is demanding a non-democratic form of government. It will be because an organized, purposeful minority seizes strategic positions within the system and subverts the substance of democracy while retaining its shell—while the majority isn’t well organized, or doesn’t care enough, to resist. As we show in a later section, the possibility that this will occur is far from remote. AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS A second way of considering whether democracy is failing is to look at the institutions of government. Successful democratic systems are not designed for governments composed of ethical men and women who are only interested in the public good. If leaders were always virtuous there would be no need for checks and balances. The Founding Fathers understood this. They designed a system to protect minority points of view, to protect us from leaders inclined to lie, cheat and steal, and (paradoxically) to protect the majority against minorities who are determined to subvert the constitutional order. During the Trump presidency, the formal institutional “guardrails” of democracy—Congress, the federalist system, the Courts, the bureaucracy, and the press—held firm against enormous pressure. At the same time, there is evidence that the informal norms of conduct that shape the operation of these institutions have weakened significantly, making them more vulnerable to future efforts to subvert them.[11] There is no guarantee that our constitutional democracy will survive another sustained—and likely better-organized—assault in the years to come. We begin with the good news about our institutions. Former President Trump did not succeed in materially weakening the powers of the Congress.[12] He did not try to disband Congress, and while he often fought that institution, it fought back. Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) had no trouble confronting him, and Democrats brought impeachment charges against him not once but twice. Although speculation was rampant, in the end then-Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-KY) did not block either trial. While former Leader McConnell and allies have been called former President Trump’s lapdogs, on virtually all domestic policy issues they have acted like almost any Republican majority would act, and on foreign policy former Leader McConnell neither stopped nor punished Republican senators who tried to constrain Trump when they thought he was wrong.[13] The American system is a federalist system. The Constitution distributes power between the federal government and the state government, codified in the 10th Amendment to the Constitution. States have repeatedly and successfully exercised their power against former President Trump, especially in two areas, COVID-19 and voting.[14] Despite Mr. Trump’s attempts to pressure the nation’s governors and other state officials into doing what he wanted, he did not inflict lasting damage on the federalist system, and the states are no weaker—perhaps even stronger—than they were before his presidency. Citizens now understand that in a crisis, states are the ones who control things that are important to them like shutdown orders and vaccine distribution. DEMOCRACY In the spring of 2020 then-President Trump, anxious to get past COVID in time for his re-election campaign, was pushing hard for states to open up early. Only a few complied, while many—including some Republican governors—ignored him. Seeing that the governors were not scared of him, Mr. Trump then threatened to withhold medical equipment based on states’ decisions about opening up. He came up against the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the 10th Amendment, which prevents the president from conditioning federal aid on the basis of governors’ acquiescing to a president’s demands.[15] The guardrails between the federal government and the states also held when it came to Mr. Trump’s campaign to reverse the 2020 election results. In Georgia, the Republican Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger, a stalwart Republican and Trump supporter, certified election results in spite of personal calls and threats from the president. In Michigan, Republican Senate Majority Leader Mike Shirkey and Republican House Speaker Lee Chatfield did not give in to Trump’s attempts to get them to diverge from the process of choosing electors. One of the hallmarks of failing democracies is a weak judicial system under heavy political control. But under assault from then-President Trump, the judiciary remained independent despite his repeated attempts to win in the courts what he could not win at the ballot box. President Trump-appointed judges often made decisions that thwarted Mr. Trump’s attempts to overturn the results. In fact, after the election Mr. Trump’s team and allies brought 62 lawsuits and won exactly one.[16] (The others he either dropped or lost.) Many of those decisions were handed down by Republican judges.[17] Perhaps former President Trump’s biggest disappointment was the Supreme Court’s decision not to hear election challenges concerning states he claimed he had won.[18] A free press is an essential element of a healthy democracy. Former President Trump spent four years using the bully pulpit of the presidency to mock the press, calling them names and “the enemy of the people” and referring to outlets he does not like as “failing.” He revoked the press credentials of reporters he did not like. (The courts restored them.) Nevertheless, reporters were not afraid to call out his lies. With Mr. Trump out of office for months now, no major news outlets have gone broke. Few are afraid to criticize former President Trump or his supporters. The free press is still fundamentally free (although President Trump undoubtably contributed to some decline in public trust of the media, which in turn weakens its oversight and accountability functions). Its financial and structural problems, most of which are attributable to the challenges of internet age, predated Mr. Trump. Some argue that former President Trump increased distrust in the media but, as polling indicates, the lack of trust in media declined to less than fifty percent in the first decade of the 21st century and has stayed in the low forties in recent years.[19] One final point: democracies often fail when their military sides with anti-democratic insurgents. But in the United States, the tradition of civil control over the armed forces remains strong—especially within the military. After the chaos in Lafayette Park last June, when Mark Milley, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, appeared with then-President Trump in military fatigues, Mr. Milley and other top military leaders went out of their way to reaffirm this tradition, which is drilled into all officers throughout their careers. A military coup is the least likely way for democracy in America to end.[20] SO WHY ARE WE WORRIED? Although scholars and pundits have long chronicled with regret the rise of partisan polarization and the decline of congressional effectiveness, concern about the outright failure of American democracy was rare before the rise of Donald Trump. Never before in American history have we had a candidate, not to mention a president, who disparaged the integrity of the electoral system and who hinted repeatedly during his election that he would not accept the results of the election if he lost. This behavior began during the Republican primaries and continued in advance of the 2016 election, which he won, and the 2020 election, which he lost.[21] It built to a crescendo that exploded on January 6, 2021, when supporters, called to Washington for a “Stop the Steal” rally, marched to the Capitol, attacked law enforcement officers, vandalized offices, and breached the Senate gallery where the electoral college vote was supposed to be taking place. The non-stop attacks on American elections were part of a broader attack on the truth. Any story Mr. Trump and his supporters disliked became “fake news,” creating, slowly but surely, an alternate universe that encompassed everything from the integrity of the election to public health guidelines for the COVID pandemic. The very existence of a sizeable number of citizens who cannot agree on facts is an enormous threat to democracy. As the Yale historian Timothy Snyder points out in his 2018 book, The Road to Unfreedom, authoritarians like Vladimir Putin have no use for truth or for the facts, because they use and disseminate only what will help them achieve and maintain power.[22] As our colleague Jonathan Rauch argues in The Constitution of Knowledge, disinformation and the war on reality have reached “epistemic” proportions.[23] Even though constitutional processes prevailed and Mr. Trump is no longer president, he and his followers continue to weaken American democracy by convincing many Americans to distrust the results of the election. About three-quarters of rank-and-file Republicans believe that there was massive fraud in 2020 and Joe Biden was not legitimately elected president. “A ‘Politico’/Morning Consult survey found that more than one-third of American voters feel the 2020 election should be overturned, including three out of five Republicans.”[24] The aftermath of the 2020 election revealed structural weaknesses in the institutions designed to safeguard the integrity of the electoral process. A focus of concern is the Electoral Count Act of 1887, which was adopted in response to the contested election of 1876. This legislation is so ambiguously drafted that one of former President Trump’s lawyers used it as the basis of a memorandum arguing that former Vice President Pence, whom the Constitution designates as the chair of the meeting at which the Electoral College ballots are counted, had the right to ignore certified slates of electors the states had sent to Washington. If Mr. Pence had yielded to then-President Trump’s pressure to act in this manner, the election would have been thrown into chaos and the Constitution placed in jeopardy.[25] Recently, former President Trump’s assault on the integrity of the 2020 election has taken a new and dangerous turn. Rather than focusing on federal government, his supporters have focused on the obscure world of election machinery. Republican majorities in state legislatures are passing laws making it harder to vote and weakening the ability of election officials to do their jobs. In many states, especially closely contested ones such as Arizona and Georgia, Mr. Trump’s supporters are trying to defeat incumbents who upheld the integrity of the election and replace them with the former President’s supporters.[26] At the local level, death threats are being made against Democratic and Republican election administrators, with up to 30% of election officials surveyed saying they are concerned for their safety.[27] As seasoned election administrators retire or just quit, Mr. Trump supporters are vying for these obscure but pivotal positions. In Michigan, for instance, the Washington Post reports that there is intense focus on the boards charged with certifying the vote at the county level. Republicans who voted against former President Trump’s efforts to alter the vote count are being replaced. And most dangerous of all, some states are considering laws that would bypass the long-established institutions for certifying the vote-count and give partisan legislatures the authority to determine which slate of electors will represent them in the Electoral College. American democracy is thus under assault from the ground up. The most recent systematic attack on state and local election machinery is much more dangerous than the chaotic statements of a disorganized former president. A movement that relied on Mr. Trump’s organizational skills would pose no threat to constitutional institutions. A movement inspired by him with a clear objective and a detailed plan to achieve it would be another matter altogether. The chances that this threat will materialize over the next few years are high and rising. The evidence suggests that Mr. Trump is preparing once again to seek the Republican presidential nomination—and that he will win the nomination if he tries for it. Even if he decides not to do so, the party’s base will insist on a nominee who shares the former president’s outlook and is willing to participate in a plan to win the presidency by subverting the results of state elections if necessary. The consequences could include an extended period of political and social instability, and an outbreak of mass violence.

Democracy is on the brink of destruction, Trump dictatorship is within reach 

DeVega 6-23, CHAUNCEY,  politics writer for Salon, host of The Chauncey DeVega Show, CHUD hunter, expert on TrumpWorld, Is American democracy already lost? Half of us think so — but the future remains unwritten, JUNE 23, 2022, salon, https://www.salon.com/2022/06/23/is-american-democracy-already-lost-half-of-us-think-so--but-the-future-remains-unwritten/ 

the American people understand that their democracy and their society are in deep trouble. But they do not agree on who or what is the cause of the problem, and do not share a common understanding of basic facts. To make matters worse there is a kind of sinister synergy between America's democracy crisis and other serious problems facing the country, which risks creating a state of collective paralysis. During his prepared comments before the House Jan. 6 committee last Thursday, retired judge J. Michael Luttig, a lifelong conservative Republican who advised former Vice President Mike Pence before and during Donald Trump's coup attempt, issued this dire warning: A stake was driven through the heart of American democracy on Jan. 6, 2021, and our democracy today is on a knife's edge. America was at war on that fateful day, but not against a foreign power. She was at war against herself. We Americans were at war with each other — over our democracy. Jan. 6 was but the next, foreseeable battle in a war that had been raging in America for years, though that day was the most consequential battle of that war even to date. In fact, Jan. 6 was a separate war unto itself, a war for America's democracy, a war irresponsibly instigated and prosecuted by the former president, his political party allies, and his supporters. Both wars are raging to this day. … America is now the stake in these unholy wars. … America is adrift. We pray that it is only for this fleeting moment that she has lost her way, until we Americans can once again come to our senses. Advertisement: In response to a question from committee chairman Bennie Thompson about the danger to the republic still represented by Trump and his supporters, Luttig elaborated further: Almost two years after that fateful day … Donald Trump and his allies and supporters are a clear and present danger to American democracy. That's not because of what happened on Jan. 6. It is because, to this very day, the former president and his allies and supporters pledge that in the presidential election of 2024, if the former president or his anointed successor as the Republican party presidential candidate were to lose that election, they would attempt to overturn that 2024 election in the same way that they attempted to overturn the 2020 election, but succeed in 2024 where they failed in 2020. Advertisement: Background Image Progress Bar 00:19 / 02:27 Volume Bar If there are any reasonable and intelligent Americans who continue to doubt that this country is in the midst of an existential crisis, facing the dangers of Trumpism and a growing white supremacist authoritarian movement, Luttig's words should shock them back into reality. A new Yahoo News/YouGov poll adds even more weight to Luttig's warnings about American democracy as it teeters on the precipice of irrecoverable disaster. The lead finding is that more than half of those surveyed, across the political spectrum — 55% of Democrats and 53% of Republicans — believe it is "likely" that the United States will "cease to be a democracy in the future." RELATED: Global forecaster on "another bad year for democracy": Is the world near a dire tipping point? Further findings in that poll are arguably even more troubling given the events of Jan. 6 and the Republican-fascist movement's increasing embrace of violence and terrorism: Advertisement: Among Republicans, 52% believe it is likely that "there will be a civil war in the United States in [their] lifetime." The proportion among Democrats is only slightly smaller, at 46%, while 50% of independents share that view While 50% of respondents were willing to rule out using violence or "taking up arms against the government" to protect the country from "radical extremists," 26% percent of those who participated said that political violence could sometimes be justified. This new poll also demonstrates that negative partisanship and other forms of extreme political polarization now appear to be permanent features of American political life. Andrew Romano summarizes this at Yahoo News: When asked to choose the phrase that best "describes most people on the other side of the political aisle from you," a majority of Republicans pick extreme negatives such as "out of touch with reality" (30%), a "threat to America" (25%), "immoral" (8%) and a "threat to me personally" (4%). A tiny fraction select more sympathetic phrases such as "well-meaning" (4%) or "not that different from me" (6%). The results among Democrats are nearly identical, with negatives such as "out of touch with reality" (27%), a "threat to America" (23%), "immoral" (7%) and a "threat to me personally" (4%) vastly outnumbering positives such as "well-meaning" (7%) or "not that different from me" (5%). Advertisement: These findings offer further evidence that the U.S. in the Age of Trump and beyond is what political scientists call an "anocracy," a system that combines features of dictatorship and democracy. The coup against democracy and the rule of law did not end when Trump's insurrectionists left the Capitol on Jan. 6. The Republican-fascists and the larger white right continue to advance a strategy whose ultimate goal is a Christian fascist plutocracy, one modeled on a system of competitive authoritarianism in which political parties still exist and elections occur, but where outcomes are manipulated as in Russia, Hungary or Turkey. Want a daily wrap-up of all the news and commentary Salon has to offer? Subscribe to our morning newsletter, Crash Course. This dystopia made real will be a combination of such books and films as "The Handmaid's Tale," "Atlas Shrugged," "Brazil," "Idiocracy," "Robocop," "CSA: The Confederate States of America" and "1984." Advertisement: Donald Trump and his acolytes continue to threaten political violence against their "enemies," meaning liberals and progressives, nonwhite people, Muslims, immigrants, LGBTQ people and any other groups or individuals they deem insufficiently "American" and not part of the MAGA faithful. The Republican Party, its propaganda machine and other opinion leaders continue to amplify Trump's Big Lie and its inherent conclusion that further violence may be necessary to return Trump (or a successor) to the White House — and, more generally, to prevent Democrats from winning or holding power by any means necessary. The core tenets of the "great replacement" conspiracy theory — which a white supremacist terrorist recently claimed as the motive for murdering 10 Black people last month at a Buffalo supermarket — have been embraced by a majority of Republicans, and an even larger majority of Trump followers. Advertisement: National security experts on terrorism and armed conflict have continued to warn that Trump's coup attempt and the Capitol attack are further evidence that the U.S. may face a period of sustained right-wing violent insurgency. Robert Pape, director of the University of Chicago Project on Security and Threats, has estimated that more than 20 million Americans believe that using political violence to return Trump to power is justified. In a widely read December 2021 essay in the Globe and Mail, Canadian political scientist Thomas Homer-Dixon offered a memorably grim prognosis of America's future. He predicted that "American democracy could collapse" by 2025 — that is, following the next presidential election — and that by 2030, the U.S. "could be governed by a right-wing dictatorship": We mustn't dismiss these possibilities just because they seem ludicrous or too horrible to imagine. In 2014, the suggestion that Donald Trump would become president would also have struck nearly everyone as absurd. But today we live in a world where the absurd regularly becomes real and the horrible commonplace…. Mr. Trump's electoral loss has energized the Republican base and further radicalized young party members. Even without their concerted efforts to torque the machinery of the electoral system, Republicans will probably take control of both the House of Representatives and Senate this coming November, because the incumbent party generally fares poorly in mid-term elections. Republicans could easily score a massive victory, with voters ground down by the pandemic, angry about inflation, and tired of President Joe Biden bumbling from one crisis to another. Voters who identify as Independents are already migrating toward Republican candidates. Once Republicans control Congress, Democrats will lose control of the national political agenda, giving Mr. Trump a clear shot at recapturing the presidency in 2024. And once in office, he will have only two objectives: vindication and vengeance. Advertisement: Homer-Dixon then drew the this parallel between the current state of the U.S. and the collapse of the Weimar Republic in the early 1930s: The situation in Germany in the 1920s and early 1930s was of course sui generis; in particular, the country had experienced staggering traumas — defeat in war, internal revolution and hyperinflation — while the country's commitment to liberal democracy was weakly rooted in its culture. But as I read a history of the doomed republic this past summer, I tallied no fewer than five unnerving parallels with the current U.S. situation. America's future stability is so much in doubt that even global rivals or enemies are concerned about the destructive forces unleashed by the Age of Trump. In a series of phone calls before and after the 2020 election, Gen. Mark Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, sought to reassure his Chinese counterpart, saying, "The American government is stable and everything is going to be OK. ... Everything's fine. But democracy can be sloppy sometimes." Advertisement: An ambush is always disorienting, and intentionally so, but the best option is always to fight back. That's where we are right now. This situation is undeniably bewildering, and deliberately so. But for pro-democracy Americans, inaction is not an option. That will inevitably lead to defeat. In military terms, a successful ambush is almost always disorienting, but the best option is always to fight back, not hunker down. The Republican-fascists and their allies want the American people to feel so confused and overwhelmed by their unending attack on democracy, the rule of law, the common good and basic human decency that they essentially turn away, close their eyes and surrender. In essence, the Republican-fascist movement is using their own version of a political "shock and awe" strategy here at home against the American people. Advertisement: The Lincoln Project recently offered this evaluation of America's democracy crisis: After three [Jan. 6 committee] hearings we know for certain the nation is at one of the most dangerous moments in its history. These revelations will not change the true MAGA believers mind but will cause them to double and triple down on the "Big Lie" — making them more dangerous and perhaps more violent. Every single American needs to decide if they are the side of the seditionists who tried to tear down a free and fair election, or do they support our Republic and its democratic principles? In short, the American people must act with deliberate purpose and speed if they hope to save their democracy and society. Voting is of course necessary, but by itself is insufficient. "Hashtag activism," with its "likes" and "shares" and memes, is for the most part symbolic or performative politics that accomplishes little or nothing in the long run, and may actually be counterproductive if people mistake it for real action. In the long-term struggle, substantive movement-building and organizing will be required to defeat fascism in America and around the world. Advertisement: Voting is necessary, but not sufficient. "Hashtag activism" accomplishes little or nothing, and may even be counterproductive. What we need is movement-building. Supporters of democracy must engage in grassroots organizing. They need to join, establish, and grow a range of civil society organizations. They must raise and donate money in effective ways, not by giving it to doomed Democratic candidates in hopeless races. Ultimately, they must be willing to engage in corporeal politics, including general strikes, street protests, civil disobedience and other forms of direct action where they can confront the Republican-fascists and their allies with overwhelming numbers. Advertisement: Right now, almost all the momentum is with the Republican-fascists and their broad-spectrum attack on American democracy and society. They are in revolutionary mode, and they are are winning. They will press onward to total victory, unless and until they are stopped. This will require people of conscience to take a personal inventory and ask themselves, "How much am I willing to sacrifice to save my country, my family and future generations from this nightmare?" The future of American democracy and society largely hinges on how many of us can answer that question honorably and rise to the challenge. 

The impact of a civil war outweighs all aff impact scenarios – civil war is probable in this context, goes international and effects become widespread

Elshelmani 2015 Arij, a studious author with multiple publications all revolving around unique socio-economic, political, cultural issues, “Why Are Civil Wars so Protracted and Difficult to End?”, 10-20-2015, E-International Relations, https://www.e-ir.info/2015/11/20/why-are-civil-wars-so-protracted-and-difficult-to-end/#:~:text=While%20the%20populations%20of%20warring,large%20number%20of%20civilian%20casualties. //EddyV

As interstate war has become less common, academic attention has shifted to the plethora of armed conflicts occurring within the boundaries of states. These civil wars have proven to be more protracted and difficult to terminate for numerous reasons that vary according to their unique socio-economic, political and cultural contexts. Hence, providing a perfect general theory is problematic. Nevertheless, a number of critical factors that affect the duration of civil wars and their inability to be resolved relative to interstate wars can be distinguished. Firstly, unlike interstate wars, which occur between clearly-defined armies and are generally amenable to compromise, civil wars tend to be low-intensity, existential struggles, making them, therefore, inherently-protracted affairs. Moreover, the decentralized organizational structure of contemporary insurgencies and their tendency to fragment and become engulfed in internecine fighting further undermines attempts at reaching a political settlement. Third, peace is difficult to achieve when, for many actors, war is preferable. Often ignored is the capacity of war to endow belligerents with profits and power. Various cases of “enemies” colluding to prolong violence challenge the common assumption that the ultimate objective of war is victory. Finally, the essay questions what an “end” to civil war implies. Even when one side claims total victory or in the rare cases where peace accords are signed and the war is formally concluded, the transition from large-scale civil violence to peace is not so clear. Collective memories of mutual violence persist into the post-conflict period, and cultures of violence are sustained. If not fully addressed, along with the underlying grievances that originally inspire violence, peace will remain at best fragile, and violence may continue in other forms. In this light, even the success stories of post-accord societies in Latin America and Lebanon appear to be “unfinished” civil wars.[1] The Asymmetric Nature of Civil Wars: Given that interstate wars are generally fought in a series of direct confrontations between professional armies and across defined frontlines, they are relatively quick and decisive. In contrast, intrastate wars are distinguished by the asymmetric distribution of material power among the main parties of the conflict, usually the incumbent government or power and the rebels or insurgents opposing it. The asymmetric nature of internal conflicts forces insurgents to adopt a strategy of guerrilla warfare in which the evasion of the enemy is a matter of survival. To overcome its military weakness, the insurgent force gradually wears down the enemy through hit-and-run tactics. Civil war is thus an inherently-protracted affair. What adds complexity to these wars is that they are almost never wholly internal. In an age of interconnectivity and interdependency, their outcome is often of strategic interest not only to neighboring powers but also to the international community at-large. The role of external intervention in influencing the balance of power between parties and therefore the trajectory of civil wars is critical. When external intervention is balanced between the opposing sides it can increase the duration of war.[2] This was most evident when the Cold War superpowers played out their ideological struggle in the conflict theater of the global South. The weaponry and supplies they provided fueled some of the most ferocious internal conflicts. Similarly, the internationalization of the contemporary Syrian conflict seems to have reconfigured the balance of power towards a prolonged stalemate.[3] Here, negotiation may only be contemplated when both parties reach a “mutually hurting stalemate,”[4] that is, a stage of deadlock when both sides simultaneously perceive continued fighting as offering little returns and mounting costs. However, with external actors distorting the perception of warring parties’ prospects on the battlefield, arriving at this stage may take many years. Limited Space for Compromise Interstate wars may be driven by border disputes; they could be a reaction to some existential threat, an attempt at regional hegemony, or a contest for access to trade routes and resources, to name a few. In theory, all of these factors are amenable to compromise, even if they too can produce long and costly wars. The Persian Gulf War is but one example; after eight years of conflict, Saddam Hussein relinquished his demands for complete control over Shatt-Al Arab and began withdrawing his forces from Iran, effectively bringing the war to a close. Where civil wars are driven by limited aims and objectives, the government can respond with the necessary reforms and negotiate with the aggrieved parties to stifle the conflict. When the objective is to secede, to overthrow the government, or even to radically transform social structures, compromise is improbable if not impossible. Secession is unfeasible for there can only be one government. Such wars are existential struggles with each side framing the conflict in terms of “victory or death.” Unsurprisingly, they take an intensely violent nature. Where belligerents cannot envision a common future of power sharing, incumbents have attempted to delegitimize their opponents by labeling them “terrorists,” “criminals,” or “ foreign agents.” This de-politicization of the opposition is a common feature of civil wars and serves as a serious impediment to their termination through civil means. As long as insurgents are excluded from the political arena, violent force will remain their primary means of communication. In other cases, parties may be willing to compromise on their original political goals and form a united government. However, the vulnerability of disarming and demobilizing entails, given the absence of mutual trust and the lack of a third party entity to monitor and enforce the agreement, can encourage combatants to reject opportunities for a peace settlement.[5] Here, it is the security dilemma, rather than the limited scope of compromise that inhibits the resolution of civil wars.[6] Organizational Structure: Fragmentation and Internal Rivalry A central requirement for any effective peace settlement is the presence of strong, representative leaders at the negotiating table. Interstate wars meet this condition more easily. Governments tend to maintain a unified hierarchical structure, with a strategic apex that exerts a tight reign over its security apparatus. In contrast, contemporary insurgencies are decentralized coalitions, plagued by factionalism and weak command and control.[7] Their propensity for fragmentation is a serious impediment to their resolution, which only becomes more potent as the war goes on and as new sub-groups emerge with their own interests and agendas. As the number of parties to a conflict increases, the prospects for agreement shrink, and, consequently, the duration of the internal war expands.[8] The contemporary experience of Syria is telling. As the war enters its third year, the broad coalition of groups constituting the armed opposition has grown to include thousands of foreign fighters and Salafist groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra, Ahrar al-Sham, and the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, who all possess their own unique ideological vision of Syria’s future.[9] These increasingly potent groups, among other factions, refuse to succumb to the influence and control of the Free Syrian Army and its political wing, viewing the latter as an elite grouping of self-interested exiles. The detachment between the political wing of the opposition and those on the battleground is problematic. Any decision made on the negotiating table at the national or international level is of limited value without the consent of those who control the reality on the ground. The Personalization of Civil Wars Though fragmentation can prolong civil wars, strong leadership is not necessarily a panacea. The Syrian civil war, like others, has also been sustained by its deeply personalized nature. The reputation of Bashar Al Assad among loyalists has achieved a “non-negotiable” status, while the opposition has refused to accept anything short of his removal from power. Gaddafi and Milosevic are two examples of leaders who opted for their own political survival over the national interest, manipulating and inflaming existing social divisions to escalate the war and secure their power.[10] Jonas Savimbi appeared to be the main “spoiler” of the Bicesse peace accords, rejecting the outcome of 1992 presidential election and returning the country to a state of war. Indeed, it was only with his death that his successor, Paulo Armindo Lukamba returned UNITA to the negotiating table and large-scale violence subdued.[11] General Michel Awn’s sense of omnipotence drove him to reject numerous invitations to join the post-Ta’ if government, and instead to declare a “war of liberation” against the Syrian military presence that would claim more than a thousand lives.[12] Of course, leaders are not always the all- powerful decision makers who the media portrays, and placing too much emphasis on their character can lend to their demonization. Nonetheless, the role of the individual cannot be completely discredited either. Indeed, breakthroughs in peace negotiations have frequently coincided with changes in the top leadership.[13] A Political Economy Perspective: Entrenched Interests in the Continuation of Violence The amount of material destruction and human suffering a civil war produces is immense. Yet, while the majority of the population may seek its end, a minority can develop an entrenched interest in its continuation. Thus, attempts to explain the longevity of civil wars are only complete with reference to the political and economic incentives they present. As the civil war rages on, the state’s capacity to control all its territories, enforce the law, and provide basic goods and services are eroded. A range of informal actors, from warlords, militias, and gangs, emerges to fill the vacuum, often carving out their own enclaves where they can become the prime source of social administration and coercion as well as the de-facto owners of the area and its resources. In this context of the state collapse, ordinary civilians can become willing participants in violence. For young uneducated and unemployed men and women, joining an armed band may be the only alternative to a life of destitution. Violence becomes a means of subsistence, supplying its members with shelter and food as well as a sense of protection, belonging and status in a society in which family networks and state institutions have disintegrated.[14] State collapse does not imply an inherent descent into anarchy and senseless violence. Rather, an organized war economy based on looting, extortion, and protection rackets forms around the armed groups. Militias originally relying on volunteers to fill their ranks and finance their operations mutate into professional business entities with profitable links to regional and international trading networks. This has been particularly the case after the end of Cold War. With the sudden absence of external patronage, the warring parties to many conflicts in the South still had to look beyond their borders for alternative means of financing their operations. Therefore, even if economic globalization may not cause civil wars, for their roots often lay in cultural, historical and political grievances, one cannot deny its role in empowering violent sub-national actors by sustaining contemporary war economies. [15] As sub-national actors develop their taste for the status, power and profits violence accrues, they may show small interest in capturing a weak state with no means of enforcing its control over its territories and resources. In the current state of conflict there is a sense of familiarity and economic security. Meanwhile, peace represents uncertainty. For a negotiated peace is ultimately based on promises of political and economic inclusion that can easily be betrayed. A popular assumption is that the objective of each of the warring parties is the total defeat of the enemy’s capability.[16] In reality, the state of violent conflict can endow criminal activities with a rare legitimacy, and therefore every effort is made by belligerents to eschew decisive battles.[17] Indeed, governments may form informal alliances with their enemies to exploit unarmed civilians and natural resources. In Sierra Leone, the poor pay and training of government forces and their affiliated irregulars encouraged them to prey on civilians rather than engage in costly combat with the Revolutionary United Front. Demonstrating this, elite figures in the Angolan administration and security forces have been accused of selling weapons to UNITA on multiple occasions.[18] Similarly, an authoritarian government may deliberately prolong the civil war as a means of concentrating its power and destroying all opposition. In the name of combating “terror” and suppressing “rebels,” a government may declare a state of emergency; introduce draconian laws to limit the freedom of expression, assembly, and association; and indefinitely delay elections. The actions of the Algerian government’s in its contest with Islamist insurgents during the 1990s seem to follow this logic. In the series of massacres of the mid and late 1990s, government forces merely watched from a close distance as Islamist guerrillas slaughtered and mutilated civilians for hours.[19] As the war progressed, the population became alienated from the Islamist cause while the government enjoyed an increase in its support. Only by escalating and prolonging the war could Algeria’s military regime entrench its political power. Unfinished Civil Wars: Sustained Cultures of Violence and the Legacy of Atrocities Even where these barriers to negotiated settlement have been overcome and contesting forces have engaged in dialogue and agreed to end all military confrontations, the transition from war to peace has been less than clear. In Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala, the ideological violence of their protracted civil wars seems to have been merely substituted with extreme levels of criminal violence.[20] There are many explanations for why “peace” can be difficult to distinguish from war. However, in all cases where the peace process has failed to address the roots of the conflict and to challenge the political structures, social divisions and economic inequalities that gave rise to insurgencies in the first place, violence has been renewed. In the case of Nicaragua and Guatemala, the continued economic marginalization of its youth and the incomplete efforts to reintegrate ex-combatants into civilian life have manifested in the plethora of criminal gangs that dominate urban and increasingly rural areas and threaten the rule of law.[21] The same failure to reintegrate demobilized fighters was a feature of the Dayton and Abouja peace processes.[22] Post- Ta’if Lebanon’s peace is at best described as a fragile one. The incessant paralysis of state institutions, which is to a large extent the product of the accords’ consociational formula, has allowed crime to fester and the country to be consumed by political assassinations and kidnappings. More problematically, it has led citizens to increasingly rely on their own sects for economic and social security.[23] Consequently, the relationship between the various confessional groups in Lebanon is still dominated by a degree of distance, suspicion, and even animosity. Problematically, these social divisions have proven to be easily inflamed by regional developments and external forces as well as local elites.[24] It follows that Post-Ta’if Lebanon is more accurately conceptualized as a prolonged ceasefire, rather than as a consolidated peace as virtually the same socio-economic and political structures that gave rise to the civil war remain intact. In such an environment the threat of renewed large-scale violence is omnipresent. Critical to understanding the fragility of post-conflict societies peace are the legacies of atrocities, which remain unaddressed. While the populations of warring states are separated and secured by their respective borders, civil wars do not offer such sanctuary. By their nature, civil wars occur among and between the people and, therefore, claim large number of civilian casualties. With the objective of controlling the populace, factions resort to coercive and brutal means. When so many civilians are displaced, brutalized and killed, a once unified society becomes a deeply polarized one. Healing the psychological wounds of a protracted civil war to avoid its renewal proves to be a long and challenging process. The consolidation of peace is further endangered by the culture of violence that protracted civil wars can breed and sustain, and which often persists into the post-war period. During the civil war, the barrel of the gun becomes the main means of resolving disputes, making demands, and attaining perceived rights among large swaths of the population. The intensity of battle and the level of atrocities against civilians can erode the social norms that may have regulated the use of violence in the past. In the post-civil war environment, often characterized by a weak security apparatus and criminal justice system, the widespread availability of weapons and weak civil society, and with the collective memories of atrocities still fresh, every incentive is available for an individual to distribute his or her own retributive justice. When violence is not sanctioned and barely condemned it becomes normalized and legitimated. Conclusion This essay has attempted to present a number of structural explanations for the protracted and persistent nature of civil wars relative to interstate conflicts. At the most fundamental level, civil wars’ protracted nature stems from the material asymmetry between the incumbent and the insurgents, their tendency to become internationalized, and the limited space of compromise they involve. The essay has also highlighted the role of their factionalized as well as personalized nature as barriers to a negotiated settlement. Given the immense physical destruction protracted civil wars entail, they are often reduced to irrational and meaningless conflicts. However, such views disregard the economic and political incentives that the continuation of violence presents to both sub-state actors and the state itself. The structural aspects of intrastate conflict present clear barriers to a negotiated settlement, but even in the cases where it has been reached, it has rarely succeeded in putting a decisive end to the war. As long as the root causes of civil war: insecurity, poverty, overpopulation, political exclusion as well as the legacy of atrocities and cultures of violence, are not addressed, violence continues, even if it mutates into different forms and occurs between different parties.

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