Democrats Lose --Roe can’t save Democrats in Midterms – Filibuster thumps
Marshall ‘ 6/22 [June 06, 2022] Josh Marshall; Mr. Marshall has covered politics and elections for 25 years. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/06/opinion/democrats-midterms-abortion-roe.html _Moonyoung
Democrats hope to make November’s midterm elections a referendum on Roe v. Wade, the linchpin decision upholding abortion rights, which the Supreme Court is almost certain to strike down this summer. That strategy makes sense. Polls show that roughly two in three Americans oppose overturning Roe and almost 60 percent support passing a bill to set Roe’s protections in a federal law. What’s more, polls showed a rising number of voters listing abortion as their top midterm issue after news of Roe’s imminent demise leaked in the form of a draft court opinion published by Politico. Unfortunately, their current plan is almost sure to fail. After the Democrats came up with just 49 votes to bring a Roe-protecting bill before the Senate on May 11, they promised to keep fighting and, in the words of Senator Amy Klobuchar, “take that fight right to the ballot box” in November. But you can’t make an election into a referendum on an issue if you can’t point to anything winning the election would accomplish. To make the 2022 elections a referendum on Roe, Democrats have to put protecting Roe and abortion rights on the table. Here’s one way to do that: get clear public commitments from every Senate Democrat (and candidate for Senate) not only to vote for the Roe bill in January 2023 but also to change the filibuster rules to ensure that a majority vote would actually pass the bill and send it to the White House for the president’s signature. At present, there are likely 48 Senate Democrats who can make that pledge. Senators Joe Manchin and Kyrsten Sinema are dead set against any changes to the filibuster — a fact you likely know because most of President Biden’s agenda has been bottled up behind their refusal for the past year. Some claim that Senators Manchin and Sinema are just taking the public heat for a number of other Senate Democrats who are also unwilling to change the filibuster rules. That’s highly unlikely. But if any do have misgivings, that’s why the public commitments are so important. Getting a list of holdouts down to a publicly named handful is the first step to persuading them to fall in line. If my math is right and there are 48 Senate Democrats ready to make that pledge, they need two additional Democratic senators in the next Congress. And that is the party’s message that makes the 2022 midterms a referendum on Roe: “Give us the House and two more senators, and we will make No ambiguity, no haggling, no living in Senator Manchin’s head for a year. You give us this, and we’ll give you that. That tells voters exactly what will be delivered with a Democratic win. It also defines what constitutes a win: control of the House and two more Senate seats. The campaign message is clear: If you want to protect Roe, give us those majorities. If this is your passion, here’s where to channel that passion. These are the Senate seats we need to hold (in New Hampshire, Arizona, Georgia and Nevada) and here are the ones we need to win (in Pennsylvania and Wisconsin and possibly in Ohio, Florida and North Carolina). With those commitments in hand, one question should be on the lips of every Democratic candidate. Will you make a firm commitment to never vote for a federal law banning abortion nationwide? Few, if any, Republicans would be able to make that pledge. And their evasions wouldn’t just make them look ridiculous; that would put squarely on the table the very real threat that Republicans would enact a nationwide abortion ban as soon as January 2025. That could prove enough to win Senate races in Pennsylvania, Wisconsin and Ohio. In a way, though, this strategy isn’t so much about winning the 2022 midterms or even making Roe into a federal law, although it’s the best way to accomplish both. It’s just an example of how you win elections. Effective campaigns are built on connecting the intense beliefs of the electorate — their hopes and fears — directly to the hard mechanics of political power. You’ve got to connect those wires. If you were testing some new electrical contraption, that’s the first thing you’d do: make sure the energy supply is wired to the engine that makes it run. This is no different. Without tying a specific electoral result to a clear commitment to a specific legislative action after the elections, you’re not connecting those wires. What Democrats would be proposing is a classic small-c conservative solution in the best sense of the word. Codifying Roe would preserve the set of rights and protections that the vast majority of Americans have lived their entire adult lives with and that the overwhelming majority of Americans do not want to change. The threat that the court will strike down such a law is real but overstated. And in any case, refusing to act because of what opponents might do is the definition of political paralysis. So how do Democrats get from here to there? They likely can’t rely on the party’s leaders, at least not at first. But they’re not essential. It’s really up to voters and activists and particularly committed members of Congress. Probably half the Democrats in the Senate would be happy to sign on this dotted line by the end of the day. Those who are up for re-election, even in safe races, will come around quickly. Some senators may resist at first. And that wouldn’t be surprising. Politicians seldom see any advantage to committing themselves in advance or reducing their room for maneuver. It’s always safer to keep your options open and be as general as possible until the final moment. That’s why assembling a clear public list of commitments is critical. Once the list gets down to a handful of hesitaters, the pressure from Democrats nationwide, focused on those members, will be overwhelming. If there are real holdouts, they’ll fold in short order. You don’t need to wait on Nancy Pelosi or Chuck Schumer or President Biden. You can get the ball rolling by calling up your Democratic senator today.
Gallup 6/14 [Gallup, Inc., 6-14-2022, "Usual Midterm Indicators Very Unfavorable for Democrats," Gallup, ] Jeff and Liam
WASHINGTON, D.C. -- With less than five months to go before voters elect all members of the House of Representatives and one-third of the Senate, the current Democratic congressional majority is facing an extremely unfavorable election environment. The party of the president typically loses U.S. House seats in midterm elections -- an average of 23 since 1974. However, 2022 is not shaping up to be an average year. Rather, as of May, Gallup finds presidential job approval and three other key national mood indicators well below the historical averages measured in past midterm election years. On their own, those numbers would all predict a greater-than-average loss of seats for the Democratic Party this fall. Gallup's latest data, from a May 2-22 survey, finds 41% of Americans , 18% approving of the job Congress is doing, 16% satisfied with the way things are going in the U.S., and a 32-percentage-point deficit in positive (14%) versus negative (46%) ratings of current economic conditions. Each of those metrics is at least 10 points lower than the historical average at the time of past midterm elections, and most are on pace to be the worst of such readings. The following sections of this report discuss how each of these four polling indicators, as well as party affiliation, has related to midterm election outcomes historically. Midterm elections are widely seen as a referendum on the incumbent president, and this is justified by the high correspondence between overall job approval and seat loss for the president's party. Given this, congressional seat losses for unpopular presidents' parties have been above average historically, . Biden's current 41% approval rating puts him in the lower tier of all prior presidents' job approval ratings taken just before past midterm elections. Biden currently has the same approval rating that Donald Trump did at the time of the 2018 elections, when the GOP lost 40 House seats, and similar to Ronald Reagan's 42% in October 1982, before the Republicans lost 26 seats. Only one president, George W. Bush, had a lower rating than Biden does today, and his 38% rating in November 2006 was associated with a 30-seat loss. Biden's fellow Democrats Bill Clinton and Barack Obama lost an even larger number of House seats in 1994 and 2010, respectively, with slightly higher approval ratings than Biden has now. Those steeper losses reflect the relatively large number of House seats held by Democrats going into those elections in addition to the president's unpopularity. The Democratic Party lost fewer seats in Obama's second midterm in 2014 when Obama was no more popular than in his first midterm four years earlier, but Democrats were defending fewer seats. In the few elections where the president's party has gained seats (1998 and 2002) or lost a small number of seats (1986 and 1990), the incumbent president has been broadly popular, with approval ratings well above 50%. The exception was 1974, with Gerald Ford's 54% job approval more reflective of his honeymoon period in the months after he took office following Richard Nixon's resignation in August of that year. The GOP's 43-seat loss was likely tied to Nixon's unpopularity (24% approval in his last rating) stemming from the Watergate scandal that led to his resignation. While Biden's job approval rating could improve by November, putting his party in a less precarious position, he would be bucking the trend for second-year presidents. Historically, presidents' job approval ratings have in the last few months before their first midterms. Democrats currently hold 220 seats in the House, just two above the number needed for a majority, and far fewer than the 250-plus they held before the Republican wave elections of 1994 and 2010. This relatively low seat exposure could help to check Democratic losses, as occurred in 2014. The 18% of Americans who approve of the job Congress is doing would be the lowest Gallup has measured in a midterm election if it holds at that level through the fall. However, it would not be much lower than the 20% to 21% approval ratings for Congress at the time of the past three midterm elections. Americans' view of the job Congress is doing is also broadly predictive of how the president's party -- if not also the majority party in Congress -- will perform in the midterms. In 1994, 2010 and 2018 -- all years when Congress' approval rating was between 21% and 23% and the president's party was in the majority -- the incumbent party lost between 40 and 63 House seats. In 2014, even with approval of Congress at 20%, the Democratic Party lost only 13 seats -- again explained by Democrats' weak starting position that year when House Republicans were in the majority. In years when congressional approval was significantly higher, the president's party suffered minimal losses or even gained seats. Americans' satisfaction with the way things are going in the U.S. is also on pace to be the worst it has been in a midterm election year. The 16% currently satisfied is six points lower than the prior midterm low -- 22% in 2010. Satisfaction relates to midterm House seat loss in a similar way as the job approval variables, with greater losses tending to happen in elections when satisfaction is low -- such as in 1982 (24%), 1994 (30%) and 2010 (22%) -- and more minimal losses or gains for the president's party in years when satisfaction is high, including 1986 (58%), 1998 (60%) and 2002 (48%). Gallup has a shorter history of measuring Americans' perceptions of current U.S. economic conditions, dating back to the early 1990s. Since that time, Americans' views of the economy during midterm election years have only ever been similarly bad as now once before -- in 2010, when net ratings of economic conditions were -31. Economic ratings tend to be less strongly related to midterm election outcomes than other mood indicators are, though views of the economy certainly influence how Americans rate the job that political leaders are doing and whether they are satisfied with the way things are going in the country. Positive evaluations of the economy in 2006 and 2018 were not enough to overcome weak job approval ratings for Presidents Bush and Trump, respectively, and for Congress, suggesting political leaders were being evaluated on factors besides the economy. But even if the economy is less correlated with midterm election outcomes, the fact that Americans view it negatively this year is just one more issue that does not reflect favorably on the governing Democratic Party. Vote choices in elections are strongly tied to a voter's political leanings. Party affiliation has been a good indicator of midterm election outcomes in the past because it either related to the partisanship of the electorate or was a harbinger of how people would vote. On average over the past three months, Americans have been equally likely to identify politically as Republicans or say they are independents who lean toward the Republican Party (45%) as to identify as Democrats or to lean Democratic (45%). While the parties appear, then, to be on equal footing heading into the midterms, the figures are generally a better sign for the Republican Party than the Democratic Party for two key reasons: First, historically, Democrats usually have an advantage on this measure of party affiliation. For example, in , Democrats had a three-point advantage (though the numbers varied greatly over the course of the year), which is typical. Second, Republican voters usually turn out at higher rates than Democratic voters do. If usual turnout patterns hold, and partisanship among all national adults is even, then the electorate will have more Republican identifiers and leaners than Democratic ones. There were also even splits in party affiliation in 1994, 2002, 2010, 2014 and 2018 election years, and all but one were good years for Republican candidates. The major exception was 2018, a year in which the parties were fairly evenly matched but Democrats did better in the elections, perhaps because of Trump's unpopularity and the that year. By contrast, in years when the Democratic Party had sizable advantages on party identification, like in 1998 and 2006, Democrats picked up seats in Congress. At the same time, the relatively slim majority enjoyed by House Democrats should shield the party from losses in the upper range of what's possible when presidential approval is in the low 40s and less than a quarter of Americans are satisfied with the state of the nation. While it is unclear whether policy issues can eclipse presidential performance or the national mood as midterm election voting factors, Democrats may benefit politically from the Supreme Court overturning Roe v. Wade and Republican opposition to gun control measures in the wake of a series of mass shootings. Recent Gallup data suggest abortion will be this year than it usually is in U.S. elections, more so among those who support rather than oppose legalized abortion. Also, even before the mass shootings, the majority of Americans expressed dissatisfaction with and favored enacting stricter laws. On the other hand, further increases in gas prices or renewed focus on the border crisis could compound Democrats' problems in November. Regardless of what issues might drive voter behavior, unless Americans' opinions of the job Biden is doing and the state of the nation improve over the next five months, the Democratic Party may face a situation similar to 1994 and 2010 when it suffered major losses in its presidents' first midterms but regrouped in time to win the presidential election two years later.