Exclusion DA – Consensus is not always possible - forcing the alternative to coexist with the plan fosters inclusionary violence and inevitably excludes the voices of the oppressed
Jessica Peet, 2020, International Journal: Canada’s Journal of Global Policy Analysis, “Eclecticism or exclusivity? The (critical) pragmatist ethos of (intersectional) analytic eclecticism,” 75(3): 420-432, mm
At first glance, pragmatism seems to provide an appropriate foundation for analytic eclecticism. Pragmatism’s investment in consensus combined with its recognition that knowledge is discursive and social—and thus open to reformulation—provides an alternative perspective to IR’s tendencies to understand knowledge as either the product of objective rationalism or subjective interpretivism. Where specific theoretical paradigms choose one approach or the other, pragmatism advocates the utility of both derivations. Thus, in theory, a pragmatist ethos allows eclectic research to sidestep metatheoretical debates and the challenges inherent in combining opposing perspectives.18 In practice, by not acknowledging the power dynamics which shape these controversies in disciplinary IR,19 a pragmatist ethos can have the effect of (re)producing the status quo, privileging rationalism, positivism, and the dominant theoretical triad. This inattention to power, generally, and the disciplinary power dynamics of epistemological difference, specifically, can be linked to pragmatism’s investment in universalism. Universalism, or the belief in a common category or position salient across theoretical traditions, enables multiple perspectives to be combined without fear of incommensurability, an issue that Fred Chernoff addresses in more detail in his contribution to this forum.20 Yet, by assuming that a universal category exists, pragmatism actually simplifies complex issues. Moreover, this focus on a universal category privileges that category as most important, marginalizing the relevance of other categories along with their potential explanatory power. This marginalization directly counters analytic eclecticism’s goal of attending to complexity and bringing diverse approaches to the forefront. This investment in universalism also brings about a static view of categories. Universal categories are identified by their similarities, which are fixed and unchanging across time and theoretical tradition. Sil and Katzenstein identify the substantive referent (i.e., the research problem) to be the universal category, arguing that the research problem is not dependent on the theoretical approach(es) being employed. However, to identify a common category among different approaches, it must be determined a priori what similarities are to be contained within that category. Thus, for any determination to be made, artificial boundaries must be imposed upon the referent so that it can be identified. But imposing constructed boundaries upon the referent works to simplify the problem, which again contravenes the goals of analytic eclecticism. Pragmatism also provides a questionable foundation for analytic eclecticism because it tends to privilege consensus over difference.21 Achieving consensus renders dynamic and complex interactions among and within categories invisible. This both undermines the spirit of eclecticism and ignores the wider power dynamics that shape the field. Consensus is not always possible. Sometimes commonality cannot be found because no universal category or position exists, and forcing commonality can breed violences of inclusion.22 Gayatri Spivak famously argues that the subaltern is rendered mute (and therefore can neither speak nor be heard) because of the complexities of finding consensus between the position of the subaltern and that of the oppressor.23 Achille Mbembe argues that the illusion of consensus across wide power differentials is only possible in conditions of extreme violence perpetrated on those at the lower end of those differentials.24 Taken together, these problems show how eclectic theorizing functions to exclude. Investment in consensus and universality inhibits the visibility of (disciplinary) power dynamics, even though they are central to shaping what is considered universal and who is considered part of any consensus produced by analytic eclecticism. When conceptualized with this kind of ethos, analytic eclecticism will always have exclusive effects because it lacks the tools to recognize or correct its own exclusivity. To achieve inclusivity, these foundations must be challenged.