That causes Russia and China to create an Axis of Evil against the US.
Eugene Rumer and Richard Sokolsky 22, Rumer, former national intelligence officer for Russia at the U.S. National Intelligence Council, a senior fellow and the director of Carnegie’s Russia and Eurasia Program; Sokolsky, senior fellow in Carnegie’s Russia and Eurasia Program; 3-23-22, “Russia’s National Security Narrative: All Quiet on the Eastern Front,” https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/05/23/russia-s-national-security-narrative-all-quiet-on-eastern-front-pub-87185, jy
Putin’s war against Ukraine, preceded by his demands for the United States and its NATO allies to fundamentally alter post–Cold War European security arrangements, has dispelled all doubts—to the extent that any remained—about the primacy of Europe as the principal theater where Russia’s strategic interests reside, from where the principal threats to the country’s security emanate, and where the principal efforts to defend it from those threats are concentrated. As a critical strategic theater, Asia pales in comparison with Europe. The attack on Ukraine demonstrates the dominance of Europe and the unimportance of Asia—beyond China—in Russian strategic thinking.
Prior to the war in Ukraine, the view that Russian strategic thinking was myopic and misguided was widespread in the U.S. national security community. According to this view, the real threat to Russia in the medium and long term would emerge from China rather than the West. Sooner or later, the Russian strategic community would realize that. And the sooner it could be disabused of its mistaken approach to China, the better for the United States, whose interests would be best served by preventing Russia from becoming an ally and force multiplier of China. U.S. policy, therefore, should de-emphasize rivalry with Russia and instead seek to drive a wedge between Moscow and Beijing. In other words, it was a policy prescription for a partnership with Russia on the basis of perceiving a shared threat from China.
That prescription is no longer viable. However, for many years before the invasion of Ukraine, Western analysts and policymakers ignored the basic fact that Russia’s partnership with China is not a short-term marriage of convenience but grounded in a set of coherent, complementary, and well-thought-out strategic rationales. This should have been obvious to anyone who followed the strategic discourse in Russia, read its national security documents, and sought to understand the basics of its domestic politics, national security decisionmaking, and economy.
One striking aspect of the Russian national security discourse largely overlooked by many in the U.S. strategic community is its all-consuming preoccupation with perceived threats from the West. Insecurity vis-à-vis the West has been the defining feature of official security documents since the 1990s, when the United States and Europe considered the Cold War to be over. In Russia, by contrast, the West’s security policy has always been viewed as a continuation in one form or another of its Cold War policies, initially as a “Cold War light” version, but increasingly as a manifestation of the West’s hostile intentions toward Russia.
Another striking aspect of Russian national security documents that has been overlooked is the absence in them of any references to China as a challenge, let alone a potential source of threats to Russia. As alarm about China and its growing ambitions on the world stage became louder in the United States, Russia’s national security documents avoided any mention of the country other than as a partner, and instead increasingly concentrated on the West as the principal source of threats. These documents, however, reflect the actual thinking of the country’s national security leadership and its strategic posture.
This paper first provides an overview of these documents, their evolution since the breakup of the Soviet Union, and the strategic backdrop to that evolution. It then focuses on the treatment of China in these documents and explores the reasons why they have ignored the country as a threat or a challenge to Russian national security. Next, the paper explores the unofficial Russian debate about China, considers the practical manifestations in Russian defense policy of its Euro-centric preoccupation, and concludes with implications for the United States.
IT IS ABOUT EUROPE
The war in Ukraine is but the latest conflict in the long historic cycle of war and peace in the relationship between Russia and the rest of Europe. Virtually the entire history of Russia as a modern state is one of wars waged in the European theater—against Sweden, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Prussia, Great Britain, France, Turkey, Austria, Germany, and so on.
The history of Russia’s relationship with Asia contains nothing similar. Compared to the major European wars, the conquest of Siberia was a series of skirmishes, few of which are recognized as milestones in Russian history. Two major military undertakings stand out—the lost Russo-Japanese war of 1904–1905 and the August 1945 campaign against Japan in Manchuria, which is extolled in Russian historiography as the final chapter of the Second World War. The latter lasted just a few weeks and is generally considered a footnote to the main war effort in the European theater, where the victory is celebrated on May 9 as the end of the Great Patriotic War.
Since the emergence of post-Soviet Russia in 1991, the Kremlin’s preoccupation with the insecurity of the country’s western flank has manifested itself on multiple occasions, and in defiance of indisputable trends in European security since the end of the Cold War. In the 1990s, Russian leaders objected to NATO admitting new members from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Russia’s president at the time, Boris Yeltsin, accused U.S. president Bill Clinton of trying to split the continent again.1 Russia’s military threatened prospective members of the alliance with nuclear weapons, its foreign intelligence service warned about military retaliation in general, and its diplomats charged that the “NATO-centrism” and “NATO-mania” of U.S. policy “cannot suit Russia.”2 All of these accusations became the major, persistent theme in Russian policy toward Europe, culminating in the demands to fundamentally revise European security arrangements presented to the United States and NATO in December 2021 as the prelude to the war against Ukraine.3
Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, Russia’s objections to NATO’s eastward expansion made little sense to an outside observer as the country’s struggles and biggest challenges were domestic during that period—the bloody campaign to suppress the separatist guerilla movement in Chechnya, the instability in the wider North Caucasus region, the sputtering efforts to revive the economy, and the political chaos. The United States and its NATO allies had nothing to do with any of these, and they provided financial and technical assistance to the Russian government on a wide range of economic and societal reforms.
Moreover, in the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s breakup, the United States and its allies spent vast amounts of money on programs that were essential to Russian national security. They financed and in many other ways facilitated the removal to Russia and securing of the vast nuclear arsenal and other weapons of mass destruction scattered across several former Soviet republics. Although this Cooperative Threat Reduction program was one of the key U.S. national security priorities, its immediate beneficiary was Russia.4
As NATO’s eastward expansion got underway, the United States, eager to collect the post–Cold War “peace dividend,” drastically reduced its military presence in Europe.5 At the end of the Cold War, it had some 300,000 troops in the continent. By 1995, that number had decreased to just over 100,000, where it remained approximately for the next decade. By 2008, it dropped to about 65,000, where it has been ever since. By 2013—the last year before the annexation of Crimea by Russia—the United States had reduced the number of its tanks deployed in the European theater from 5,000 in 1989 to zero.6 Other NATO members had carried out equally drastic changes to reduce their defense spending and the size of their militaries.7
Thus, NATO’s expansion was accompanied by a process of its demilitarization. In speeches by its leaders and in official statements, the alliance embraced as its purpose securing “a lasting peace in Europe, based on common values of individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law.”8 That purpose at times seemed to overshadow its original mission of common defense, which was expected—or almost presumed—to become obsolete as common values would become the foundation of European security. In two strategic concepts—in 1999 and 2010—NATO also declared achieving “partnership” with Russia as a goal.9 In some documents it already referred to its relationship with Russia as a “partnership.”10
Senior U.S. officials in speeches and testimonies throughout the pivotal 1990s stated that expansion would not involve greater deployments of U.S. troops to the territories of new members but would instead result in an overall reduction of the U.S. military presence on the continent, which would be transformed into an “area where wars simply do not happen.”11 The alliance also pledged to Russia that it had
no intention, no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members, nor any need to change any aspect of NATO’s nuclear posture or nuclear policy – and do not foresee any future need to do so.12
And, given their small size and military capabilities, none of the new members could pose individually or collectively a meaningful threat to Russia.
In addition to its three pillars of propagation of shared democratic values, reduction of NATO’s military forces, and eastward expansion, the revamped European security architecture was buttressed by two key treaties intended to enhance the stability and security of all European nations. The first was the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty signed by the United States and the Soviet Union in 1987, which eliminated an entire class of weapons that Soviet leaders had found threatening to their heartland and destabilizing for international security.13 The other was the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty in 1990, which imposed limits on and regulated military deployments by all its signatories.14 In addition, Vienna Document 99 provided for increased transparency of military activities to build mutual confidence and reduce the risk of inadvertent and accidental escalation.
In addition to these treaties and documents governing primarily European security matters, the United States and Russia signed several arms-control treaties that greatly reduced the numbers of strategic nuclear weapons and means of their delivery in their arsenals. The 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), and New START in 2010 were major contributions to both countries’ security.
When measured by such indicators as the presence of powerful hostile neighbors, the military footprint as well as the declarations and actions of its presumed principal adversary in the European theater, and the framework of legally binding treaties, Russia entered the twenty-first century with the security of its western flank assured as never before. That, however, was not enough for it.
IT IS OFFICIAL
These positive changes in European security were noted in a succession of Russian national security documents of the 1990s and the 2000s. However, these documents also expressed a clear unease about the eastward expansion of NATO. Beginning with the 1993 military doctrine, “the expansion of military blocs and alliances to the detriment of the interests of the Russian Federation’s military security” was noted as a “danger” that could become an actual threat in the event of “the introduction of foreign troops in the territory of neighboring states of the Russian Federation.”15 The expansion of NATO became a key theme in subsequent iterations of military doctrine and national security strategy, with growing apprehension that “military dangers to the Russian Federation [were] intensifying,” chief among them the “military infrastructure of NATO member countries” approaching Russia’s borders.16
The most notable official pronouncement in this regard was Putin’s speech at the 2007 Munich Security Conference in which he issued a stern warning to the United States and its allies not to expand NATO further eastward.17 The Kremlin followed up on Putin’s warning by crushing the Georgian military in the brief 2008 war to make clear that it would not tolerate Tbilisi’s ambitions to join NATO.
The war was followed by the resumption of cooperative relations with the West.18 But the détente with the West during Dmitry Medvedev’s presidency did not diminish Russian opposition to NATO’s eastward expansion as a threat to its security interests.19
Russia’s balancing act between cooperation and competition with NATO ended following its 2014 annexation of Crimea and the start of its undeclared war in eastern Ukraine. NATO was officially and unequivocally declared the principal source of military danger to the country.20 Russia’s most recent National Security Strategy, published in July 2021, describes the United States and NATO as developing options for nuclear and conventional strikes against the country.21
The war against Ukraine, launched by the Kremlin in response to the West’s refusal to accept its demands to fundamentally revise the post–Cold War security arrangements, has put an end to the few remaining hopes of managing the tense relationship through such channels as the NATO–Russia Council, the Normandy Format to resolve the stalemate in eastern Ukraine, and the U.S.-Russia Strategic Stability Dialogue.22 The post–Cold War chapter in relations has ended with a major war between Russia and Ukraine backed by NATO in effect with all measures just short of direct participation by alliance troops. The ongoing conflict underscores the primacy of the European theater for Russia and the role of the United States and NATO as the pacing challenge for its defense and national security policy.
CHINA MISSING
By contrast, China is virtually absent from the Russian official statements, national security documents, and narratives spanning the three post–Cold War decades. The most recent National Security Strategy contains two references to the country: one in the context of “developing a relationship of all-encompassing partnership and strategic cooperation,” and the other in the context of deepening cooperation with it in the context of the BRICS (Brazil-India-China-South Africa) counterpart to the U.S.-led G7 group of advanced democracies.23 Earlier iterations similarly referred to China as a partner with whom Russia planned to sustain and expand cooperative relations.24
Partnership with China has been the counterweight to Russia’s increasingly adversarial relations with the United States and NATO. The two have progressed in synch over the course of Putin’s leadership, and the war against Ukraine is the most recent manifestation of this dynamic. Just before the war, Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping jointly announced the “no limits” friendship and declared that there were “no ‘forbidden’ areas for cooperation” between their two countries. These statements confirmed that balancing against the West by aligning ever closer with China is at the heart of Russian policy.25
From Russia’s perspective, the partnership with China rests on solid reasoning. This includes political complementarity between two authoritarian governments and economic complementarity between China’s manufacturing sector and Russia’s resource wealth. For Russia’s ruling elite, the relationship is particularly important for two reasons. First, unlike the United States and the European Union, China does not seek to impose its values or demand domestic political changes that would loosen its hold on power in exchange for partnership. Beijing would also probably look unfavorably at attempts by Moscow to liberalize domestic politics. Second, Russia’s ruling elite derives significant material benefits from controlling the commanding heights of the economy. It has little incentive to change the resource sector’s dominant role in the economy, which benefits from trade with China.
Beyond these ideological, political, and economic factors, Russia has sound strategic reasons for pursuing and strengthening its partnership with China. Their priorities complement rather than contradict each other. Since Russia’s primary theater is Europe and China’s is the Asia-Pacific, their strategic interests overlap only in Central Asia, a region that is of secondary importance for both and where they can deconflict their interests as long as no strategic competitor like the United States is present.
Russia and China share a common adversary in the United States, which has global capabilities and presence that they see as challenging their interests in their critical theaters. Both consider U.S. defense programs, such as missile defenses deployed in Europe and the Asia-Pacific or to protect the homeland, as a threat to their security and an attempt by the United States to deny them the ability to deter and retaliate against it in the event of war. Russia and China also in effect function as a force multiplier for each other by tying up U.S. capabilities in their respective critical theaters and thus preventing it from focusing its efforts on one or the other.
AVOIDING A TWO-THEATER CONFRONTATION
For Russia, which during most of the Cold War faced a major confrontation in two strategic theaters—with the United States and NATO in Europe and with China in Asia—the repeat of that experience, which ultimately led to the collapse of the Soviet economy and the breakup of the Soviet Union, is not an option. The Kremlin sees the West as by far the most serious threat, which must be prioritized while disagreements with China have to be managed and resolved through diplomacy.
A great deal has been written about the successful diplomatic maneuver that was the opening of U.S. relations with China during former president Richard Nixon’s administration. For the Soviet Union, already facing a hostile China in its Far East since the early 1960s as a result of the Sino-Soviet split, the prospect of an alignment between Washington and Beijing translated into a major military and economic burden. At the height of the Cold War, it had to maintain as many as fifty divisions facing China along a border of 4,200 kilometers.26 That was in addition to the sixty-five divisions in the western Soviet Union, twenty on its southern flank, and thirty in Eastern Europe.27 If the West’s victory in the Cold War is attributed to the inability of the Soviet economy to sustain the burden of competition with the United States and its allies, significant credit is owed to China as a force multiplier in that competition.
The imperative to avoid a two-theater confrontation with powerful adversaries is also a lesson of the Soviet experience during the Second World War. After the experience of tense relations in the 1930s, which culminated in a major battle in 1939 in Mongolia, the Soviet Union signed a neutrality pact with Japan in 1941.28 Combined with intelligence that Japan would not launch an attack against its Far East, this secured the Soviet Union’s strategic rear.29 No longer threatened with a two-front war in Europe and in Asia, Moscow was able to concentrate its effort on the war with Germany. This is a lesson well remembered in Russia today.30
The only major military campaign carried out by the Soviet army in the Pacific took place after the defeat of Germany. Launched against Japan in August 1945, when the outcome of the war in the Pacific was not in doubt, this lasted just a few weeks and was concluded in early September. Known as the Manchurian campaign, it resulted in the defeat of the Japanese Kwantung Army.31
In Soviet and Russian military literature, which relies heavily on historical experience to inform future concepts of operations, the Manchurian campaign has long been held up as a successful example of rapid offensive operations designed to bring about a quick defeat of the enemy as early as in the initial phase of the war.32 In preparation for it, in early 1945, the Soviet High Command undertook major troop redeployments to the Far East from Europe, where the outcome of the war with Germany was already certain. In April 1945, the Soviet Union renounced its nonaggression treaty with Japan.33 It issued a declaration of war on August 8 and the following day launched its offensive—three days after the United States dropped the first atomic bomb on Hiroshima. The operation was concluded on September 2, when Japan surrendered. During the Cold War and the long period of tension with China, the Manchurian campaign was seen as the prototype for potential future operations against it.34
However, more recent Russian historiography reflects a different understanding of the Manchurian campaign. Instead of offering lessons for the conduct of hypothetical future operations against China, it is used to correct what Russia sees as the false historical narrative propagated in the West that the campaign was of marginal impact on the defeat of Japan in the Second World War. On the occasion of the seventieth anniversary of the campaign in 2015, the dean of Russian military scientists, Army General Mahmut Gareev, who as a young officer fought in the Second World War and participated in the campaign, published an article challenging the proposition that the U.S. atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki had played the decisive role in the defeat of Japan, arguing instead that the Manchurian campaign was of the “greatest military-political significance.”35 The campaign, he stated, had precipitated the capitulation of Japan.
Instead of the anti-China bias evident in Russian Cold War writings, more recent ones reflect a clear anti-Japan bias and emphasize the Japanese threat to the Soviet Union and China during the Second World War. Also on the occasion of the seventieth anniversary of the Manchurian campaign, the official Russian government newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta charged that “Japanese aggression had for many years posed a serious threat to the vital interests of the Soviet and Chinese peoples, [and] millions of Chinese were enslaved by treacherous occupiers.”36 Gareev wrote in his article that the defeat of the Japanese army in Manchuria “washed away the shame of [Russia’s] defeat” in the Russo-Japanese war of 1905, which had weighed as “a heavy memory in the conscience of our country.”
The shift in Russian official historiography from the Cold War preoccupation with China to the post–Cold War focus on Japan is consistent with changes in security policy. Russia’s ever-closer partnership with China has relegated the prospect of a military confrontation between them to the margins, whereas the deteriorating relationship with the United States has elevated the perception of threat from its treaty ally Japan.
Japan is also the only country—other than Ukraine, after the illegal annexation of Crimea by Russia—that maintains active territorial claims against Russia. The Russian military doctrine published in 2003 highlights the threat of maritime landing operations in the Far East.37 The potential culprit in such contingencies could only be Japan, possibly in coalition with the United States. The document also notes that inadequate transport links between central Russia and the Far East could have a “negative impact” on the course of military operations.38 The combination of Japanese territorial claims and inferior Russian capabilities in this theater could in the event of a conflict leave Russia with few alternatives to resorting to nuclear strikes against the invaders.
Japan hosts U.S. troops on its territory and participates in joint military activities with the United States in the Asia-Pacific. Although it has canceled two previously planned sites for the U.S. Aegis Ashore missile system, it has decided to procure two Aegis-equipped ships and thus to contribute to what Russian officials perceive as the U.S.-led effort to build global missile defenses, which they consider to be a threat to Russia.39 Russian analysts have also criticized Japan’s changes in its defense posture that entail, in their view, growing geographic ambitions, capabilities beyond self-defense, and participation in presumably U.S.-led coalition wars.40
Overall, however, the Far East and the Asia-Pacific do not hold a special place as an independent theater of operations in Russian official military thinking. Rather, its importance reflects threat perceptions driven by adversarial relations with the United States and its NATO allies centered on Europe and the imperative of avoiding a simultaneous confrontation in two far-flung theaters.