Cyberpunk and posthumanism combine to challenge what it means to be human – new cognitive technologies can challenge health span, cognition and emotion capabilities
Julia Grillmayr 20 is a literature and cultural studies scholar as well as print and radio journalist, based in Vienna and Linz, Austria. Her postdoc project at the University of Art and Design in Linz (funded by the Austrian Science Fund FWF) investigates ‘scenario thinking’ in contemporary science fiction and futurology (see https://scifi-fafo.com). (Julia, “Posthumanism(s)” The Routledge Companion to Cyberpunk Culture, Chapter 33, p273-274) //le
What contributes to cyberpunk’s ongoing importance is without question its capability to put the idea of an original human essence to the test; this applies to the cadre of Movement-era authors1 in the 1980s onwards. Cyberpunk shows bodies and minds that are constantly altered, enhanced, or perverted by bio- and nanotechnological prostheses, cognitive implants, and/or new orifices that interface with digital networks and cyberspatial domains. The definition of what it means to be human becomes slippery in cyberpunk as categories of identity, nature, and essence crumble: everything is interdependent, in flux, and defined rather by what it does than what it is. Closely linked to cyberpunk’s emergence comes the advent of what is loosely called the posthuman, a concept which focuses on the same central themes—the amalgamation of bodies and technology, brain-machine interfaces, and potential habitats for humans in virtual spaces and space colonies. Various writers, cultural theorists, and philosophers have been conceptualizing what posthuman bodies in an increasingly posthuman present and future could and should look like. It is therefore imperative to identify and differentiate the two major strands of understanding the posthuman that not only set different priorities but contradict each other in fundamental assumptions: trans- humanism and critical posthumanism.
First, transhumanism is all about transcendence. The prefix is short for ‘transitional human,’ an intermediate stage of human development into, at some future endpoint, the posthuman. Transhumanists put forth the freedom of the human individual to technologically alter their cor- poreal body—referred to as “morphological freedom” (More 4)—through prosthesis, but more often through speculative bio- and nanotechnology. In this respect, one of the main goals is the extreme postponement or even abolition of death. “Becoming posthuman,” argues Max More in “The Philosophy of Transhumanism,” “means exceeding the limitations that define the less desirable aspects of the ‘human condition’” (4). Posthuman beings would not only “no longer suffer from disease, aging, and inevitable death,” but would “have vastly greater physical capability and freedom of form” (More 4). Furthermore, More explains transhumanists “typically look to expand the range of possible future environments for posthuman life, including space coloniza- tion and the creation of rich virtual worlds” (4). Moreover, transhumanists extrapolate that new cognitive technologies will not only enhance human capabilities to think and remember, but also to feel. Nick Bostrom, one of the most prominent voices of the transhumanist movement, identifies health span, cognition, and emotion as the three areas where posthuman capacities, “greatly exceeding the maximum attainable by any current human being without recourse to new technological means,” should be developed (28–29). Together with intellectual capacity and “the capacity to remain fully healthy, active, and productive, both mentally and physically,” Bostrom
stresses that “the capacity to enjoy life and to respond with appropriate affect to life situations and other people” would be ameliorated (29). In sum, transhumanist discourse sees becoming posthuman as akin to the transition from childhood to adulthood as a logical next step in human evolution (Bostrom 42).
Critical posthumanism is quite unlike transhumanism as it tells completely different stories about posthumans. Primarily, it does not presume that posthumanity exists in the near or far future; rather, critical posthumanism presumes we have already become posthuman and in part asks how we arrived at our posthuman condition, exemplified by N. Katherine Hayles’s How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, and Informatics. In the tradition of Michel Foucault, who stresses in The Order of Things that our orders of knowledge are socially con- structed, posthumanists such as Hayles emphasize that our system of beliefs, our epistemes, shape the world, not only on a metaphysical but also on a material level. Foucault calls Man “an inven- tion of recent date” that will eventually be replaced by other ideas and constructs, “erased, like a face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea” (387). Posthumanism therefore draws on this insight to resituate liberal humanism as merely one story or invention among others. In this vein, Donna J. Haraway’s “A Cyborg Manifesto” tells a different story, a story of dethroning Man from his privileged position as crown of creation; it is a story against anthropocentrism and in favor of the relatedness of humans, animals, machines, and other non-living earth dwellers. The ability to tell ‘different stories’ opens up the possibility of thinking about the emergence of new technologies in tandem with a critique of humanism.
As a result, while transhumanists understand the term ‘posthuman’ as referencing something that comes after the human, for critical posthumanists it connotes the concept of something that comes after humanism. Transhumanism, as More points out, “continues to champion the core of the Enlightenment ideas and ideals—rationality and scientific method, individual rights, the pos- sibility and desirability of progress” (10). It can thus be understood as a “contemporary renewal of humanism” (Sorgner and Ranisch 8) or even conservative “retrohumanism” (Clarke xiv). In contrast, critical posthumanism challenges these Enlightenment ideas and ideals and the anthro- pocentrism they are based upon, and insists on “the urgency of finding new and alternative modes of political and ethical agency for our technologically mediated world” (Braidotti 58).