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The 1AC’s language perpetuates and normalizes militarism as a cultural system

Gusterson and Besteman 19 (Hugh, Professor in the Department of Anthropology and Elliott School of International Affairs of George Washington University, Catherine, Professor in the Department of Anthropology of Colby College, “Cultures of Militarism: An Introduction to Supplement 19”, February 2019, “Current Anthropology Volume 60, Supplement 19”) // Ilake LT

In contrast, anthropologists’ interest in militarism has taken shape in the context of post–cold war transformations in the management of violence. These years have seen the violent reorganization of some cold war client states; the proliferation of militia-led insurgencies; the interpenetration of organized crime and drug trafficking with insurgency and counter in-surgency in parts of the global south; the articulation of coun-ter insurgency abroad with domestic policing at home in many Western countries; the reformulation of the United Nations into an institution of militarized peacekeeping and occupation; the increasing use of military labor to perform civil, humanitarian, policing, and development activities; and a growing awareness of the ways in which militarism as a set of cultural practices and ideologies pervades all domains of social life. The anthropologists in this volume see militarism as a cultural system; it is shaped through ideology and rhetoric, effected through bodies and technologies, made visible and invisible through campaigns of imagery and knowledge production, and it colonizes aspects of social life including reproduction, self-image, and notions of community. We interrogate militarism in its established and emergent forms, probing its genealogies, its facility at colonizing daily life, and its ability to present itself as a response to insecurities it has itself provoked.4This collection of papers draws on the rich discussions at the symposium from which this volume emerged to capture some of the distinctive features of cultures of militarism. The papers emphasize militarization as a contingent process over militarism as a measurable object;5decenter the state as the core locus of such processes; probe the relationship between militarism, experience, and identity, with a special focus on the body; examine connections between militarism and social injustice; and evince a commitment to critique and under-mine militarism while, at the same time, respecting the force of its appeal. The New Anthropology of Militarism: Four Features Threat Constructions These papers understand militarism as a process rather than as a bounded, measurable thing enmeshed in deterministic relationships with other reified variables. Militarism as an in-flective force or bundle of processes acts upon society in pow-erful and expansive but uneven and contingent ways. Although militarism carves its way deep into social structures, it is also shaped and reshaped in the dialectical interaction between in-grained structures on the one hand and human agency and contingency on the other. It is capillary, shape-shifting, always in motion as it constructs threats, enrolls constituencies, colonizes cultural life, and generates new loci of resistance. As Michel Foucault (2007:44) writes, security apparatuses “have the con-stant tendency to expand; they are centrifugal. New elements are constantly being integrated....Security therefore involves or-ganizing, or anyway allowing the development of ever-wider circuits.” And there is no domain of social life it does not touch. Just as contemporary wars seem to have no clearly demarcated end, so militarism has no discernible edge; it increasingly seeps into every corner of the world, every aspect of social life, in someway. Military/intelligence logics and personnel are now being directed to manage arenas of life formerly understood as outside the purview of the military, like development projects in Africa, humanitarian aid, and responses to environmental catastrophes, black markets, and the hacking of political parties’ computers. In the words of Catherine Lutz, one of the foremost anthropological theorists and observers of militarism, the process of militariza-tion“ has reshaped almost every element of global social life over the 20th century.” It involves an intensification of the labor and resources allocated to military purposes, including the shaping of other institu-tions in synchrony with military goals. Militarization is simul-taneously a discursive process, involving a shift in general societal beliefs and values in ways necessary to legitimate the use of force, the organization of large standing armies and their leaders, and the higher taxes or tribute used to pay for them. Militarization is intimately connected not only to the obvious increase in the size of armies and resurgence of mil-itant nationalisms and militant fundamentalisms but also to the less visible deformation of human potentials into the hierarchies of race, class, gender, and sexuality, and to the shaping of national histories in ways that glorify and legiti-mate military action. (Lutz 2002:723)As Lutz’s comment indicates, the material base of militarism is connected with ideologies and discourses through which proliferating militarized infrastructures and rationalities are normalized, naturalized, and legitimized. Such ideologies and discourses valorize the ethos of the warrior (Gibson 1994; Orr2004; Webb 2018) and construct threats in such a way as to validate military spending, military interventions, and the mil-itarization of formerly nonmilitary arenas of life. To say that threats are “constructed” does not mean that they are imaginary or unreal. But threats can be figured through different narratives and addressed in different ways, and the choice of narrative figuration may have enormous material consequences. The So-viet missiles deployed to Cuba in 1962 were quite real and, if used, would have inflicted crushing damage on the United States. But the United States could have chosen to regard them as a reasonable counterweight to its own Jupiter nuclear-tipped mis-siles in Turkey, on the Soviet Union’s doorstep, rather than pro-voking a global crisis by narrating them as an existential threat (Weldes 1999). Likewise, based on the evidence of the last 2 de-cades of US-Vietnamese relations, the United States could plausibly have decided in the 1960s that its vital interests would have suffered little if a small country on the other side of the planet were allowed to “go Communist. “Instead, it fruitlessly expended the lives of over 50,000 Americans and 2–3 million Vietnamese in what American national security elites wrongly perceived, thanks to the consensually accepted domino theory, as a struggle it could not afford to lose. Or, as discussed in this volume, Turkey in the early twentieth century could have constructed Armenians as constituency to be accommodated, not exterminated, and Guatemalan and Colombian elites could have constructed rural challenges against inequality and injustice as a social problem to address through development and land reform, not a military threat that demanded counterinsurgency. In these cases, the preferred threat constructions militarized the problems at hand, mobilizing more resources for military projects and saturating the social field with militarized violence.

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