Preserving the LIO is only an excuse for both external and internal war
McMichael 16 (Christopher, PhD in Politics from Rhodes University, research include organized crime, Libertarian Marxism, and Fascism, “Pacification and Police: A critique of the Police Militarization Thesis,” November 29 2016, https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0309816816678569)
The militarization thesis is also haunted by the spectre of the police state in both the past and the future. On one hand, this is accompanied by nostalgic descriptions of ‘real’ policing – as rhetorically asks,
How did we go from a system in which laws were enforced by the citizens … to one in which order is preserved by armed governments agents too often conditioned to see streets and neighbourhoods as battlefields and the citizens they serve as enemy?
Historical examples of state despotism from Nazi Germany to Stalinist Russia are used to depict what a society looks like when ‘constraints demarcating policing and military functions are either ineffective or absent’ (: 485). These equivalences to past regimes are also used as a guide to the possible future outlaid by militarization with many commentaries, including variations on the theme of ‘America may not be a police state – that is a political system characterised by an arbitrary exercise of power by police – but it’s getting too close for comfort’ ().
But the extent to which militarization is presented as a novel contemporary phenomenon may reveal nothing so much as the extent to which police institutions have been ideologically successful in naturalizing their role in society. As a result new developments in tactics and equipment come to be presented as a disturbing deviation from the norm. However, this focus on internal signifiers of violence blurs how even ‘community’ and public-orientated policing can work in accord with overt aggression. To the extent that the militarization thesis seems more concerned with excess and spectacle, it misses the routine repression of ‘officer friendly’ as he or she walks the beat, patrols the neighbourhood, and visits schools to build public relations and win popular support. In the United States, one police response to the social crisis of the 1960s was to experiment with ‘softer’ law enforcement to pre-empt social response, which drew upon ‘hearts and minds’ tactics, originating in military counter-insurgency (: 91). ‘Militarization’ is therefore just one of the key changes in recent US policing, working in tandem with other forms of softer power.
The idea that police violence and repression is exceptional is encouraged by a political discourse, which maintains that in liberal democratic societies, state power is fundamentally constrained by the rule of law and a concern for human rights. Indeed, many of the critiques of ‘police militarization’ hold that ‘military’ policing can be legitimate as long as it is kept within the bounds of law. For instance, one ACLU advocate said that
The militarization of local police is a threat to Americans’ right to live without fear of military-style intervention in their daily lives, and we need to make sure these resources and tactics are deployed only with rigorous oversight and strong legal protections. ()
This faith in legal protection is counterpoised with the threat that seems to lurk in the background of the militarization discourse: the ‘police state’. Underlying this is the idea that a ‘blurring’ between the military and the police is a hallmark of the despotic state, and in particular the various Fascist and Stalinist states of the last century, with their vast coercive apparatuses. What this implies is that liberal democracies have a categorically different kind of police and criminal justice system: one that is intended to protect the interests and property of its (‘law abiding’) citizens rather than internal warfare. Such an ideology holds that while ‘conquest and bloodshed’ may have been central to the genesis of capitalist modernity, contemporary liberal states are marked by fundamentally peaceful social relations (: 305). In its most media-driven form, the militarization thesis, as it relies on the assumption of separation of police power and war power, therefore, generally regards police as a fundamentally benign institution in society, which provides a central public service and which needs to be steered away from the dangerous pull of militarism.
The militarization concept assumes that the boundary between war and police powers is a common sense fact of life in liberal societies, in which the police should manage disputes and enforce laws without favour and with minimum resort to force. But even a cursory acquaintance with older police sociology indicates that the police are principally involved in domestic operations to uphold the dominant social order. For , the police emerged as an elite response to the threat posed by the dangerous classes of poor to property – ‘a sophisticated and convenient form of garrison force against an internal enemy’. The role of police goes beyond suppression of internal threats and entails a wide variety of activities, from general administration to pursuing their own interests (). It was crucial for early police institutions to legitimate themselves, whether through identification with the concept of the rule of law, or direct involvement in communities (). But while we can reject a crude, instrumentalist understanding of the police as exclusively concerned with class repression, the point remains that these spectrum of activities, from daily patrolling to intelligence gathering, should not be assumed to be in the ‘ defence of a universal consensus of the public good’ (: 259). Rather, these functions all work to uphold state order and to administer daily life under capitalism.
Along with the underlying assumption that the police uphold a universal public good, the concept of police militarization makes the a priori assumption that foreign warfare does not, or at least should not, have any bearing on the ‘everyday’ functions of the police. Many liberal thinkers have viewed warfare as both the last resort of state power and as antithetical to capitalism because it interrupts production and consumption (: 264). In fact, ‘the notion of militarism is itself capitalist. It emerges with the distinction between warriors and entrepreneurs in place of the feudal lord’ (). But this distaste for war is ambivalent as liberals accept the war may also be necessary to prevent interruptions to the market and to extend ‘civilization’. Liberals therefore accept war as a historical necessity in establishing the reach of the market and the nation state; but once order has been established, military power is to be withdrawn and replaced with administrative forms of internal pacification (). To frame it another way, once the green uniforms have subdued the territory, the blue uniforms manage it.
Liberal thought maintains that there is sharp and clear distinction between the green and blue, and it is this distinction between war and police that needs to be refused. That is, the creation of the distinction itself is what does the political work of liberal ideology in obfuscating the fact that the police mandate has always been a mandate of social war. This distinction effectively amounts to a conceptual removal of war from the framing of social order and internal politics, ultimately reifying the ‘war’ and ‘peace’ distinction by misrecognizing ‘peace’ as itself a ‘war’ for capitalist social order The remainder of this article will contest this on two fronts. First, the idea of a classic distinction between the police and military simply does not hold up under historical scrutiny. Second, this distinction is indicative of liberalisms broader inability to depict how war is imbricated within all aspects of capitalist society, and especially in policing. This entails a rethinking of police as a project of pacification.