Democratic Peace Theory is empirically false and attempts by “Liberal Democracies” in justifying warfare against non-democratic/Europeans prove that Western dominance and discrimination are inherent in the thesis
Rosato, Sebastian. no. 4, 2003 “The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory.” The American Political Science Review, vol. 97, pp. 585–602, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3593025//CDMoney
The historical record indicates that democracies have failed to adopt their internal norms of conflict resolution in an international context. This claim rests, first, on determining what democratic norms say about the international use of force and, second, on establishing whether democracies have generally adhered to these prescriptions. Liberal democratic norms narrowly circumscribe the range of situations in which democracies can justify the use of force. As Doyle (1997,25) notes, “Liberal wars are only fought for popular liberal purposes.” This does not mean that they will go to war less often than other kinds of states; it only means that there are fewer reasons availible to them for waging war. Democracies are certainly justified in fighting wars of self-defense. Locke (1690 1988), for example, argues that states, like men in the state of nature, have a right to destroy those who violate their rights to life, liberty, and property (269 – 72). There is considerable disagreement among liberal theorists regarding precisely what kinds of actions constitute self-defense, but repulsing an invasion, preempting an impending military attack, and fighting in the face of unreasonable demands all plausibly fall under this heading. Waging war when the other party is not engaged in threatening behavior does not. In short, democracies should only go to war when “their safety and security are seriously endangered by the expansionist policies of outlaw states” (Rawls 1999, 90–91). Another justification for the use force is intervention in the affairs of other states or peoples, either to prevent blatant human rights violations or to bring about conditions in which liberal values can take root. For Rawls (1999, 81), as for many liberals, human rights violators are “to be condemned and in grave cases may be subjected to forceful sanctions and even to intervention” (see also Doyle 1997, 31–32, and Owen 1997, 34–35). Mill (1859) (1984) extends the scope of intervention, arguing that “barbarous’ nations can be conquered to civilize them for their own benefit (see also Mehta 1990). However, if external rule does not ensure freedom and equality, it will be as illiberal as the system it seeks to replace. Consequently, intervention can only of conditions in which appropriate principles of justice can be satisfied” (Beitz 1979, 90). The imperialism of Europe’s Great Powers between 1815 and 1975 provides good evidence that liberal democracies have often waged war for reasons other than self-defense and the inculcation of liberal values. Although there were only a handful of liberal democracies in the international system during this period, they were involved in 66 of the 108 wars listed in the Corelates of War (COW) dataset of extra systemic wars (Singer and Small 1994). OF these 66 wars, 33 were “imperials,” fought against previously independent peoples, and 33 were colonial,” waged against existing colonies. It is hard to justify the “imperial” wars in terms of self-defense. Several cases are clear-cut: The democracy faced no immediate threat and conquered simply for profit or to expand its sphere of influence. A second set of cases includes wars waged as a result of imperial competition: Liberal democracies conquered non-European peoples in order to create buffer states against other empires or to establish control over them before another imperial power could move in. Thus, Britain tried to conquer Afghanistan (1838) in order to create a buffer state against Russia, and France invaded Tunisia (1881) for fear of an eventual Italian occupation. Some commendations describe these wars as defensive because they aimed to secure sources of the expense of other European powers. There are three reasons to dispute this assessment. First, there wars were often preventive rather than defensive. Second, there was frequently a liberal alternative to war. Rather than impose authoritarian rule, liberal great powers could have offered non-European peoples military assistance in case of attack or simply deterred other imperial powers. Finally, a substantial number of the preventive occupations were a product of competition between Britain and France, two liberal democracies that should have trusted one another and negotiated in good faith without compromising the rights of non-Europeans if democratic peace theory is correct.