Militarism institutes warfare as a state of being - "deterrence" is a myth that implies war is temporary, denying our existence in a constant state of war
Gelot and Sandor, 19 (Linnea Gelot and Adam Sandor, 12-5-2019, accessed on 7-17-2022, Conflict, Security & Development, "African Security and Global Militarism", https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/14678802.2019.1688959)
The concept’s intuitive nature, however, obscures two important features of threat governance in contemporary African politics. First, as pointed out by Frowd and Sandor, while militarisation aims to capture processes of change in the legitimation and extension of military power, it nevertheless lacks the analytical flexibility necessary to bring into view varied practices and different forms of violence associated with contemporary interventions. For example, it is increasingly the case that interventions operationalised in Africa by leading states, international organisations and NGOs, including those that involve the military, engage in various forms of ‘armed social work’. The pursuit of such practices, however, does not always signal a logic of war preparation and military power, but rather one of pastoral forms of power and selective (in)security. In other words, military actors are not always involved in martial pursuits, but the pursuit of such practices are nearly always defined or informed by logics of security, notably human security. Secondly, if militarisation constitutes the entrenchment of society’s acceptance of military approaches to resolving problems, such that it affects all aspects of our everyday lives, then how do we know when that process is operative from when it is not? Certainly, we live with the complex legacies of past military practices and ideologies, even if today they are not presently operative or immediately coercive. Yet, when researchers use the Internet to research African politics, or communicate at a distance via WhatsApp with African interlocutors, does this constitute the militarisation of our everyday lives since these technologies were originally developed by military institutions? Indeed, if it is so inexorably pervasive, how can we analytically disentangle a civilian-centred society constituted by banal acts such as these from military-centred ones that regularise the constant possibility of the use of martial force? We pose these questions to highlight tensions in the concept of militarisation. Its theorisation in the literature has signified a set of processes that blurs political phenomena and boundaries like the public and private, police and military, and inside and outside. Nevertheless, as a concept it ultimately struggles to escape the rigidities of those distinctions and categories. The Special Issue equally shares the questions (posed as a critique) advanced by Anna Stavrianakis and Maria Stern: ‘if disciplines and practices central to civilian and military life grew up together, is it appropriate to talk of militarisation, as though ostensibly civilian practices were not already enmeshed with military power, itself central to the constitution of social order and the state?’ Militarisation implies some pre-war, peaceful, normal state of affairs when war and its fighters kept to their corners instead of having shaped the arena of politics and the political itself. This is not to say that societal transformations regarding the use of force (e.g. militarisation, demilitarisation and the like) do not occur, or will not occur in the future. Our point is to stress that war, security and society have always been mutually imbricated, and that studying the use of force should always involve giving full recognition of those imbrications. Only by fully recognising this can we capture the diverse forms of political violence operating in and on transnationalised African spaces. There is a danger that some usages of militarisation to explain the governance of threats in/on Africa result in an underestimation of war-like forms of politics because it blithely assumes that war is somehow an historical and social aberration in African settings, or elsewhere. The same danger applies as a result of frequent unquestioning usages of security as a predominant guiding concept. That said, an IPS approach to militarism that takes war and security into account can carve out analytical room for a fluidity in our use of concepts; that is, the possibility exists to pursue careful treatments of these concepts that successfully navigate a middle ground.
Militarism is the root cause of ALL war in the current era
La Prairie, Randy S. Western Michigan University ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 2021. 28843783.
Whatever the broader social implications of the invasion of Iraq and American militarism may be, if one only takes the view that committing war crimes with vast and terrible human consequences should be avoided, then understanding the sociological causes of war in the United States may be necessary for preventing such paroxysms of violence in the future. This is especially true if the causes of the invasion of Iraq were systemic and structural, enduring features of our society, the same as at other times when the United States used military force. Indeed, many analysts (e.g. Mann 2003; Dorrien 2004) have insisted or implied that the Iraq War was unique in that the Bush administration’s unilateral assault on Iraq was rooted in a militaristic foreign policy ideology that advocated offensive military aggression and American global domination, whereas American defense policy has traditionally been more multilateral, defensive, and benign. I argue, on the contrary, that the invasion of Iraq sprang from the same impulses of powerful individuals and institutional configurations that have led the United States to war throughout the entire post-World War II period. Preventing illegal or otherwise unnecessary wars in the future, then, requires at the very least a correct understanding of the patterns of social behavior and institutions that cause them. That is, it requires having the right theoretical explanation at hand to inform public policy and activism. Strengths and Weaknesses of the Research Design: Because understanding patterns of behavior and institutional effects implies a study of multiple cases, one significant weakness of this inquiry is the singular focus on the case of the Iraq War. This study must be supplemented by studies of American involvement in other conflicts to prove the validity of the theory across all or most cases. The aim of this study is only to demonstrate the relative superiority of the elite model of war mobilization relative to the alternatives offered by sociologists. To the extent that this is achieved, this study will at least strongly suggest needed public policy changes and avenues for future research and teaching.