Deterrence theory already considers possibilities of failure but still gives the logical conclusion that the aff is most likely to succeed – critique of the theory only provides examples of instances where the theory failed, but fails to take down the logics of the theory – it’s a hasty generalization
Achen and Snidal 89 (Christopher H. and Duncan, professor of politics at Princeton University, professor of international relations at Oxford University, “Rational Deterrence Theory and Comparative Case Studies,” 1989, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/world-politics/article/abs/rational-deterrence-theory-and-comparative-case-studies/05B3C8641D5EF6F9A36067EEA0210CCE#:~:text=Several%20recent%20books%20have%20argued%20that%20comparative%20case,This%20paper%20shows%20that%20such%20contentions%20are%20unwarranted.)
Conversely, if a deterrable initiator believes that it would very likely not be in the defender's interest to retaliate, or that the defender lacks the means or the will to do so, the initiator will attack. Thus, under conventional rational-choice assumptions, when the attacker is deterrable, successful deterrence turns on the defender's credibility. If the latter can convince the attacker that he has the political and military ability to fight, and that the prize (or his reputation for fighting when challenged) is worth more to him than the cost of the war, then, and only then, will a deterrable initiator be deterred.24 This simple model is less brittle than sometimes thought. Its propositions are contingent: if the expected punishment exceeds the gain, then opponents will be deterred. Thus, for example, the model implies that some conceivable punishment would deter, but not that any particular one will, nor even any feasible one. Put more strongly, the model implies that deterrence will fail for sufficiently determined attackers. Not all conceivable opponents are deterrable.25 Critics of rational deterrence sometimes write as if failures of deterrence were equivalent to failures of deterrence theory. Levy, for example, notes, "this is an ad hoc hypothesis which cannot technically be derived from any formal theory of deterrence."26 The truth is that the theory actually predicts some breakdowns. When deterrence fails because the retaliatory threat is absent, incredible, or less valuable than the prize, the theory has forecast perfectly. Rational deterrence theory implies that deterrence will not always be successful. Rational deterrence is very much an ideal-type explanation. No sensible person pretends that it summarizes typical deterrence decision making well, or that it exhausts what is to be said about any one historical case. Yet it has dominated discussion in all traditions of deterrence research, including historical investigations. For example, George and Smoke criticize rational deterrence for its assumption that a government is a rational actor and can be treated as if it were a single person.2 ? Yet the same authors summarize their case-study evidence as follows: In almost every historical case examined, we found evidence that the initi- ator tried to satisfy himself before acting that the risks of the particular op- tion he chose could be calculated and, perhaps more importantly, con- trolled by him so as to give his choice of action the character of a rationally calculated, acceptable risk.28 The rational unitary-actor model is not easily evaded. The power of rational deterrence theory is conceptual, not mathematical. It derives from the underlying logical cohesion and consistency with a set of simple first principles, not from the particular language in which it is expressed. In consequence, the model has been astonishingly fecund; both for theory and for policy. Its surprising implications, now familiar from the literature, include "the rationality of irrationality," the dangers of total disarmament, and the value of aiming for strategic equivalence between the superpowers.29 Perhaps most importantly, it was rational deterrence theory that sensitized policy makers to the negative aspect of defensive systems such as civil defense, the ABM, and SDI, which make first strikes less dangerous. The point is strongly counterintuitive; indeed, Aleksey Kosygin told Lyndon Johnson at Glassboro that he didn't understand it.30 But this surprising conclusion is a clear implication of rational deterrence theory. Contrary to George and Smoke's view, rational deterrence theory has proved itself in practical policy applications. No other theoretical perspective has had nearly the impact on American foreign policy, certainly not the conclusions of the case-study literature. Far from being an abstract, deductivistic theory developed in a policy vacuum, rational deterrence theory has repeatedly taken inspiration from the most pressing policy questions of the day, from decisions of bomber-basing in the 1950s to SDI in the 1980s. It has set the terms of the debate, and has often influenced the outcome. One may choose to applaud or decry its impact, but one cannot deny that the theory of rational deterrence, like any good theory, has been of immense practical importance.