War is caused by leadership succession, democracy necessary to curtail
Chares Lipson, 2013. Leadership Succession as a Cause of War: The Structural Advantage of Democracies. Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 112–38, doi:10.1515/9781400850723.112.
The last chapter dealt with all four sources of the democratic contracting advantage: transparency, audience costs, constitutionalism, and continuity of regimes. This chapter continues the examination of regime continuity, focusing on leadership succession. Succession crises are a frequent source of wars. Democracies are systematically better at averting them and, hence, at averting the wars that stem from them. Because democracies have solved the succession problem internally, they avoid its most dangerous consequences externally. My main point, however, is not simply that succession crises produce wars. They obviously do. My aim is to show how they block the path to peace, mainly by creating vast uncertainties and obstructing long-term bargains that could prevent war.