Perfect deterrence theory is accurate and robust.
Quackenbush 10. Stephen L. Quackenbush is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Missouri. He received his PhD in 2003 from the University at Buffalo, SUNY. Stephen L. Quackenbush (2010) General Deterrence and International Conflict: Testing Perfect Deterrence Theory, International Interactions, 36:1, 60-85, DOI: 10.1080/03050620903554069
The specific purpose is to fill this evidentiary gap by subjecting perfect deterrence theory—a recently developed theory of general deterrence—to a systematic test. I do so for several reasons. First, perfect deterrence theory (Zagare and Kilgour 2000) is supported by a formal logic with explicit theoretical expectations that facilitates empirical testing. Second, several preliminary tests of perfect deterrence theory have rendered promising, albeit provisional results (Senese and Quackenbush 2003; Quackenbush and Zagare 2006).1 And finally, as Huth (1999) points out, standard formulations of deterrence—to the extent that they have been explored empirically—are without compelling support. Perfect deterrence theory is an axiomatically distinct theoretical alternative to classical deterrence theory, which focuses on ideas such as brinkmanship and mutual assured destruction. Perfect deterrence theory highlights the importance of two variables: capability and credibility. A state’s threat is capable if the threatened party believes that it would be worse off if the threat were carried out than if it were not. For example, if Defender has a capable threat, then Challenger prefers Status Quo to Conflict. One additional equilibrium—Steadfast Deterrence Equilibrium—exists. As with the Certain Deterrence Equilibrium, Status Quo is the only possible outcome. However, this equilibrium exists at intermediate and high values of Defender credibility, and thus coexists with equilibria of other types. Therefore, through the Steadfast Deterrence Equilibrium, perfect deterrence theory predicts that the Status Quo is always possible as long as Defender’s threat is capable. Thus, Zagare and Kilgour’s (2000:149) claim that successful “deterrence could conceivably emerge under (almost) any conditions in a one-sided deterrence relationship.” hese independent variables constitute the equilibrium outcome predictions of perfect deterrence theory. However, a number of alternative explanations of international behavior exist. Therefore, several control variables, representing the major foci of recent conflict studies, are used to test the robustness of the results obtained. Some of these variables (particularly relative power and S score) are components of the utility functions that form the basis of the equilibrium predictions to be tested. However, it is possible that these variables exert an independent influence on deterrence outcomes in addition to their influence on equilibrium predictions. Furthermore, since these individual components are combined in a different, nonlinear fashion within the unilateral deterrence game to generate equilibrium predictions, multicollinearity between the equilibrium predictions and the control variables is not present.16 To examine the robustness of these results against alternative explanations, the full multinomial logit model was run including the control variables. The full model, shown in Table 3, produces a highly significant fit to the data. The results of the full model indicate that the predictions of perfect deterrence theory are quite robust. Therefore, perfect deterrence theory’s predictions of Status Quo, Defender Concedes, Challenger Defeated, and Conflict are all strongly supported by the empirical record, and these predictions are robust against alternative explanations. Thus, perfect deterrence theory provides a proportional reduction in the error of non-status quo predictions of 20 percent. Although improvement is always possible, these results nonetheless support perfect deterrence theory.