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Demilitarization decks deterrence theory, which guarantees escalation

Mazarr 20 (Michael Mazarr, Senior Political Scientist and Researcher at RAND Corporation, 12-3-2020, accessed on 7-20-2022, NL ARMS Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies 2020: Deterrence in the 21st Century—Insights from Theory and Practice, "Three Fundamental Conditions for Successful Deterrence", )

Much of classic deterrence theory can be boiled down to a simple proposition: The potential aggressor must believe that the defender has the capability and will to do what it threatens.36 This criterion is, again, perceptual: The question is not whether the defender actually has such capabilities or will, it is whether the aggressor believes that it does. Deterrence depends on the perception of the “threatener’s determination to fulfil the threat if need be”—and, more importantly, on the potential aggressor’s “conviction that the threat will be carried out”. 37 Deterrence fails, Bruce Russett concludes, “when the attacker decides that the defender’s threat is not likely to be fulfilled.” 38 This axiom highlights two distinct factors—capability and will. Perceived weakness in either can undermine deterrence. Capability is straightforward enough. As suggested earlier, the immediate, local balance of forces is not always a key determinant of deterrence success—but a defender’s broadly perceived suite of capabilities, military and otherwise, must be strong enough to convince a potential attacker that it is likely to pay a heavy price for aggression. Will is a much more abstract variable and easily subject to misperception. Aggressors have repeatedly convinced themselves that a defender did not have the will to respond, especially in cases of extended deterrence. Will is partly a function of the national interests involved: If a defender is seen to have vital interests at stake, a potential attacker will believe threats of response. Aggressors can try to undermine a defender’s willingness to respond by using “salami slicing” approaches—using a long series of low-level aggressions to change the facts on the ground without ever taking action that would justify a major response. Such strategies are designed to put the defender in a dilemma: It cannot respond to every small violation, but if it does not begin to punish minor transgressions, its strategic position will erode over time. The United States confronts this challenge with Chinese and Russian grey-zone campaigns today.

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