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UQ - American hegemony is low—aftereffects of the Bush and Trump administrations

Alfredo Toro Hardy 22 Alfredo Toro Hardy is a Venezuelan retired diplomat, scholar, and public intellectual. He has a Ph.D. from the Geneva School of Diplomacy and International Relations; master’s degrees from the University of Pennsylvania and the Central University of Venezuela and a postgraduate degree from the Ecole Nationale d’Ádministration, ENA. He has attestations for special courses from the University of Paris II and Harvard University and a Bachelor of Law degree from the Central University of Venezuela. “America’s Two Cold Wars,” 3/21/2022, Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd., https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-981-16-9503-2 P 77-78

The obvious questions to be asked are these: What has happened between the 1990s, when the power of the United States reached its apex, and now? How did America’s gigantic leverage upon a substantial part of the world weaken to the point of losing true relevance? Two names can provide the answers to these questions: George W. Bush and Donald Trump. In 2001, George W. Bush’s team came into government carrying an awkward notion about America’s might. Instead of understanding that the hegemonic system in place served their country’s interests exceedingly well, they felt that the system had to be rearranged in order to recognize the United States’ new position as sole superpower and its unmistakable primacy. As a result, they began to turn upside down a complex structure that had taken decades to build, precisely when America’s standing within it had reached its pinnacle. 78 A. T. HARDY In doing so they did not understand, as T.V. Paul asserts, that legitimacy lowers the cost of exerting power and that for a hegemonic power legitimacy results fundamental for the maintaining of supremacy. The United States had attained a stage where its supremacy was accepted by the international community as both benign and legitimate, which had required interweaving the exercise of its power with international institutions and legal instruments. However, proclaiming the futility of cooperative multilateralism, which from their perspective just constrained the freedom of action of America’s power, the Bush administration asserted the prerogatives of their country’s primacy. Moreover, the United States’ national interest had to take precedence to international law, as was made clear by President Bush before the 2003 invasion of Iraq. During that time, he repeatedly emphasized that even if such invasion violated international law, his country would do whatever was necessary to ensure its security (Paul, 2018, Chapter 2). Unconcerned by international norms or by the United Nations’ rules, America became a free rider within the international system. Among many examples, the following are particularly telling: It refused to adhere to the Kyoto Protocol, as that would have imposed restraints upon its sovereignty, notwithstanding that with just 4 percent of the world’s population the country was responsible for 25 percent of the global pollution footprint; it refused to submit to the International Court of Justice, while pressuring other countries to follow suit, as its soldiers were being accused of human rights violations in Afghanistan and Iraq; it refused to pay its quotas to the United Nations and to other multilateral organizations that did not bow to Washington’s views (Prestowitz, 2003). The Bush administration’s world became one that searched for unconditional followers and not for allies’ worthy of respect; one of ad hoc coalitions and “with us or against us” propositions where multilateral institutions and norms had little meaning; one of punishment to dissidence and not of encouragement to cooperation; and one where preventive action prevailed over international law. Well-known neoconservatives such as Charles Krauthammer, Robert Kagan, and John Bolton, proclaimed America’s supremacy and derided countries not willing to follow its unilateralism. Krauthammer labelled those nations an axis of petulance, whose main problem was their irrelevance. Kagan, referring to Europe’s insistence in adhering to international norms, talked about that continent’s weakness and about its incapability to understand that raw power was the ultimate enforcer of national security. Bolton asserted that if the United Nations’ Security Council wanted to reflect the real correlation of power in the world, it should only have one member: The United States (Kagan, 2003, p. 37; Krauthammer, 2002; Toro Hardy, 2006 [1, p. 139]).

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