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China overtaking US hegemony will be peaceful - China uses economic measures rather than war to achieve hegemony

Bader 21 – [Julia, Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Amsterdam with a MA in Politics and Management from Konstanz University and a PhD in Political Science from Heidelberg University, 7/21/21, “Undermining American Hegemony”, Cambridge University Press, https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/abs/undermining-american-hegemony/china-and-the-asian-infrastructure-investment-bank-undermining-hegemony-through-goods-substitution/5D854284BD4A85BF0E465BECAD8DC42A]

When Britain’s Chancellor of the Exchequer, George Osborne, unexpectedly announced the UK’s intention to join the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in mid-March 2015, an unnerved US official could not hold back his concern ‘about a trend [in the UK] toward constant accommodation of China’ (Reference Watt, Lewis and BraniganWatt et al. 2015). This rare instance of rebuking a close partner in public, however, did not prevent other US allies from following the British example: in a domino-like manner other European states, Australia and South Korea followed suit. By March 2015, fifty-seven countries, including non-Asian and G7 states, had applied for membership of the AIIB (AIIB 2020). Since then, membership has grown to 102 members. China is increasingly ready and able to openly challenge the hegemonic position of the United States in international relations. Indeed, the academic debate about the rise of China in international relations has long shifted from discussing whether China will affect the existing international order to debating about how it will do so. That is, the early literature investigating the nature of China’s rise in terms of a status quo or revisionist orientation towards the existing international order (Reference JohnstonJohnston 2003; Reference LegroLegro 2007; Reference ChanChan 2008; Reference BuzanBuzan 2010; Reference Schweller and PuSchweller and Pu 2011; Reference Kastner and SaundersKastner and Saunders 2012; Reference Wuthnow, Xin and LinglingWuthnow, et al. 2012) is being complemented by examinations of how China uses its economic cloud to effectively influence the policy preferences of others in order to protect its own (foreign) policy interests (Reference Flores-Macías and KrepsFlores-Macías and Kreps 2013; Reference Fuchs and KlannFuchs and Klann 2013; Reference KastnerKastner 2014; Reference StrüverStrüver 2017; Reference BaderBader 2019). Yet, the role that China has started to take on in the new millennium goes much further than employing economic statecraft in its bilateral relations (Reference Medeiros and FravelMedeiros and Fravel 2003; Reference EconomyEconomy 2010). China now sees the UN ‘as one of the key venues in which to demonstrate its responsible Great Power status and its willingness to provide global public goods’ so as to gain legitimacy at home and abroad (Reference FootFoot 2014:1088).Footnote1 Outside of the UN, Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative signals the readiness for leadership of the kind that ‘America has not shown since the post-war days of the Marshall Plan’ (The Economist 2017). More generally, experts have noted a trend in China’s foreign policy towards ‘re-engineering’ – or ‘shadow diplomacy’ as some have called it – which involves the construction of new, supplementary international platforms and institutions (Reference Heilmann, Rudolf, Huotari and BuckowHeilmann et al. 2014; Reference WesleyWesley 2015). The AIIB is a prime example thereof. To make sense of China’s recent power-political manoeuvres, this chapter builds on the concept of goods substitution and on the categorisation of orientation towards the international system as introduced in the earlier chapters of this book. While I am not intending to reduce the establishment of the AIIB to power-political considerations, I argue that the AIIB was initiated as a counter-hegemonic attempt targeted at the architecture of international finance and at US dominance therein. The initiative’s effects in terms of deconcentrating power were only limited. But, while largely conforming to the norms and standards of existing international financial institutions (IFIs) and development banks, China was successful in making all founding members subscribe to the principles of non-conditionality and non-interference, which largely deviate from current practices in development finance. The AIIB serves well as an illustrative case of goods substitution. It was seen primarily as a power-political maneuver by policy-makers in the United States who feared that the AIIB would undermine governance conditionality – and hence political influence in lending countries – in the short-term, and hollow out US supremacy in global finance in the long run (Reference Callaghan and HubbardCallaghan and Hubbard 2016). Hence, US opposition and its attempts to prevent others from joining the Chinese initiative. In addition, the case of the AIIB sheds light on the demand-side dynamics of goods substitution and illustrates how opportunistic hedging and uncoordinated herding by third states may inadvertently undermine the existing order. The chapter starts by placing the AIIB initiative in the context of the existing international arrangements which the AIIB sought to substitute. Then, I develop the argument that the AIIB – initially thought of as a revisionist counter-hegemonic initiative – transformed into an integrated part of the existing international financial architecture due to the engagement of Western third states. I conclude by arguing that goods substitution as an analytical lens may advance the study of international relations by placing the mechanisms of power politics at the centre of inquiry, being less obsessed with traditional security concerns and, most importantly, attributing more agency to non-hegemonic actors.

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