Free beta access. 50 free AI tokens each week. Optional top-ups available. See what is included
Opening Word document…

Allied support and China’s weaknesses keep the U.S on top

Singh 22[Bhubhindar, 18 May, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore, https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/09512748.2022.2075441,BK]

There are two other factors that support the preservation of US hegemony in the coming decades, but have received little attention in the unipolarity literature. First, the durability of the US hegemony is secured by an expanded support from its regional allies in the post-2010 period. Though the American hegemony is expected to remain strong, its authority, as argued by Ikenberry (), has experienced relative weakening due to China’s growing political, military and economic power and impact on regional affairs. The ‘renegotiated’ outcome, as argued here, will not see a decline in American hegemony, as the US allies have boosted efforts to preserve American hegemony in the region. Though these states are unable to influence the outcome of the regional balance of power, US allies, nevertheless, are stakeholders who shape the regional dynamics in critical ways. The regional states, especially US allies, have pursued more activist foreign policy strategies in support of the strong American military presence in the region and maintain a resilient US hegemony (see Singh et al., , pp. 29–31). For instance, the emergence of the ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ (FOIP) promoted by Japan is a way to keep the US engaged in the region and counter Chinese attempts at regional dominance (MOFA & Japan, ). FOIP is aligned with the liberal internationalism’s organizing principles that include the promotion of economic interdependence, strengthened institutionalism and a rules-based order. Moreover, when the US withdrew from the TPP in 2017, Japan took the lead to garner support from the remaining 11 countries that led to the eventual signing of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). Second, the durability of the US-led regional order is also a result of the weaknesses related to China’s attempts to install its own alternative order (see Kai He’s paper in this special issue). China has faced resistance in its order-building attempts beyond the economic realm – externally from America’s overwhelming power and its regional allies, and internally from its own domestic challenges, such as maintaining sustainable and equitable growth across the country, aging population, environmental issues and others. As opposed to the US during the early postwar period, China does not have sufficient strategic resources and goodwill to support its order-building efforts beyond the economic domain. Any ambitious attempt to pursue order-building in political and strategic domains has been viewed in suspicious terms and countered by Northeast Asian states. A good example is how Japan countered China’s attempt to impose a narrow conception of ‘East Asia’ (made up of ASEAN, China, Japan and South Korea) on the East Asian multilateral process. With support from selected ASEAN states, Japan pushed for the incorporation of other dialogue partners, such as Australia, New Zealand and India as core members of the East Asian community and the ASEAN-led multilateral order (Terada, 2010). Suspicions from the regional states in response to Beijing’s increasingly hard-line foreign policy strategy (as seen in its tough diplomatic approach towards Hong Kong and Taiwan, its assertive policy towards its territorial disputes with Japan and several Southeast Asian states, as well as its economic coercive policies towards Australia and South Korea) have further hardened, (see Choe, 2021; The Economist, 2022).

Sign in to recut, update, or save this card.