Criticisms of US hegemony are inherent to any hegemonic country, not specifically about US heg
Nau 9 – [Henry, Professor of Political Science and IR at George Washington University, “Is American Hegemony Bad or Just Better than Alternatives?”, March 2009, JSTOR, https://www.jstor.org/stable/25482053?saml_data=eyJzYW1sVG9rZW4iOiI0ZTc2ZGVlOC0zMmRjLTRkZTktOWYyMC1hZTNhODcyZDkwZTIiLCJlbWFpbCI6InVtMTk0NTU5QHVtaWNoLmVkdSIsImluc3RpdHV0aW9uSWRzIjpbImJhYzI1OTdlLTI3YzMtNGIyNy04YzJhLTE3NDlkOWUyYjI1NSIsIjM2MjdjZWE2LTM1YmItNDJkNS04M2ZmLTY4ZmY5ZDc4NDhiZCJdfQ#metadata_info_tab_contents]
What is curious about this volume, like so many on globalization, are the questions it does not address. There is no serious discussion, for example, of the security requirements of globalization. If the United States did not police globalization today, who would? It is true that hegemony is not the only peaceful configuration of power in history. The European Union, a community of relatively equal powers, is a current example. But Germany and France did not cooperate after World War II to end centuries of internecine European conflict without the presence of the US security umbrella. To expect China and Japan to cooperate in the absence of a continuing US security role in Asia assumes a lot and requires at least some careful exploration. In addition, except for the contribution by Bajpai and Sahni, the volume is silent on the debate going on inside other countries about how those countries would run the world if the United States were weaker. The focus is entirely on US dominion which is strongly criticized. But why is there the implicit expectation that European, Chinese, Japanese, Brazilian or Indian foreign policy, which according to the volume should benefit from the new "bargaining chips" provided by globalization, would do much better? It's natural for non-Americans to be more optimistic about their contributions to global peace and prosperity, just as Americans may be about their contributions. But non-Americans have to make the case, just as they find fault with the case made by Americans. If American leadership has been so deficient, how did the Cold War end without a hot war and how has the world enjoyed unprecedented prosperity since the Cold War ended? The volume seems completely oblivious to the fact that this latest "outburst" of capitalism has raised the standard of living of more people living under the poverty line than ever before. China and India, with most of the world's poorest population, are growing three and four times faster than Europe, Japan and America, and have been for 20 years or more. Would this have happened under Soviet (if Moscow had won the Cold War), European, Chinese, Indian or Japanese hegemony or consortium? Would these countries have championed freer trade policies for East Asian and now Chinese, Indian and Latin American exporters, or sympathized with the promotion of human rights in places such as Sudan and Zimbabwe, where Russian and Chinese policies currently block international efforts to stop humanitarian atrocities? The criticism of America is not the problem. A dominant power is fair game. But the criticism also ironically takes for granted the benefits of American hegemony, the open markets and global security provided by US foreign policy, the flexibility of America's middle classes, which have transitioned to better jobs in America so that more jobs could be created in poorer countries, and the light footprint of American imperialism that since 1945 has nurtured not colonies but democratic self-governments in Europe, Asia and elsewhere. Admittedly, America's soft power is under a cloud, but the relevant question is, compared to what. Some, if not much, of the opposition to America has little to do with America. It has to do with authoritarian ideologies in other countries, particularly in Asia and the Middle East, that prefer elitist over middle-class economies and nationalist over liberal political ideologies.