China will not achieve regional hegemony—lack of political allies in the Indo-Pacific region
Roy 20 – Denny; Ph.D. in political science, University of Chicago, 1991) writes mainly on Northeast Asian international security issues; “China won’t achieve regional hegemony”; 19 Mar 2020, , The Washington Quarterly, 43:1, 101-117, DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2020.1734301
The recent rise of China has been undeniably impressive, prompting many observers to conclude it is destined to achieve hegemony, or the ability to compel the other governments in the region to conform to China’s preferences on political and strategic issues as well as to prevent or roll back any major strategic re-adjustment that China chooses to oppose. Some argue that the United States should accept what appears to be inevitable and get out of China’s way by yielding up America’s own postwar position of strategic preeminence in the Indo-Pacific.1 But attaining major power status, even to the point of rivaling the United States in economic and military influence, does not make China a hegemon or guarantee that China will continue to ascend until it dominates the region. Discussions of an impending Chinese hegemony in the Indo-Pacific are instead based on the relative growth of China’s economic clout and military power. Superficial material capabilities, however, do not tell the whole story. If the United States maintains its present level of commitment to Indo-Pacific leadership, Beijing will be unable to establish a Chinese hegemony over the region, although a burgeoning China will be able to reduce US freedom of action. And even if the United States decided to withdraw from its military bases and alliances, China would probably be unable to comprehensively impose its will on the region through military force. China’s potential to dominate is restrained by a combination of both domestic and international factors. Beijing’s own frequently stated position is that “China will never seek hegemony, expansion or [a] sphere of influence”2—however, this position lacks credibility. China has for decades criticized the United States for its military bases and alliances in the western Pacific as well as for policies that allegedly worsen geopolitical tensions.3 The CCP has defined China’s vital interests—i.e., the issues over which the Chinese would see themselves as defending rather than aggressing—so expansively that fulfilling them all would constitute a Chinese regional hegemony in practical terms. The list includes demands that Taiwan must become a province of the PRC; that the international community recognize China as owner of the Japan-administered Senkaku islands as well as most of the East and South China Seas; that Beijing has the right to veto selected South Korean defense policies (e.g., the THAAD missile defense controversy of 2016–17); that the Japanese government must “not make a fuss about” and cease surveillance of PLA ships or aircraft patrolling the Japanese coastline;4 and that foreign entities must conform to the Beijing-approved interpretation of myriad important political questions involving China. In effect, then, the collection of what Beijing identifies as vital interests equates to a Chinese regional sphere of influence—a buffer zone around its territory within which Beijing would have veto power over the activities of foreigners. It is evident that China does indeed seek the preeminent regional role now held by the United States.5 The question, however, is whether China can feasibly attain these ambitions. What Beijing identifies as vital interests equates to a Chinese regional sphere of influence. The Legacy of Benign Hegemony China will not achieve regional dominance for several reasons. The first is that most of the Indo-Pacific countries will resist, rather than facilitate, a change in regional leadership. Some hegemonies are more popular than others. Historically, a hegemon establishes a regional order—arrangements, rules, and norms of international relations—that suits its own interests.6 The willingness of the dominant power to accommodate the preferences of other states in the region can vary. The United States has been a relatively benevolent hegemon. On two occasions when member states tried to extricate themselves from the Soviet order in Eastern Europe, for example—Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968—Moscow intervened to quash these movements with military force. By contrast, the US military withdrew from two valuable bases in the Philippines in 1992 when the Philippine government refused to extend their leases. Support among regional middle and smaller powers for American preeminence is relatively high because many of these states see their economic and security interests well-served by the US-sponsored order’s openness and liberal values.7 Conversely, many regional countries have historically-based fears of Chinese domination.8 Vietnam, for example, has suffered a total of nearly a thousand years of Chinese occupation and cultural imperialism during its history. Recent actions such as China’s claim to own nearly the entire South China Sea in contravention of the UN Law of the Sea Treaty (which Beijing itself has signed) revive regional fears of recrudescent Chinese imperialism. China’s position as the main trading partner for regional states seemingly offers Beijing the prospect of gaining hegemony on the cheap—by leveraging the economic dependence of its neighbors, Beijing could get other governments to accept Chinese leadership on regional political and strategic issues and even to cede some of their autonomy to China. In recent years, Beijing has successfully used its economic weight to wrest concessions with political implications from large corporations and universities in many countries, including the United States.9 In Cambodia, Laos, and the Philippines under the Duterte administration, PRC economic power appears to have induced policies supporting Beijing’s regional agenda.10 As much as Beijing would wish otherwise, however, China’s economic influence over Indo-Pacific states generally does not equate to a corresponding amount of political influence, nor does it automatically result in states siding with the PRC. Although China is the top trade partner for Australia and South Korea and is the top supplier of imports into Japan, all three countries remain US treaty allies that host US military forces. Australian Defense Minister Linda Reynolds recently expressed a commitment to work more closely with “nations that share our values” against “countries prepared to flout the rules-based order.”11 China is also the largest trading partner of Indonesia and Singapore. After years of trying to stay out of the South China Sea territorial dispute, Jakarta’s policy has recently taken a hard turn against China’s position: renaming a portion of China’s claim the North Natuna Sea, destroying trespassing Chinese fishing boats, and beefing up Indonesian military forces based on Great Natuna Island. While China often criticizes the US military presence in the region, Singapore is so supportive that it built a pier at its Changi Naval Base to accommodate visiting US aircraft carriers. Recently, the Indo-Pacific region has seen a backlash against perceived Chinese attempts to exploit business and trade relationships for political purposes. Canberra sided with Washington to bar Chinese corporation Huawei from providing undersea internet cables for Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands. Upon his return to power in 2018, Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad reviewed his country’s economic relationship with China, warning of “new colonialism” that “has the effect of diminishing the freedom of action of other countries.”12