The alternatives are worse--They offer optimistic Asian perspectives on American hegemony, but a strong US is key to economic integration, preventing obstructive authoritarian ideologies, and international cooperation.
Nau 09 Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, George Washington University, “Review: Is American Hegemony Bad or Just Better than Alternatives?”, March 2009, International Studies Review , Mar., 2009, Vol. 11, No. 1 (Mar., 2009), pp. 184-186
This collection of essays covers familiar ground but still offers value as a largely Asian perspective on hegemony and globalization. Fourteen of the 18 contributors are from Asia, nine from India alone. In an introduction by Chandra Chari, the volume rejects the notion, popular among Western realists, that American hegemony is necessary to avoid anarchy and expects "the processes of globalization, which have economically empowered a large number of countries across the globe," to provide new "bargaining chips" to strengthen multilateralism. Opening chapters address global perspectives. Eric Hobsbawn, the eminent British scholar, leads off with a blistering attack against the "political crazies" (p. 23) in the United States who after 9/11 abandoned the "emollient cream" (p. 22) of American Cold War policies and sought global hegemony through military might. If these crazies prevail, he predicts "another century of conflict" (p. 20). Akira Iriye and Joseph Nye, two equally eminent Harvard scholars, celebrate the "momentum toward transnationalism" (p. 33) ignited by globalization and expect that growing diversity especially on the economic and information chess boards of world affairs will check American military pretensions. William Wallace at the University of Saint Andrews worries that the world may be approaching "a nuclear tipping point beyond which a 'cascade of proliferation' could occur as states assume that the international nuclear order can no longer provide them with sufficient protection" (p. 56). Prem Shankar Jha, an Indian journalist, argues that "capitalism has burst its 'container'" for the fifth time in history, spawning each time widespread social disorder, while T.C.A. Srinivasa-Raghavan, an Indian business editor, sees a gathering storm of resource competition and inflation that "is very similar to what the world saw in the three decades prior to the First World War" (p. 82). Paul M. Evans, a Canadian scholar, sees some hope in the new focus on human security but then acknowledges that Asian countries in particular fear that "human security represents a Western agenda, centring (sic) on such liberal values and approaches as human rights and humanitarian intervention, and giving too little weight to economic and development priorities" (p. 84). Kanti Bajpai and Varun Sahni, Indian academics, close out the first part of the volume with a chapter that might have usefully served as the introduction, using three meanings of hegemony--ideological, liberal (institutional) and realist--to explore India's thinking and responses toward globalization. The second half of the book offers regional assessments of American hegemony and potential alternatives. Chandrashekhar Dasgupta, a distinguished Indian diplomat, looks at the European Union and concludes that "it is unlikely to result in a degree of unity that might pose a threat to American primacy" (p. 120). Jorge Chabat, a Mexican analyst, highlights the leftward tilt of Latin American politics but concludes that Brazil and Venezuela, the two countries with hegemonic aspirations to counter the United States, are likely only to "annoy the giant and tie him up in multilateral organizations" (p. 133). Yu Xin tian, a Chinese contributor, optimistically predicts the "peaceful rise" of China "whose only relatively difficult relationship is between China and Japan" (p. 146). Vyjayanti Raghavan, an Indian expert, agrees and concludes that if China and Japan cooperate, Asia can achieve "a form of regional economic integration" as Europe did when France and Germany cooperated (p. 173). Akiko Fukushima, a Japanese analyst, disagrees with the idea of Asian economic integration but envisions a "partnership" that respects rather than shares sovereignty. In remaining chapters, Simon S.C. Tay, a Singaporean scholar, notes rising regionalism centered around ASEAN; N. Ravi, an Indian journalist, sees India and other south Asian countries integrating more with outside regions than with one another; Hamid Ansari, India's vice president in summer 2008, despairs about American policy in the Middle East; and Abdul Lamin, a South African professor, urges Africa to seize opportunities for reform and integration with the global economy. What is curious about this volume, like so many on globalization, are the questions it does not address. There is no serious discussion, for example, of the security requirements of globalization. If the United States did not police globalization today, who would? It is true that hegemony is not the only peaceful configuration of power in history. The European Union, a community of relatively equal powers, is a current example. But Germany and France did not cooperate after World War II to end centuries of internecine European conflict without the presence of the US security umbrella. To expect China and Japan to cooper ate in the absence of a continuing US security role in Asia assumes a lot and requires at least some careful exploration. In addition, except for the contribution by Bajpai and Sahni, the volume is silent on the debate going on inside other countries about how those countries would run the world if the United States were weaker. The focus is entirely on US dominion which is strongly criticized. But why is there the implicit expectation that European, Chinese, Japanese, Brazilian or Indian foreign policy, which according to the volume should benefit from the new "bargaining chips" provided by globalization, would do much better? It's natural for non-Americans to be more optimistic about their contributions to global peace and prosperity, just as Americans may be about their contributions. But non-Americans have to make the case, just as they find fault with the case made by Americans. If American leadership has been so deficient, how did the Cold War end without a hot war and how has the world enjoyed unprecedented prosperity since the Cold War ended? The volume seems completely oblivious to the fact that this latest "outburst" of capitalism has raised the standard of living of more people living under the poverty line than ever before. China and India, with most of the world's poorest population, are growing three and four times faster than Europe, Japan and America, and have been for 20 years or more. Would this have happened under Soviet (if Moscow had won the Cold War), European, Chinese, Indian or Japanese hegemony or consortium? Would these countries have championed freer trade policies for East Asian and now Chinese, Indian and Latin American exporters, or sympathized with the promotion of human rights in places such as Sudan and Zimbabwe, where Russian and Chinese policies currently block international efforts to stop humanitarian atrocities? The criticism of America is not the problem. A dominant power is fair game. But the criticism also ironically takes for granted the benefits of American hegemony--the open markets and global security provided by US foreign policy, the flexibility of America's middle classes, which have transitioned to better jobs in America so that more jobs could be created in poorer countries, and the light footprint of American imperialism that since 1945 has nurtured not colonies but democratic self-governments in Europe, Asia and elsewhere. Admittedly, America's soft power is under a cloud, but the relevant question is, compared to what. Some, if not much, of the opposition to America has little to do with America. It has to do with authoritarian ideologies in other countries, particularly in Asia and the Middle East, that prefer elitist over middle-class economies and national ist over liberal political ideologies