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China and Russia use information warfare exploit pandemics and slow foreign response

Bachmann et al 20 – [Sascha-Dominik Dov Bachmann, Doowan Lee, and Andrew Dowse; Sascha-Dominik Dov Bachmann - Canberra Law School; NATO SHAPE; Swedish Defence University (FHS). Doowan Lee - Government of the United States of America - Naval Postgraduate School. Andrew Dowse - Edith Cowan University. “COVID Information Warfare and the Future of Great Power Competition,” The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs Vol.44:2 Summer 2020, 11-16-2020, accessed through SSRN.]

COVID-19 AND GREAT POWER COMPETITION COVID-19 (or coronavirus) has ushered in a new era of heightened competition among major powers. The pandemic’s impact has far exceeded national security and public health. In addition to COVID-19 as a global health emergency, we see increasing weaponization1 of the pandemic by both the Kremlin and the CCP to achieve strategic goals. Unfortunately, our own resilience to oppose such aggressive acts remains under-matched. One of the key components of the CCP’s strategy concerns operations in the information sphere, per the so-called ‘Three Warfares’2 which is discussed later in the article. Below the threshold of armed conflict and taking place in the ‘grey zone’, such information operations manifest as either influence operations and/or ‘strategic preconditioning’3 for any later action, both with and without the use of force.

INFORMATION WARFARE DURING COVID-19 Great Power competition of today is evident in Western relations with both the Kremlin and the CCP. The CCP appears determined to shape the world to a strategic vision where it will safeguard its economic, strategic, and security interests in Asia, the Pacific, Europe, and the Arctic for generations to come.4 Russia—its strategic partner—aims to rebuild Russia as a ‘Great Power’ and player on the international scene with twin foci on Europe and on where opportunities may arise for it to weaken Western influence and interests. It should be noted that both the Kremlin and the CCP are using concepts which we describe as either hybrid warfare and/or grey-zone warfare, examples of which are best provided by contemporary Russian warfare approaches.5 Responding to the use of irregular strategies employed by the CCP and the Kremlin, the U.S. has included the concept of Great Power competition in its national security strategy. Great Power competition entails the distribution of relative gains with no finite terminal objectives. In this context, it is not hard to see how information warfare plays a critical role in shaping how the great powers are competing in key issue areas where major powers use weaponized narratives to sow internal discord and distrust,6 rendering their adversaries unable to focus on external threats. In other words, the information environment has thus become one of the main battle spaces of Great Power competition. The need to approach information warfare from a full-spectrum perspective is more acute than ever. While disinformation mitigation is a critical component of information statecraft, it is only a necessary component, not the sufficient whole. Both revisionist states use digital media platforms and other information warfare capabilities not only to consolidate their authoritarian rule, but also to undermine and disrupt the liberal international order that the United States and its allies have buttressed.7 Drawing on this inspiration, other autocrats are emulating the CCP and the Kremlin to exploit the information environment and undermine the strategic interests of the United States.8 Authoritarian regimes further seem determined to weaponize digital media and information technology from domestic population control mechanisms to foreign policy tools.9 Emulating the Kremlin, the CCP seems poised to weaponize the cyber domain, as well as publicly available information (PAI) as tools of disruption and coercion.10 For example, the CCP has aggressively promoted patently false narratives about the origin of the coronavirus. In addition, it has actively promoted the Party’s public health ‘leadership’ using automated accounts, bots, and trolls, despite numerous frauds and defects noticed in several countries.11 The CCP’s COVID aid to other countries has further been riddled with frauds, to say nothing of its explicit use for propaganda purposes.12 Similarly, the Kremlin is exploiting the pandemic to highlight how the European Union is failing its mandates.13 While this is consistent with the Kremlin’s information operations as we saw in the 2016 election, it has palpably escalated its propaganda efforts during the COVID pandemic by intentionally propping up radical right conversations that promote the dissolution of the EU

Foreign disinformation campaigns decrease vaccination rates. We need to implement the plan now

Wilson and Wiysonge 2020 — [Steven Lloyd Wilson and Charles Wiysonge - politics, Brandeis University, Waltham, Massachusetts, USA and Cochrane South Africa, South African Medical Research Council, Cape Town, South Africa, “Social media and vaccine hesitancy,” BMJ Global Health, 11-17-2020 https://gh.bmj.com/content/5/10/e004206.full, accessed 7-21-2022]

Meaning of the study Foreign disinformation campaigns are robustly associated with declines in mean vaccination rates. The use of social media to organise offline action is highly associated with an increase in public belief in vaccines being unsafe. Both of these findings suggest that combating disinformation and misinformation regarding vaccines online is critical to reversing the growth in vaccine hesitancy around the world. These findings are especially salient in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, given that the vaccines under development will require deployment globally to billions of people in the next year. Policymakers need to begin planning now for ways to work against the patterns found in this study. While public outreach and education about the importance of vaccines will likely be the cornerstone of any COVID-19 vaccine deployment, we argue that the findings in this paper show that such efforts are empirically not sufficient even if clearly necessary. Based on our findings, we argue for an additional two-pronged strategy explicitly targeting foreign disinformation campaigns and the use of social media by anti-vaccination groups. First, governments must mandate that social media companies are responsible for taking down antivaccination content (whether originating from genuine domestic actors or foreign propaganda operations). This is obviously easier said than done and involves both legal and technical hurdles. However, authoritarian states provide an ironic roadmap despite the chilling implications for free speech: they have consistently been successful at pressing technology companies into policing speech on their behalf within their borders. Where there is political will, there is the capacity for removing content damaging public health. Second, foreign disinformation campaigns should be addressed at their source. A preponderance of such campaigns amplifying anti-vaccination content originate from within Russia or via pseudo-state actors informally associated with Russia. The utilisation of information warfare on the internet is a broad issue that has little hope of general resolution. However, given the global nature of the COVID-19 crisis and the fact that pushing anti-vaccination propaganda will tangibly cause civilian deaths around the world—and in Russia—there is a chance that, with sufficient pressure and incentivisation, diplomacy could produce a ceasefire of sorts with regard to this specific genre of disinformation. We urge policymakers to take the time before a COVID-19 vaccine is available for mass distribution as an opportunity for action against social media factors contributing to vaccine hesitancy.

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